STANDARD WAR-BOOKS COLONEL REPINGTON'S DIARIES VESTIGIA (1878-1914) THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1914-1918) AFTER THE WAR (1921) FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL By Field- Marshal Sir William Robertson, G.C.B., etc., etc. FORTY DAYS IN 1914 By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G. CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR Edited by Lord Edward Gleichen VOL. I. (1914-15) VOL. II. (1916-17) VOL. III. (1918) ATLAS THE DARDANELLES By Major-General Sir Charles Callwell, K.C.B. THE MARNE CAMPAIGN By Lieut. -Col. F. E. Whitton. 1914 By Viscount French of Ypres. CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND DECEMBER 19, 1915, TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918 BY GEORGE A. B. DEWAR ASSISTED BY LIEUT.-COL. J. H. BORASTON, C.B. IN TWO VOLUMES VOLUME II Vli ,>2> CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD LONDON • BOMBAY • SYDNEY 1922 D Printed in Great Britain by T. and A. Constable Ltd. at the Edinburgh University Press CONTENTS OF VOL. II BOOK II—THE ENEMY'S INITIATIVE CHAPTER I 1918 : BEFORE THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE PAGES German strategy for 1918—Ludendorff as an out-and-out westerner —The Germans resolve to dispose of Russia—Crushing the Bolsheviks—Bringing German divisions to the Western Front —Ludendorff on the civil power in Germany and Great Britain respectively—The Western Front the only theatre that really mattered—Could we have taken the initiative against Germany early in 1918 ?—The moral of our troops—Our work in 1917— The imminence of the German offensive recognised by every one except, apparently, Mr. Bonar Law—Colonel Henderson on the British Cabinet of 1813—Cabinets of 1813 and 1918 ' ' compared—Ludendorff on the quite subsidiary importance of Asia Minor—Our want of troops on the Western Front— The censoring of the British Commander-in-Chief's Despatches —The problem of man-power in 1918—Sources of man-power by which the British Army in France could be recruited in 1918 ' ' —Proposals to knock out Austria and Turkey—Clemenceau objects—Haig warns the Government of the impending German offensive—The Government do not act on his warning*B . 3-28 CHAPTER II 1918 : BEFORE THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE {Continued) The great problem of training our forces in France—Our battalions are allowed to drop in 1918 from a 13 to a 10 battalion basis— What this meant to the Commander-in-Chief and his army—Sir William Robertson on the necessity of keeping divisions up to strength—The question of the line again—British are asked to relieve their Ally even whilst they are carrying on the vast Flanders offensive—At a conference at Boulogne on September ' ' 25, in Haig's absence, it is —decided in principle— that the British shall take over more line Haig's protest The remote possi-— bility of a German offensive on the Alsace-Lorraine front vi SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND PAOE3 Painleve, the French Prime Minister, desires us to take over more line—Berry-au-Bac, in this matter, still the goal of a French section—The War Council at powerful Supreme — Versailles is in favour of —our taking over more line Haig has to threaten resignation The— matter is compromised, and at length the discussion— closes The Petain and Haig compact for mutual assistance— The absurd story that this was a plot against Foch Nature and details of the French scheme : and of the British scheme ........ 29-43 CHAPTER III ' CAVALRY STUDIES ' The Commander-in-Chief presses for munitions of mobility—The need of mounted troops for 1918—When was the request for them first made ?—Cavalry in 1916 and 1917—The unpopular- ' ' ity at home of cavalry generalship —On January 7, 1918, the Commander-in-Chief argues in favour of mounted troops for the coming operations—The civil power objects—Cavalry must be reduced—The shipping argument against cavalry— Retrenchment in the west, but expenditure in the east—The ' ' Government not in the mood for Cavalry Studies —What greater power on the mobile side would have saved us in 1918 . 