PART II Analyses Chapter 3 Introduction and Background CONTENTS Page Introduction. 49 Background . 50 History .. ... ... ... ... ● * 50 The Role of FOFA in NATO Strategy . 51 Chapter 3 Introduction and Background INTRODUCTION In late 1984, the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 1986, accomplished the first two tasks listed nization (NATO) adopted the Follow-On Forces above. This report covers the others. In the Attack (FOFA) concept as one of a few critical special report, OTA suggested to Congress warfighting tasks for its conventional forces. that in considering how best to support the Although the concept had been under devel- FOFA concept, systems ought to be considered opment for several years at the Supreme Head- not individually, but as complete packages to quarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), it support clearly defined operational concepts; was adopted in general terms only. This pre- nonetheless, some systems will be “key sys- cipitated much activity on the part of the mem- tems”; all component systems will have to be ber nations, SHAPE, and the NATO interna- procured in sufficient quantities; practice and tional staff to define more clearly what FOFA training will be important; and some redundancy is, how it is to be implemented, and what the may be desirable. Readers wishing an elabora- individual nations are going to do to support tion on these points, or greater background on its implementation. the FOFA concept and the technologies of in- terest, are referred to that special report. As part of the U.S. effort, the Office of Tech- nology Assessment (OTA) was asked by the After outlining the rest of the report, this House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the chapter provides a brief review of the history House Committee on Armed Services, and the of the FOFA concept, and of how FOFA fits Senate Committee on Armed Services to con- into NATO’s strategy. A fuller description is duct a study of options for implementing found in the special report. FOFA. In particular, OTA was asked to: Chapter 4 addresses the threat: Warsaw ● discuss the military and deterrence ra- Pact forces, and what we know about that part tionale; of Soviet doctrine that is relevant to FOFA. ● survey the status of various applicable ca- All Warsaw Pact forces will follow Soviet doc- pabilities and programs, including those trine. There has been some controversy in the to develop advanced conventional muni- West regarding Soviet doctrine and the appro- tions; priateness of FOFA as a response. This chap- ● review relevant Soviet doctrine and plans; ter reviews those areas of controversy. ● review the attitudes of our NATO Allies; ● assess the strengths and weaknesses of Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the specific objec- various existing and proposed alter- tives for several different types of attacks on natives; follow-on forces, and the operational concepts ● assess the likelihood that various plausi- being considered for achieving those objec- ble combinations would meet U.S. and tives. This sets the stage for the discussion of NATO goals; and packages of systems to implement these con- ● discuss a range of policy options, their cepts and the technical issues surrounding pros, cons, and timing of availability. those systems, found later in the report. This report is the final product of that study. Chapter 7 analyzes possible Soviet responses An earlier report— Technologies for NATO to FOFA, and chapter 8 reviews the attitudes Follow-on Forces Attack Concept: A Special of our Allies toward FOFA. FOFA was con- Report of OTA's Assessment on Improving ceived by SHAPE as an Alliance-wide effort NATO Defense Response–released in July (although primarily concerning those nations 49 50 New Technology for NATO: Implementing FoIIow-On Forces Attack with forces in the Central Region); its value ticularly regarding Joint STARS, PLSS, re- would be diminished if only the United States motely piloted vehicles, and advanced smart were to implement it, or if national responses anti-armor weapons. These are the subject of were uncoordinated. NATO’s current abilities chapters 10 and 11. to attack follow-on forces are reviewed in chap- Chapter 12 analyzes how existing and new ter 9. systems could be brought together into com- The technological advances that are impor- plete packages to implement the operational tant for FOFA were described at some length concepts discussed in chapter 6. in the special report. Although these are pri- Chapter 13 reviews previous studies of im- marily mature technologies that could result plementing FOFA, summarizes their conclu- in fielded systems over the next decade, ma- sions, and discusses major common threads. jor issues—technical and other—remain, par- BACKGROUND History Force declared its support for AirLand Bat- tle, and in late 1982 the services signed the In the late 1970s, both the U.S. Army and Joint Operational