CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 105 REPORT 1‐15 September 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-4 Strongly embracing the “economy of ef- RCIED attack against an ANSF vehicle in 5-8 Northern Region fort” approach that has pervaded through- Nangarhar, making nearly half of the 12 Western Region 9-10 out 2012, AOG conducted seven suicide NGO incidents the result of collateral attacks countrywide this cycle - including a damage rather than direct targeting. 11-13 Eastern Region complex attack against Camp Bastion in Amongst the seven remaining NGO inci- Helmand - despite registering a decline in Southern Region 14-17 dents, three involved the stopping and overall AOG incident volumes. While late 18 questioning of NGO staff in transit - two ANSO Info Page reporting will partially bridge this gap, at by AOG (Kapisa and Ghazni) and one by the time of writing the first half of Septem- ANSF (Kunar) - and a further two in- ber had recorded 367 AOG initiated inci- volved the robbing of demining NGO HIGHLIGHTS dents, a 37% decrease from the average of equipment in Kandahar and Parwan. 582 that had occurred every half-month While this puts September on pace to rec- 12 NGO incidents in- over the height of the fighting season (June cluding the death of ord the highest volume of NGO incidents an NGO volunteer in - August). However, whereas incident vol- thus far this year (the previous high being Kabul umes may be starting to gradually decline 17 in June), trends involving NGO inci- in line with established seasonal trends, the dents have followed few precise patterns Seven suicide attacks use of a relatively high volume of BBIED other than a broad correlation between across the country and SVBIED assets denoted a significant their peak and the months of greatest con- post-Eid, pre-winter push by AOG. In flict activity, suggesting that the current Complex attack on fact, whereas June, July, and August saw a levels may not sustain. IMF Camp Bastion, total of 23 incidents involving suicide ele- Helmand The last days of this cycle also witnessed ments - thus averaging just under eight a four peaceful demonstrations (three in the month - the seven that occurred in the first East and one in Kabul) against a movie half of September therefore nearly equaled made by independents overseas which was that previous monthly average. ANSO is supported by deemed anti-Islamic and resulted in a wave Although the high profile suicide attacks of protests in the Middle East. While none noted above primarily targeted ANSF, of these four escalated, the situation was IMF, or the GOA, NGOs were not be- gaining traction at the time of reporting, yond the reach of collateral involvement, and the fact that violence occurred in inter- and suffered in two separate instances due national protests over the same issue has to the close proximity of NGO staff or created significant concern. It should be compounds to the targets. Most signifi- noted however, that the majority of past cantly, this included the death of a young protests of a similar nature in Afghanistan NGO volunteer in a BBIED attack in which have resulted in violence have not downtown Kabul, while two NGO com- systematically targeted the entire interna- pounds - a clinic and a school - were also tional community, but rather occurred ex- damaged during a complex attack that took pressly in the vicinity of ISAF, ANSF, or place against an IMF base in Wardak. GOA compounds, or international organi- More broadly, NGOs were affected in a zations. As such – much like BBIED total of 12 security incidents this period, strikes - the risk to NGOs remains primari- also suffering collaterally in an IED strike ly collateral. in Balkh, an IDF attack in Kunar, and an ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents ABUL Year to Date 10 KABUL K 50 This Report Period 1 Two significant events stood out 40 in Kabul’s security environment of a single, essentially ineffective 30 over the first half of September, attack by a lone operative suggests 20 that in spite of frequent concerted each of them insightful examples 10 attempts, the armed opposition of the state of the conflict within 0 the national capital – and moreo- appears to have been stopped ver both taking place on the same from staging any meaningful as- day. sault against government and mili- tary facilities in the national capital KABUL AOG KABUL Crime First, at approximately 1100 hrs during the height of this fighting on the 8th, an explosion took place season. This is further reinforced which only served to cause more locals to sur- in the immediate vicinity of the by the use of a child to bypass round the convoy. When ANP from District 6 US embassy and the international tight