American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 53, Number 1, January 2016 EQUANIMITY AND THE MORAL VIRTUE OF OPEN- MINDEDNESS Emily McRae Abstract The author argues for the following as constituents of the moral virtue of open- mindedness: (i) a second- order awareness that is not reducible to frst- order doubt; (ii) strong moral concern for members of the moral community; and (iii) some freedom from reactive habit patterns, particularly with regard to one’s self- narratives, or equanimity. Drawing on Buddhist philosophical accounts of equanimity, the author focuses on the third constituent, equanimity, and argues that it is a central, but often ignored, component of the moral virtue of open-mindedness, and its absence can explain many failures of open- mindedness. Some people are able to revise even their open- minded when many people in her situ- most cherished beliefs in response to chal- ation would fail.2 lenges, and others are not able to, even when An account of open- mindedness as a the stakes are high for failing to do so. Wendy moral virtue should be able to explain what Montgomery, a lifelong Mormon, grew up contributes to failures, as well as successful believing that homosexuality is a sin, for applications, of open- mindedness. An intui- which AIDS is God’s punishment. When tive understanding of the open- minded person she learned, by reading his diary, that her as someone who recognizes her fallibility thirteen- year- old son was gay, she thought: is not suffcient since most of us are able to “Either everything I knew about homosexu- recognize that we are fallible beings yet fail ality is wrong, or my son is not really gay. to apply that knowledge in the appropriate And, he is obviously gay.” She had to then situations. A recent attempt to understand “unlearn everything that [she] had learned” open-mindedness in terms of robust moral before. With considerable effort, she was not concern (Arpaly 2011) is also insuffcient, only able to accept her son’s sexual orienta- since failures of open- mindedness can occur tion, but also became a public advocate for even when robust moral concern is present. LGBTQ Mormons.1 How was Wendy able I argue that the moral virtue of open- to do this? Other parents who have grown mindedness is a character trait that includes up with similar beliefs to Wendy’s, and who at least the following three characteristics: also love their children, are not able to use (i) a second- order awareness that is not re- their child’s experience to challenge their ducible to frst order doubt; (ii) strong moral beliefs. Wendy Montgomery was able to be concern for members of the moral community; ©2016 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois APQ 53_1 text.indd 97 11/11/15 12:23 PM 98 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY and (iii) some freedom from reactive habit 1. Open- Mindedness patterns, particularly with regard to one’s and Second- Order Awareness self- narratives, or equanimity. After a brief One puzzling feature of open- mindedness discussion of the frst two characteristics, I as a (epistemic or moral) virtue is that it is not focus on the third, equanimity, which I argue is obvious how one can be open- minded about a crucial aspect of open-mindedness that is not her beliefs while simultaneously actually explored in Western philosophical accounts of believing them (Adler 2004; Riggs 2010). this virtue. Drawing on Buddhist philosophical How could one confdently hold a belief accounts of equanimity, I argue that equanim- while at the same time genuinely be open to ity is a central component of the moral virtue the possibility that it is wrong? But it would of open- mindedness and its absence can ex- be troubling to think that the open- minded plain many failures of open- mindedness. are those who are lukewarm about their be- I orient my discussion of open- mindedness liefs, since surely it is also important to be in the context of morality, understood broadly open- minded about at least some of those as including respect for self and others, care, beliefs one feels strongly about, including and concern for the welfare of self and others. political, religious, and moral beliefs. The This is not to deny that open- mindedness is mark of a person who has the virtue of open- an epistemic virtue, or even primarily an epis- mindedness, it seems, is her ability to be temic virtue, but rather to highlight the ways open to evidence that some of her cherished that this virtue also arises in moral contexts. beliefs—and not just her less confdently Although I doubt that a strict delineation be- held beliefs—may be mistaken. tween epistemic and moral virtues ultimately As Jonathan Adler (2004) and Wayne Riggs can be made (Driver 2003; Zagzebski 1996), (2010) have argued, this puzzle of open- there are nevertheless