CORPORATE PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN: BIG BANG OR BIG BUST? by Sarah M. Ingmanson [email protected] A thesis presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MA in International Affairs University of Pennsylvania The Lauder Institute April 2004 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA ABSTRACT CORPORATE PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN: BIG BANG OR BIG BUST? by Sarah M. Ingmanson Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee: Jennifer Amyx, PhD Department of Political Science According to the General Outline for Japan’s Defined Contribution Pension Law (no. 88) issued June 29, 2001, the introduction of defined contribution (DC) pension legislation in Japan was necessary for the following two reasons: • The existing corporate pension system in Japan had not sufficiently permeated to small-to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs. • In the event of a job change, the pension assets and transfer of those assets were not sufficiently secured, resulting in an impediment to labor mobility.1 For Japanese employers, DC plans would increase the predictability of their pension costs while removing the funding risk from the corporate balance sheet. On the other hand, Japanese employees would be the ones to shoulder all investment-related decisions and risk – an untested concept in Japan. From March 1997, discussions began within Japan’s dominant political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), over the suitability of DC pension legislation in Japan. From there, the road to legislation proceeded in a meandering fashion until the law finally went into effect in October 2001. Expectations ran high that this legislation would induce a massive wave of DC plan conversion as Japanese companies began unloading their 1 Translated from: 「Kakutei kyoshutu nenkin hou (heisei 13 nen houritu dai 88 gou) no gaiyou」 (“The General Outline of the Defined Contribution Pension Law (2001 Law No. 88)”) 2 traditional defined benefit (DB) plans. However, despite the continuing pressures on Japanese companies which, in the extreme were faltering under the weight of their underfunded pension liabilities, such a widescale movement did not occur. What appeared as a clear solution in the new DC option, then becomes a puzzle given the lukewarm response in Japan. Some observers interpret this reaction as paternalistic Japanese companies acting irrationally to uphold their DB promises to employees at any cost – even the risk of insolvency. However, jumping to this conclusion requires one to ignore the historical fact that Japanese companies were the main proponents of the DC law in the first place. As I will show, the main determinant of corporate decision-making on the pension issue has not been paternalism, but rather the binding constraints of the DC legislation. In other words, the form of the law is the key explanation for the low levels of DC plan adoption. Therefore, an understanding of what transpired between those first discussions of corporate pension reform within the LDP in 1997 until the passing of the Defined Contribution Pension Act in June 2001, will help Japanese companies, employees, and the global investment community better predict the future course of corporate pension reform and anticipate corporate behavior in response to such reform. In broader strokes, this analysis also sheds light on the nature of policymaking in Japan today. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES..............................................................................................................................................................6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................................................................7 SECTION I .............................................................................................................................................................................9 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................................9 SECTION II..........................................................................................................................................................................14 PENSION CRISIS.................................................................................................................................................................14 Koreishoshika Shakai................................................................................................................................................14 Demographic Link to Pensions................................................................................................................................15 Other Strains on the System......................................................................................................................................16 Managing an Underfunded Plan.............................................................................................................................18 The Lost Decade: Recession Japan ........................................................................................................................18 Corporate Pensions: the final savior?....................................................................................................................20 SECTION III........................................................................................................................................................................24 PATERNALISM DE-BUNK-ED & DC NON-PROLIFERATION.......................................................................................24 Dispelling the Conventional Thinking ....................................................................................................................24 Role of Corporate Pensions......................................................................................................................................27 Global Trends .............................................................................................................................................................29 Structural Flaws to Blame ........................................................................................................................................31 Recession (Bear Market) Psyche.............................................................................................................................32 Union Threat: fact or fiction? ..................................................................................................................................33 Employment and HR Reform....................................................................................................................................34 History Provides Guidance ......................................................................................................................................35 SECTION IV ........................................................................................................................................................................38 TOWARD DC LEGISLATION IN JAPAN ...........................................................................................................................38 ‘Veto Players’ Framework........................................................................................................................................38 Legislative Process.....................................................................................................................................................39 Toward DC Legislation.............................................................................................................................................40 1997: the conception of defined contribution........................................................................................................42 1998: steady progress ...............................................................................................................................................45 1999: the year of reform? .........................................................................................................................................48 Year 2000: stalled again...........................................................................................................................................50 2001: at last.................................................................................................................................................................51 SECTION V..........................................................................................................................................................................53 THE DC DEBATE ANALYZED .........................................................................................................................................53 Impure Origins............................................................................................................................................................53 Money Politics.............................................................................................................................................................54 Cabinet Disruption within the LDP.........................................................................................................................55