security in the city, indicating arrived on the scene shortly afterwards, they military forces’ command head- a potential AOG view that it is acted in such a way so as to appear on the side quarters, in what was initially re- better to stage a small attack with of those in the convoy; some of the first re- ported to have been a young boy a higher likelihood of completion sponders on the scene fired directly at the BBIED operative detonating his than a larger one where the finan- crowd, which sparked increased unrest and explosive device. In the explo- cial and personnel costs of disrup- eventually led to unarmed attacks on the police sion, four children working as tion are high. The armed opposi- by the crowd, a small number of whom did street-sellers - one of whom also tion will continue attempting to later arm themselves with AK-47s. In the pro- volunteered at an NGO - were stage such statement attacks in tracted violence that followed, which lasted killed and another four injured, Kabul city going forward, but it is roughly eight hours, one policeman and two while two policemen were also noteworthy that the summer of local civilians were killed, while 11 policemen wounded. Uncertainty about the 2012 has been the quietest the city and nine civilians were injured, and a number precise nature of the device used has had since the opposition em- of vehicles and police CPs in the area set arose later, with alternative report- barked on a strategy of such at- ablaze and destroyed. ing suggesting that the boy re- tacks in 2008. It can often be forgotten amid the widespread sponsible may have instead been Just an hour later on the same elevation of Ahmad Shah Massoud since 2001 carrying an RCIED that he – or that for many, particularly in southern Kabul, another person – control detonat- day, which happened to be ‘Ahmad Shah Massoud Day’, a his legacy is not a positive one, given their ed, rather than being strapped memories of that part of the city being a front- with an explosive vest. vehicle from outside of the prov- ince in a convoy of Massoud sup- line between his and HIG forces during the Nevertheless, the salient point of porters struck a local pedestrian dark days of the country’s civil war. As such, the incident remains unchanged when driving through District 5 at the presence of large convoys of Massoud sup- by its precise tactical form. After Mazari Square. After a small porters driving through this part of the city a long summer without a major crowd spontaneously gathered to may stir passive resentment – and the addition suicide/complex attack within express their anger at the accident, of armed Massoud supporters and sympathetic Kabul city, and multiple disrup- armed men within the convoy ANP firing on local crowds could generate tions of complex attack cells by fired warning shots into the air, strong anger. security agencies, the occurrence NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of 12 September 2012 THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents ARDAK Year to Date 5 WARDAK W 70 This Report Period 1 60 In Wardak, an NGO was victim focused activity was seen in Mai- 50 to collateral involvement in the 40 twin BBIED/SVBIED attack that dan Shahr, which was in fact 30 took place at the Saydabad DAC home to the highest number of 20 on September 1st, consistent with incidents of any district during the 10 the key form of risk that NGOs fortnight. On the Maidan Shahr- 0 face from such attacks. At 0700 Bamyan road, just inside the dis- hrs, a BBIED operative first deto- trict but close to the AOG strong- WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime nated his vest at the entrance of holds of Ismailkhel and Mul- the ANP HQ, while shortly after- lahkhel, five young Hazara men soldiers injured in the clashes as well); a further wards, another operative driving a were stopped by armed men in operation in Mullahkhel two days later (and truck rigged as a SVBIED deto- the late afternoon while on their just two days before the above-described kill- nated his charge at the entrance of way to Dai Mirdad. After being ings of the five civilians), saw the arrest of four the nearby IMF base, in an attack taken out of the car and ques- AOG operatives in possession of a number of very similar to recent SVBIED tioned for approximately 20 ANA uniforms. The salient point being that attacks in neighbouring Logar; minutes, they were all shot and even such a large clearing operation did not indeed, it is highly likely that the killed, in spite of exhibiting no prevent such killings taking place during the operational trail originates via affiliations with the government mid-afternoon just five kilometers from the Logar’s Baraki Barak, whose dis- or security forces.