contexts in which open- mindedness can be avoided if we understand mindedness can arise that are primarily ethi- open- mindedness as a second- order attitude. cal (such as Wendy Montgomery’s situation) Open- mindedness is (or, at least, includes) an and others that are primarily epistemic (such attitude that one takes about one’s beliefs, as a scientist open-mindedly considering namely that they could be mistaken. It is, as counter- evidence to her hypothesis). For the Riggs puts it, “to be aware of one’s fallibility purposes of this paper, I call virtues that focus as a believer, and to be willing to acknowl- on or arise in the context of the desire for truth edge the possibility that any time one believes “epistemic virtues” and virtues that focus on something, it is possible that it is wrong” or arise in the context of our relationships (Riggs 2010, p. 180). It is not (or, not neces- with others as members of the moral com- sarily) a lack of confdence in one’s particular munity “moral virtues.” Open-min dedness beliefs that motivates open-mindedness, but can be motivated by the desire for truth or the a more general (second- order) recognition desire to respect or care for self and others (or that one is a fallible being. Open- mindedness, some combination). My interest here is in the then, is not frst- order doubt but the second- range of cases in which open- mindedness is order attitude that it is possible that one’s primarily motivated by respect and care for frst- order beliefs are wrong, despite being members of the moral community. Thus my confdently held. account will be incomplete, as the charac- But how does the general recognition of teristics of open- mindedness that I claim are fallibility translate to particular expressions of necessary in primarily moral contexts may not the virtue of open-mindedness? We may share apply equally to primarily epistemic contexts. J. S. Mill’s skepticism about our capacity to APQ 53_1 text.indd 98 11/11/15 12:23 PM EQUANIMITY AND OPEN- MINDEDNESS / 99 fully integrate the recognition of our own one is susceptible, and then monitor one’s fallibility: own reactions in order to properly recognize Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, occasions for open-mindedness (Riggs 2010, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying pp. 182–184). While this is surely right, the weight in their practical judgment, which is there remain several questions that need to always allowed to it in theory: for while every be answered: What is the relevant kind of one well knows himself to be fallible, few think self- knowledge? How is it attained, and how it necessary to take any precautions against their are blind spots overcome? Can we monitor own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any ourselves effectively, or must we rely on oth- opinion of which they feel very certain, may be ers? As I hope to show in section 5, Buddhist one of the examples of the error to which they concepts of equanimity help answer some of acknowledge themselves to be liable. (Mill these questions. 1978, p. 17) Adler argues that Mill’s position rests on 2. Robust Moral Concern an underlying misunderstanding: Mill is and Open- Mindedness confusing the second- order attitude of open- Understanding open- mindedness as the mindedness (the general recognition of one’s disposition to have second- order awareness fallibility) with the frst-order belief that one that recognizes one’s own fallibility allows us is actually wrong (Adler 2004, p. 132). The to say, as we surely want to, that lack of con- open-minded person does not (and should fdence in one’s beliefs is not the only reason not) constantly doubt the truth of her beliefs; one could be motivated to be open- minded. rather, recognizing her general fallibility, she The recognition of fallibility combined with checks the truth of her beliefs selectively.3 the desire for truth provides motivation to be But something still remains of Mill’s worry: open- minded even when one holds a belief how does the open- minded person apply with a high degree of confdence. But open- this general knowledge of her own fallibil- mindedness might be motivated by more than ity, even selectively? After all, the general the recognition of human fallibility and the recognition that one, like all human beings, desire for truth. In some cases, the motivation is fallible is uncontroversial and would not to be open- minded is based in moral concern serve to distinguish those with the virtue rather than in the pursuit of truth (although, of open-mi ndedness from those without it of course, these need not be incompatible).4 unless that recognition is integrated into the We may be motivated to be open- minded to agent’s habits of thought, feeling, and action someone else’s point of view simply because in the appropriate ways.