AP ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL The Additional Protocol is a legal document facilities and materials and only certain areas of these negotiated between the International Atomic Energy facilities. Agency (IAEA) and an individual state granting the The IAEA subsequently adopted ‘Program 93+2’, IAEA further inspection authority to that provided in which sought to prevent the diversion of declared that state’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement materials and to detect undeclared materials. The with the IAEA. The Additional Protocol aims to program called for a legally binding protocol to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance supplement existing safeguards agreements and about both declared and possible undeclared dramatically expand the scope of IAEA inspections. activities and to get a more complete picture of a This became the Additional Protocol. state’s overall nuclear program. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to Measures under the Additional Protocol: While information and sites. every Additional Protocol is negotiated between the state and the IAEA, and is individually tailored, there Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) have repeatedly are several main aspects that remain constant. States called for universal adherence to the Additional that have signed Additional Protocol Agreements Protocol and have issued working papers during the with the IAEA agree to provide the IAEA NPT review process arguing that implementation of information about, and IAEA inspector access to, all the Additional Protocol should become a key parts of a State's nuclear fuel cycle—including standard by which to measure an NPT States Party’s uranium mines, fuel fabrication and enrichment commitment to the Treaty. plants, and nuclear waste sites—as well as to any Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), unlike NWS, other location where nuclear material is or may be are subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards under present. Article III of the NPT. Some NNWS take the position that the comprehensive IAEA safeguards are States also agree to provide information on, and sufficient to prevent nuclear proliferation, and that IAEA short-notice access to, all buildings on a requiring the Additional Protocol as well is nuclear site. The Protocol provides for IAEA unnecessary and burdensome. Some countries in the inspectors to have "complementary" access to assure Middle East, such as Egypt, have also refused to the absence of undeclared nuclear material or to implement the Additional Protocol or undertake resolve questions or inconsistencies in the additional nonproliferation obligations until Israel information a State has provided about its nuclear signs on to the NPT and/or agrees to a nuclear- activities. Advance notice in most cases is at least 24 weapon-free zone in the region. hours. The advance notice is shorter—at least two hours—for access to any place on a site that is sought Background: in conjunction with design information verification or The international call for an Additional Protocol ad hoc or routine inspections at that site. The emerged out of the IAEA’s failure to detect Iraq’s activities carried out during complementary access efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction could include examination of records, visual (WMDs) prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It was observation, environmental sampling, utilization of discovered that Iraq had violated its NPT safeguards radiation detection and measurement devices, and the agreement by building nuclear facilities and failing to application of seals and other identifying and tamper- declare them to the IAEA. In addition, the IAEA indicating devices. discovered in 1992 that North Korea had diverted plutonium from its civilian program at a declared States also agree to allow the IAEA to collect reactor but had hidden these activities when IAEA environmental samples at locations beyond declared inspectors were present. The ease with which Iraq locations when deemed necessary by the Agency. and North Korea were able to do so demonstrated the Wider area environmental sampling would require shortcomings of existing NPT safeguards, as these IAEA Board approval of such sampling and safeguards allow the IAEA to inspect only declared consultations with the State concerned. