Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials A Report Card and Action Plan MATTHEW BUNN, ANTHONY WIER, JOHN P. HOLDREN PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMMISSIONED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE MARCH 2003 www.nti.org/cnwm © 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard University Printed in the United States of America The co-sponsors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational pur- poses, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly state: Reproduced from Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003). Project on Managing the Atom Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Fax: (202) 495-8963 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom Nuclear Threat Initiative 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, 7th Floor Washington D.C. 20006 Fax: (202) 296-4811 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.nti.org A companion website to this report is available at http://www.nti.org/cnwm Table of Contents FOREWORD . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . .vii PART I: SETTING THE STAGE . .1 INTRODUCTION . .2 2. THE THREAT . .9 Sidebar: Al Qaeda and Chechen Terrorist Attempts to Acquire Nuclear Weapons and Materials . .12 Sidebar: Al Qaeda and Taliban Attempts to Recruit Nuclear Expertise . .14 An Appalling Scenario . .15 Sidebar: “Dirty Bombs” vs. Nuclear Bombs . .17 3. BLOCKING THE TERRORIST PATHWAY TO THE BOMB . .20 Step 1: Form a Highly Capable Group With Extreme Objectives . .20 Sidebar: Will States Give Terrorists the Bomb? . .22 Step 2: Decide to Escalate to the Nuclear Level of Violence . .25 Step 3: Steal Nuclear Weapon or Weapons Material . .26 Step 4: Acquire Stolen Nuclear Weapon or Weapons Material . .26 Step 5: Smuggle Nuclear Weapon or Weapons Material to Safe Haven . .27 Step 6: Construct Weapon or Sidestep Weapon’s Safeguards . .28 Step 7: Smuggle Weapon Into Target Country . .30 Step 8: Transport Weapon to Target Location . .30 Step 9: Detonate Weapon . .31 PART II: ASSESSING THE CURRENT RESPONSE . .33 4. INPUT MEASURES: “EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER”? . .34 Leadership . .34 Sidebar: Impediments to Accelerated Progress . .36 Organization and Planning . .36 Information . .39 Sidebar: Bush Administration Initiatives to Prevent Nuclear Weapons Terrorism . .40 Sidebar: Effective Program Implementation . .42 Resources . .43 Sidebar: Congressional Initiatives to Prevent Nuclear Weapons Terrorism . .44 Sidebar: The G-8 Global Partnership . .54 Conclusion . .58 TABLE OF CONTENTS i 5. OUTPUT MEASURES: HOW MUCH IS DONE, AND HOW FAST IS THE REST GETTING DONE? . .61 Assessing Three Types of Threat Reduction Programs . .61 Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials . .64 Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling . .72 Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel . .75 Monitoring Nuclear Stockpiles and Reductions . .78 Ending Production . .79 Reducing Nuclear Stockpiles . .79 Summary: How Much of the Job is Done? . .81 6. APPLYING THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET’S ASSESSMENT APPROACH . .85 7. WHY THE GAP BETWEEN THREAT AND RESPONSE? . .87 PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE . .91 8. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS . .92 Controlling Warheads and Materials: Crosscutting Steps . .93 Sidebar: Progress on the Seven Steps . .94 Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials . .95 Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling . .96 Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel . .96 Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions . .97 Ending Production . .98 Reducing Stockpiles . .98 9. CROSSCUTTING STEPS TO ORGANIZE THE RESPONSE . .99 Sustained White House Engagement . .99 A Single Leader . .99 An Integrated, Prioritized Plan . .101 An Effective Global Partnership . .104 Resources Sufficient to the Task . .107 The Information Needed to do the Job . .112 Independent Analysis and Advice . .113 10. SECURING NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS . .115 “Global Cleanout” . .115 An Accelerated U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Partnership . .118 Forging Sensitive Nuclear Security Partnerships . .122 Building Effective Global Nuclear Security Standards . .129 Securing, Monitoring, and Dismantling the Most Dangerous Warheads . .132 Expanded Support for the International Atomic Energy Agency . .135 11. INTERDICTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING . .138 ii CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS 12. STABILIZING EMPLOYMENT FOR NUCLEAR PERSONNEL . .141 A Broader and Higher-Level Dialogue With Russia . .141 A Broader Approach To Job Creation . .142 Support For Secure Retirement . .144 A Focused Approach to Shrinking the Nuclear Weapons Complex . .145 Resources Matched to the Challenge . .146 13. MONITORING STOCKPILES AND REDUCTIONS . .147 Stockpile Declarations . .149 Building Bridges Between “Islands of Transparency” . .150 Steps Toward Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement and Nuclear Material . .150 14. ENDING PRODUCTION . .151 15. REDUCING STOCKPILES . .153 Reducing HEU Stockpiles – Maintaining the Current Agreement . .153 Reducing HEU Stockpiles – An Accelerated Blend-Down Initiative . .154 Expanded Disposition of Excess Plutonium . .156 16. CONCLUSIONS . .163 APPENDIX A: ANECDOTES OF NUCLEAR INSECURITY . .166 APPENDIX B: THE DEMAND FOR BLACK MARKET FISSILE MATERIAL . .179 ABOUT THE AUTHORS . .187 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . .188 ABOUT THE PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM . .189 TABLE OF CONTENTS iii iv CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS Foreword We were proud twelve years ago to launch security principle of the 21st century. It is the only America’s effort to secure weapons of mass threat whose danger is dire and diffuse enough to destruction, materials and know-how in the former unify all nations, and it will take the unity of all Soviet Union to keep them from falling into the nations to meet that threat. In the end, every hands of people who would do us harm. This work nation that possesses materials or weapons of has been vitally important. It has accomplished mass destruction must secure them and account important objectives. But today, the scope of the for them, in a manner that meets stringent stan- effort does not match the scale of the threat. dards and is internationally verifiable – using their own funds, supplemented with international funds As the demand for weapons of mass destruction where needed. rises and the chance of their use grows, we are concerned to see urgent calls for increased threat For more than a year, we have been working in reduction dismissed because “current programs Washington, D.C., Moscow, and other major capi- are doing all they can.” tals to develop and build support for a Global Partnership Against Catastrophic Terrorism, and The threat of nuclear, biological and chemical we were pleased when the leaders of the G-8 took weapons terrorism is too near and too dire to be a crucial step in this direction. In June 2002, G-8 discussed in the context of “current programs.” leaders launched a Global Partnership Against the The threat cannot be made to fit the program; the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass programs must be remade to fit the threat. We Destruction, and they pledged $20 billion over 10 must ask and answer the essential questions: years to efforts designed to reduce these deadly “What is the threat? What is our response? What threats. But there is much to be done to transform must we do to close the gap?” this initiative into an effective, fast-paced global effort to block the terrorist pathway to a bomb. These are not questions for only one or two countries. The world must give its answer, and give it soon. One of our biggest obstacles to action is overcom- We need a Global Partnership Against Catastrophic ing the denial that such an attack could occur and Terrorism, based on the fundamental premise that the paralysis that comes from believing the job is the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats too massive and too overwhelming to be done. It is all nations face together and no nation can solve a big job, no doubt. But it is also measurable and on its own. Today, the most likely, most immediate, manageable, and the world needs to know it. That most potentially devastating threat is the terrorist is why we are pleased to present this vital and use of weapons of mass destruction. The best way timely report – Controlling Nuclear Warheads and to address the threat is to keep terrorists from Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan. acquiring weapons or weapons.