Caietele Echinox, vol. 25, 2013 : Topographies du mal : Les Antiutopies 252 Ruxandra Cesereanu Political Police in Communist Romania: the Totalitarian Dystopia ABSTRACT Securitate’s strategies and “language” The purpose of this study, in its first part, is a documentary summary concerning the Historian Marius Oprea has antholo- establishment of Communist Romania’s Po- gized and commented on several of the most litical Police (Securitate), by applying an a- important documents relating to the crea- nalysis of the structure, operation, strategies tion, the structure and the operation of com- and language used in the official documents munist Romania’s repressive body, in his by the repressive body. The second part of work Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securi- this study focuses on a former communist tăţii în documente (1948-1989) [The Banali- torturer’s portrait, as illustrated in the rela- ty of Evil. Documentary History of the Secu- tively official confession he made. ritate (1948-1989)]. Marius Oprea speaks KEYWORDS primarily about the “Soviet-communist oc- Romania; Securitate; State Terrorism; cupation” which had a decisive role in the Informant; Confession; Sadism; Communist birth of the Securitate, Romania’s repressive Torturer; Atonement; Theatricality. institution being deemed an “instrument of state terrorism” (Oprea, 2002, p. 12) by RUXANDRA CESEREANU reason of the dictatorship of the proletariat Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania dogma. “The analysis of the political police [email protected] control mechanisms in the Romanian totali- tarian regime indicates that brutality ad- vanced to the rank of state politics, in the name of the «class struggle» and caused a long-term reflex, a ‘trivialization’ of evil, maintained with assistance from the a- pparatus of the political police” (Oprea, 2002, p. 14). The purpose resided in instill- ing and sustaining fear among the people, their intimidation and the branched, calcu- lated administration of terror. The Securitate made use of extreme physical brutality in Political Police in Communist Romania: the Totalitarian Dystopia the first stage of its operation (1948-1964), strategic regional direc- 253 while later, in the second period (1964- torates; the initial num- 1989), it chose an insidious form of Pavlov- ber of active officers was two-three thou- ian persuasion, even though this time inter- sands, but it doubled and even tripled in the val, too, saw enough cases of physical ag- following years. For stimulation purposes, gression against the opponents of the com- the Securitate agents had huge wages (the munist regime. Whereas the first stage was managing staff had wages five times higher dominated by “lumpenproletarian” agents – than the common workers) and benefited mercenaries, some of them illiterate, acting from various types of product stamps. Over as frenzied tormentors (Oprea, 2002, p. 137) time, the number of directorates increased –, the second stage was dominated by the both structurally and regionally. In 1949, educated Securitate agent, the wannabe in- adjacent to the Securitate, the Securitate tellectual. But even in the first stage, during troops are created, which included several 1952-1953, communist leader Gheorghe tens of thousands of armed forces. Gheorghiu-Dej and the heads of the Securi- Historically, in the first phase of the tate promoted the idea of the training, spe- Ceauşescu era, in 1967 and 1968, the Secu- cialisation and improvement of the intel- ritate is partially disturbed by Nicolae Ceau- lectual skills of the repressive body’s per- şescu’s attack against the regime of Gheor- sonnel; this action had in view the decrease ghiu-Dej and of the minister of interior (op- in the numbers of the existing lumpens, who erating since 1952), Alexandru Drăghici; the found themselves pressed and advised to former played the role of the “father” who complete their studies; the courses would had to be killed symbolically and ideolo- last ten months and the subject matters were gically, the latter was the rival “sibling”. political sciences, foreign languages, in- The excuse is provided by the liquidation of struction, broadcasts, fight techniques etc. the communist (intellectual) leader Lucreţiu Until 1948, when the Securitate was created Pătrăşcanu, deemed an abuse of the Gheor- and discretionary powers were granted to it, ghiu-Dej regime: based on it, Ceauşescu at- there hadn’t been a void of terror, because a tempts to rebuild the internal image of a prior secret police had been functional, al- reforming leader. In the second phase of beit not impeccable, a former Security re- Ceauşescu’s era, the Securitate was modern- formed and infiltrated by Soviet agents, Ro- ised, but suffered an important blow, at the manian communists