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes © James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Last Update: 09/23/2015 AP France (INFCIRC/290/Add.1) are designed to assist Furthermore, states give the IAEA the right to make the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in use of internationally established communications NNWS. Unlike the United States, neither have a systems, including satellite systems and other forms national security exemption. Both Protocols generally of telecommunication. reflect the Model Additional Protocol, but only apply in cases where activities have links to NNWS. States also agree to accept IAEA inspector Russia and China: Both countries’ Additional designations and to issue multiple entry visas (valid Protocols, INFCIRC/327/Add.1 and for at least one year) for inspectors. INFCIRC/369/Add.1 respectively, do not allow IAEA inspectors physical access to any facilities. States also agree to provide the IAEA with Under their respective Additional Protocols, both information about, and IAEA verification countries are required to provide information on mechanisms for, any research and development nuclear imports and exports to and from NNWS, and activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. on activities in cooperation with NNWS relating to the nuclear fuel cycle. Finally, States agree to provide the IAEA with information on the manufacture and export of India: As a non-signatory to the NPT, India lacks the sensitive nuclear-related technologies, and IAEA comprehensive safeguards that NNWS signatories to verification mechanisms for manufacturing and the NPT have. India’s Additional Protocol stipulates import locations in the State. that only certain facilities are placed under safeguards. The Protocol only requires India to share Model Additional Protocol issued by the IAEA information relating to nuclear-related exports, while the Model Additional Protocol includes the sharing of information on nuclear fuel-cycle-related research Unique Additional Protocols: and development, nuclear-related imports, and uranium mining. India’s Additional Protocol also All five nuclear weapon states and India have in does not provide the IAEA with complementary place Additional Protocols that vary significantly access provisions, which allow the IAEA to inspect from the Model Additional Protocol issued by the undeclared facilities. India’s Additional Protocol IAEA. applies many of the voluntary safeguards provisions United States: As a nuclear weapon state (NWS), the that exist for nuclear weapon states, although India is United States is not required to accept comprehensive not recognized by the IAEA as a nuclear weapon safeguards under the NPT, nor to declare any nuclear state. activities. The Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/288/Add.1) expands the United States- IAEA Safeguards Agreement to include mines and STATUS OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS other locations without nuclear materials. However, Number of APs in force: 126 [+ Taiwan and the United States’ Additional Protocol is limited to Greenland] civilian nuclear facilities and excludes activities with APs signed: 146 direct national security significance. In addition, the APs approved but not yet signed: 1 United States maintains the right to decide Overall total of APs: 147 + Euratom, Taiwan, when/where to apply managed access procedures. and Greenland Although the United States Additional Protocol is Of the NNWS NPT Parties with significant otherwise very similar to the Model Additional nuclear activities: 48 have APs in force Protocol, its purpose is very different. Rather than enabling the IAEA to detect undisclosed nuclear 5 have signed activities or non-compliance with the NPT, the 1 have an AP approved by Board but not yet United States Additional Protocol serves to “assist signed [the IAEA] in developing more effective tools and techniques for use in complementary access in 8 have not commenced negotiation of an AP. NNWS.” Note: 1. “Significant nuclear activities” United Kingdom and France: The Additional encompasses any amount of nuclear material Protocols for both the UK (INFCIRC/263/Add.1) and in a facility or location outside facilities Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes © James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Last Update: 09/23/2015 AP (LOF), or nuclear material in excess of the El Salvador: 24 May 04 exemption limits in INFCIRC/153 paragraph Estonia: 1 Dec 05 37. Fiji: 14 Jul 06 2. States with significant nuclear activities Finland: 30 Apr 04 are shown in bold. France: 30 Apr 04 States with Additional Protocols in Force: FYROM: 11 May 07 Afghanistan: 19 Jul 05 Gabon: 25 Mar 10 Albania: 3 Nov 10 Gambia: 18 Oct 11 Andorra: 19 Dec 11 Georgia: 3 Jun 03 Angola: 28 Apr 10 Germany: 30 Apr 04 Ghana: 11 June 04 Antigua and Barbuda: 15 Nov 13 Greece: 30 Apr 04 Armenia: 28 Jun 04 Guatemala: 28 May 08 Australia: 12 Dec 97 Haiti: 9 Mar 06 Austria: 30 Apr 04 Holy See: 24 Sep 98 Azerbaijan: 29 Nov 00 Hungary: 1 Jul 07 Bahrain: 20 Jul 11 Iceland: 12 Sep 03 Bangladesh: 30 Mar 01 India 25 Jul 14 Belgium: 30 Apr 04 Indonesia: 29 Sep 99 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3 Jul 13 Iraq: 10 Oct 12 Botswana: 24 Aug 06 Ireland: 30 Apr 04 Bulgaria: 01 May 09 Italy: 30 Apr 04 Burkina Faso: 17 Apr