44-48 CHAPTER IV THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL RESERVE The Italian offensive against Austria, August 1917—Caporetto— The Allied conference at Rapallo—Decision to set up a supreme Allied council—Its procedure—Studying the question of unity of control—Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith condemn ' the proposal to appoint a generalissimo— Personally, I am ' — utterly— opposed to that suggestion Mr. Asquith's argument Defective—land communications between the Western Front and Italy The Supreme War Council's main purpose—A general reserve and conflict of opinion among the Allies thereon —January 30, 1918, the Council assembles at Versailles—An offensive in the east proposed—The Commanders-in-Chief on the Western Front opposed to this—Respective functions of the Commander-in-Chief and the new authority—Clemenceau's view—The general reserve—Foch's view—A war board to co- ordinate all operations from the North Sea to the Adriatic— The board to control the general reserve—The Italians dissent from this—Paris proposed as a meeting-place : Italians and CONTENTS vii PAT.E3 British object—The American view—Proposal to place the general reserve under the Chiefs of Staff negatived—The general reserve to be administered by representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States—The Commander- in-Chief not to have power to order its movements for action —Haig's attitude — The unpromising moment chosen for the reserve—A of establishing —general patchwork — military and civilian opinion Robertson's— and Foch's idea The Supreme War Council's idea An atmosphere of doubt and hesitancy at Versailles—The real objection to the establishment of a com- mittee-controlled general reserve—What the British Com- mander-in-Chief was expected to do—Did the failure of the proposal spoil the Supreme War Council ? —Two divergent opinions on this subject—Haig has to decline the request that he shall give up six or seven of his divisions—Foch's view that the War Board ought to decide on such questions as recruit- ment and transportation—Would the Chiefs of Staff have been more successful than the Versailles committee in handling a general reserve ?—What committees can do and not do in war —The use of reserves in war—The notion that, once we have a general reserve,—it does not matter if the enemy breaks through to begin with The— reductio ad absurdum of the theory of strategical— reserves The British front in France and its weak points The strength of the forces which the Germans always faced our front with—Retreat out of the question in the north, where we were always compelled to hold the line in strength— Successful defence depends on the timely arrival of reserves during an attack—5500 yards held by a British division where 3000 yards were held by a German division opposite us— Haig's decision against the general reserve proved sound by the German offensive, March-April 1918—Criticisms levelled at our G.H.Q. for holding divisions in reserve—Leaders on the spot— alone able to decide exactly where reserves should be used How reserves are used in a battle—The inexplicable blunder of Versailles—Its civilian supporters probably did not study the question of a general reserve ..... 49-63 CHAPTER V GERMANY'S GREATEST BATTLE (By J. H. B.) danger signal in 1917 : the German reaction at Cambrai— of our — Temper troops—at the end of 1917 Our methods of —defence at this period Training in the new defensive tactics British Intelligence Service in France—Brigadier-General viii SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND PAGES John Charteris—A —Its — complete Intelligence— — hierarchy character and— work Its first duty Raids The interrogation of prisoners The knowledge of the average German private— ' ' The listening-set —Belgian and French agents in the occupied territory—The work of aeroplanes in the Intelligence depart- ment—Wireless stations—The Intelligence officers—Mobile pigeon-lofts—The myth as to the conversion of the dead into its — soup and soap ; and origin The most efficient Intelligence service on the Western Front—Brigadier-General E. W. Cox succeeds Charteris—Watching the development of German strength in the west—What use would the enemy make of his great increase in strength ? —Versailles' idea of where and when he would strike—Paris at the back of the French military mind—The certainty that the Germans would strike on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front—Our G.H.Q.'s view—Flanders an unlikely theatre for early main operations of the enemy— The impossibility of ruling it out — Our weakest point'— The biggest objective in France from the enemy's point of view—Haig is right both as to time and place of the German attack—Could we hold up a German attack on our right ?— We have to concentrate on the completion, as far as possible, of the Forward and Battle Zones—The French responsible for the charges for destroying bridges across the canal—Break- down of the plans for French co-operation on our right—How our advanced lines were held—The basic principle of the elastic method goes by the board—The only way in which it could have held good—The fog on the morning of March 21, 1918—Gough's view—Stories as to German skill in finding their way despite the fog—Could our troops have stopped the attack on March 21 if there had been no fog ? 64-86 CHAPTER VI GERMANY'S GREATEST BATTLE {Continued) (By J. H. B.) The days just before the offensive—March 15 and March 18-19— The Fifth Army's arrangements for defence—Movements of G.H.Q.