Concept Joint Attack of the U.S. Air Force began to study seriously the Second Echelon (J-SAK) that laid out proce- idea that much could be done to break up a dures for cooperation between Army and Air Soviet-style offensive by attacking deep into Force units in deep attack. enemy territory. Air bases and other major fixed facilities, major formations of ground Also in 1982, the staff at SHAPE produced forces, logistics, transportation nodes, and in- a study of attacking follow-on forces. This led dividual high-value targets like command to the NATO Defence Planning Committee posts and missile launchers were among the (DPC) formally approving SACEUR’s Long targets considered. To be sure, attacking into Term Planning Guideline for FOFA on Novem- enemy territory was nothing novel for either ber 9, 1984, making FOFA officially part of service. The Air Force had always had inter- NATO strategy. diction of various forms as a major mission, Although FOFA was a SHAPE develop- and the Army had always relied on firepower ment (known at various times as ‘deep strike, delivered by these interdiction aircraft and by ‘‘strike deep, and the ‘Rogers plan’ ‘), its con- its own artillery to “soften up” the enemy nection to the United States was inescapable, forces prior to engaging them. And within and amplified by General Rogers’ also hold- NATO’s integrated military command, into ing the job of Commander-in-Chief of U.S. which elements of both services would be in- forces in Europe. The AirLand Battle concept tegrated in the event of war, nuclear planning was unpopular among Europeans because of had always considered such targets to be of its emphasis on counterattack, and it soon be- prime importance. came confused with FOFA in the debate that followed. In addition, many were (and some At the same time, the Army-in part because remain) skeptical of the value of attacking deep of long-standing criticism that accused it of rather than waiting to engage the advancing being too static and insufficiently mobile for enemy forces in the close battle. modern warfare-was developing a new doc- trine called “AirLand Battle. ” AirLand Bat- After the November 1984 DPC meeting, the tle, officially published in 1982, called for a concept was turned over to the NATO inter- combination of deep fires to break up the national staff for coordination and refinement, enemy’s offensive, and counterattacks to re- and subsequently to the office of the Assistant store losses and seize the initiative. The Air Secretary General for Defence Support to pro- Ch. 3—Introduction and Background ● 51 vide a forum for the member nations to coordi- tlefield in a conventional war-such as Ger- nate their armaments programs. The focus has many—have the greatest interest in sending now largely shifted from doctrine development the Soviets a clear message that aggression to arms procurement, particularly arms trade would lead quickly and directly to nuclear war. and cooperation. However, the attitudes of the Although NATO anticipates a conflict that individual members regarding FOFA have not would involve its Northern and Southern Re- as yet completely jelled. gions in Europe (as well as the Atlantic), the On a parallel track, SHAPE is still develop- focus is expected to be the Central Region. ing the concept. The original rather general ap- Warsaw Pact successes there would split the proach, of delaying, disrupting, and destroy- Alliance and make the defense of the rest of ing enemy forces from just beyond the range Europe all but untenable. Furthermore, Ger- of direct fire weapons to as far in the enemy many is the focus in the Central Region: its rear as NATO’s forces can reach, is becoming collapse would almost certainly produce defeat a set of more specific goals phased to coincide in the Central Region. with the introduction of new capabilities. NATO strategy for a conventional defense Meanwhile, both the Army and the Air Force in the Central Region is dictated by political continue to refine their deep battle and inter- and geographic considerations as well as by diction concepts taking FOFA into account. the threat facing it. Ground and air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the The Role of FOFA in NATO Strategy Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether- lands, and Belgium are under the command Flexible Response is a strategy for deterring of the Commander-in-Chief Central Region, aggression, underwritten by a triad of conven- who in turn reports to the Supreme Allied Com- tional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear mander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is re- forces. NATO would respond to any attack at sponsible for the Northern, Central, and South- an appropriate level of violence, and reserves ern Regions. France, although a member of the the right to escalate a conflict, including the Alliance, is not part of this integrated military first use of nuclear weapons.