and mercenaries. level of its administration, when Ion Mihai At the time of its creation, the structure Pacepa (assistant to the head of the External of the Securitate was rather impressive; it Intelligence Directorate in the Ministry of included ten clearly focused directorates, Interior) decided to remain in the Occident which monitored socio-politically the entire in 1978, disclosing the Securitate structure country, in the following manner: Intelli- and purposes as a repressive institution. On gence, Counter-sabotage, Counter-espio- this account, Ceauşescu reorganised it later nage in penitentiaries and Police, Counter- harshly, in a manner evocative of the 1950s, espionage in the army, Criminal investiga- granting to it special, omnipotent condition. tions, Ministry protection, Technical Opera- In the last phase of the Ceauşescu period, tions, Staff, Party Politics, Administrative the Securitate staff numbers had gone up to Section; additional to these main directo- 15,000, who were making use of the im- rates there were secondary sections, specia- pressive number of 137,000 active inform- lised in interception, tailing, supervision. ants – which was an outstanding increase as The Securitate diagram included thirteen compared to the initial stage of the Ruxandra Cesereanu 254 Securitate, when the in- have contributed to the creation of such an stitution was operating apparatus” (Oprea, 2002, p. 256). via 3000 employees and 42,000 informants. The frenzy attached to the fight against The 1970s saw the beginning of the increase “the enemies of the people” is reiterated in in the numbers of intellectual collaborators counterpoint at the same conference in Feb- – the institution of the Political police was ruary 1950 by Gheorghe Pintilie (his real beginning to part with the rural collabo- name was Pantiuşa Bodnarenco, Soviet a- rators; in the same period, the Securitate gent), sinister look of a career-oriented a- discontinued recruitment by coercion and gent, assassin of Ştefan Foriş (former leader blackmail; instead, it chose to relate to the of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej’s rival): “we patriotic feeling, in keeping with the Ceau- should brace, to be able to strike the enemy şist nationalism. Three types of links were as hard as possible, perhaps even three- used: classic informants, collaborators (sup- fold”[...] “We cannot say the fight is over, port people who did not inform, but helped while we said we stroke the enemy hard, we the Securitate) and the residents – hosts of may say that only now do we begin to strike the houses where the Securitate officers and him harder. Only now is the enemy enraged the informers met. [...]”; “The Party decided to strike with all Below follows an analysis, at the level might and with all might we shall strike” of mentality, of the strategies and purposes (Oprea, 2002, pp. 133, 160). Even merely of the Securitate, as directly or indirectly by looking within the Securitate, Pintilie revealed by the discourses of its leaders. discovers the enemy’s omnipresence; hence, First, I am going to note that all the docu- he proposes a kind of hara-kiri with a pos- ments relating to the activity of the Securi- sible remedial effect “We must shake our- tate are marked by the tendentious presence selves free of a series of weaknesses, we of several verbs directed against the “enemy must eliminate them pitilessly from our of the people”: these are “to crush”, “to re- body” (Oprea, 2002, p. 133). press”, “to wipe out”, “to unmask”, “to de- Another part of Gheorghe Pintilie’s stroy”, “to liquidate”, “to exterminate”, “to discourse centres on the necessity to apply shoot down”. Minister Teohari Georgescu physical aggression against the “enemy of was stating in 1949 that “the Securitate is the people”; however, this should be done the body that strikes” (Oprea, 2002, p. 74), methodically, rather than in a sadistic, un- in an attempt to prevent the omissions and discerned way: the enemy must be stricken deficiencies of the institution he was lead- “with full hatred”, but orderly. For this rea- ing. “The strikes will be ruthless”, the same son, the agents themselves must be in- minister would restate in a conference held nocents who purify themselves first: “let us on February 28, 1950, “Because while we remove anything foreign to our organs, our have the law, as discussed earlier today, we organs hold high, specific tasks, we must will strike” (Oprea, 2002, pp. 120, 131). fight and eliminate anything rot” (Oprea, Three years later, investigated in his turn 2002, p. 146). Vigilance is deemed hygie- and blamed with not being vigilant of his nic, because it engages the agent in a proc- class hatred, Teohari Georgescu was de- ess of self-re-education: “My intent is not to clareing that he had led