Hume on the Problem of Evil The Problem of Evil: P1: God is (def.) the benevolent and omnipotent creator P2: If such a creator exists, then there can be no evil P3: There is evil in the world SC: A benevolent and omnipotent creator does not exist C: God does not exist As a consequence of this it follows that either God is not benevolent or God is not omnipotent, or both. Does Hume accept this argument, and its consequences? Hume's claim: a posteriori it is not reasonable to believe in God's existence He argues that since sound a priori arguments for the existence of God don't exist, one must turn to experience to determine if God exists. On this basis, the existence of evil shows that we cannot infer that a benevolent and omnipotent creator exists. If God were really benevolent and omnipotent, what could he have done differently to produce a world without evil? Hume's Four Circumstances: • Make the world such that it wasn't necessary for pain to be required in order to ensure self- preservation • Make the world such that laws of nature need not apply universally but only generally • Give greater powers or abilities to creatures in the world so that they can avoid misery • Prevent the forces of nature from causing disorder What does this line of reasoning suggest? Is it possible to retain our notion of God, or something like it, despite the fact that there is evil in the world? Hick and Theodicy One approach, due to Augustine, is to argue that anything that exists is good in itself and that anything that is evil is so only in so far as its essential goodness is spoiled or corrupted The purpose of a theodicy is not to explain every instance of evil but to provide considerations that prevent evil from constituting an insuperable bar to rational belief in God (Hick 276) In this way Hick claims that theodicy, done well, involves a negative approach In this direction Hick distinguishes between two kinds of evil: moral evil or wickedness; and nonmoral evil or suffering or pain Essential to the notion of moral responsibility, and part of the very notion of a human for many (including many religions), is freedom of action. It would seem that this freedom necessarily entails that an agent is capable of performing both right and wrong actions and, consequently, is capable of both good and evil How does this become a consideration that supports a theodicy? Are there any problems with this consideration being used to this end? Let's suppose that we accept the necessity of human freedom. Then let us turn the tables and bring in consideration of nonmoral evil. How can our world, with all its sources of hardship, inconvenience and danger of innumerable kinds, be created a perfectly benevolent and omniscient God? .