Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 190 | 23.11.2015 www.osw.waw.pl Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces Piotr Szymański The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian mi- litary activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in de- fence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces , speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithu- ania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will de- pend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The evolution of the Baltic states’ security and defence policies In the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, Lithua- age of Russia. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia saw nia, Latvia and Estonia had to face the challenge Russia as a threat to their sovereignty and na- of defining the foundations of their security pol- tional identity2. Their fears of Russian revision- icies and building up their defence capabilities. ism and possible moves to incorporate them into In the first half of the 1990s the Baltic states the Russian sphere of influence were rooted in considered three directions of security policy: the experience of 50 years of occupation, as well (a) neutrality or non-aligned status; (b) a trilat- as the presence of Russian-speaking minorities. eral alliance (in close military co-operation with These fears were fuelled by Russia’s moves to the Nordic states); (c) aspirations to join NATO prevent the Baltic states from integrating with and the EU1. The former two options were seen the West (which included the threat or use of as a temporary alternative to the security guar- force, provocations, economic pressure, and antees that NATO could offer, because at that allegations concerning violations of the rights time the Baltic states’ room for manoeuvre was of Russian-speaking minorities)3. In view of all limited by the Russian troops still stationed on this, in the mid-1990s the Baltic states identi- their territories (until 1993 and 1994). The Baltic fied membership in NATO and the EU as their states’ foreign policy at that time was built on 2 a positive image of the West and a negative im- J. Kozakiewicz, ‘Polityka bezpieczeństwa państw bałty- ckich’ [Security policy of the Baltic states], Instytut Studiów Strategicznych, Kraków 2003, p. 105-247. 1 G. Miniotaitė, ‘Lithuania’s Evolving Security and Defence 3 The Russians sought to have the withdrawal of their Policy: Problems and Prospects’, in R. Lopata, J. Novag- troops from the Baltic states linked with the question of rockienè, G. Vitkus (ed.), Lithuanian Annual Strategic Re- respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities view 2006, Military Academy of Lithuania 2007, p. 179. in Latvia and Estonia. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 190 1 foreign and security policy objective (by joining alistic5. Lithuania and Latvia, and to some extent NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and Estonia, complied with the doctrine in force in signing Association Agreements with the EU). NATO, which emphasised out-of-area operations, When they regained independence, the Baltic and the Baltic states stepped up their involve- states had no armed forces of their own. The cre- ment in foreign missions (since the mid-1990s ation of armed forces, which began in the years they have taken part in several UN operations in 1990–1991, became an important element of the Balkans and the Middle East, usually as part the reconstruction of their statehood. Lithuania, of Danish contingents). A real test for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had to build the structures of Latvia and Estonia came with their involvement individual military branches from scratch, and the in the NATO/USA expeditionary operations in same goes for military commands, training and 2003–2014 in Afghanistan (NATO’s ISAF) and Iraq education systems as well as defence ministries. (the USA’s Iraqi Freedom). In proportion to their demographic potential, the Baltic states made some of the greatest contributions among NATO After regaining independence, Lithuania, members to foreign missions6. Their involvement Latvia and Estonia started building their defined the direction in which Lithuania and Lat- armed forces from scratch. via modernised their armed forces, which were professionalised (Latvia stopped conscription in 2006 and Lithuania did so two years later), and In the 1990s the Baltic states, like much of Eu- developed their expeditionary potential at the ex- rope at that time, developed their armed forces pense of the capability to defend their own terri- according to a conscription-based model with tories. In both countries the reforms also involved a large reserve base, complemented by volunteer a downsizing of numbers of troops, reservists territorial defence forces (TDF). They co-operat- and territorial defence forces members (TDF in ed with many countries in terms of the acquisi- Lithuania were incorporated into the land force tions of armament and military equipment, troop in 2003) and investments in the navy and special training and the implementation of NATO stan- forces. Estonia adopted a more reserved stance dards, including in particular the Nordic states, with regard to the doctrine changes within NATO Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, (while actively participating in foreign missions); the United States and Israel. This resulted in the it maintained a high mobilisation capacity, re- procurement of disparate types of military equip- tained conscription, and the principle of total ment (transferred or sold on preferential terms), defence, which envisaged the involvement or all impediments to trilateral military co-operation military and civilian structures, as well as state in- and development of different strategic cultures4. stitutions, in the defence of the state. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became NATO mem- bers in 2004. Once they obtained the Alliance’s 5 E. Männik, ‘The Evolution of Baltic Security and Defence Strategies’, in T. Lawrence, T. Jermalavicius (ed.), Ap- guarantees, their sense of security improved prenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of considerably: in their strategic documents, the Defence Development in the Baltic States, p. 30. 6 three states considered a scenario of direct mil- In Iraq, soldiers from the Baltic states served in three sec- tors: the US central zone (an Estonian platoon), the Polish itary aggression against any of them to be unre- zone (a Lithuanian platoon and a Latvian company) and the British zone (a Lithuanian platoon). In Afghanistan suc- cessive rotations of soldiers involved company-sized forc- es. The Lithuanian contingent commanded the Provincial 4 Despite obstacles, since the mid-1990s the Baltic states Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province of Ghor, while have been developing trilateral military co-operation. the Latvian contingent was part of the Norwegian PRT in This includes preparations to participation in foreign the Maymana province and the Estonian contingent served missions (BALTBAT), airspace surveillance (BALTNET), under British command in the Helmand province. P. Pal- mine countermeasures (BALTRON) and military educa- jak, ‘Participation In International Military Operations’, in T. tion (BALTDEFCOL). Lawrence, T. Jermalavicius (ed.), op. cit., p. 224. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 190 2 The Baltic states have a small military potential GDP, but the financial crisis prevented them from and have no capability to independently en- carrying out these plans9. The annexation of gage in the regular defence of their own ter- Crimea in March 2014 triggered a public debate ritory (see Appendix 1). This is mainly due to on security and defence policy in the Baltic states. the small size of their armed forces and the fact that they are poorly equipped. In some areas, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are only starting The Russian aggression against Ukraine to develop certain capabilities (e.g. the mech- triggered a public debate on security and anisation of infantry in Latvia). Due to budget- defence policy in the Baltic states. ary constraints, the Baltic states’ air forces do not have combat components (their tasks are limited to transport and training), and their Some politicians, military and experts started to land forces have no tanks. In foreign missions, see Russia as a direct threat to the Baltic states’ they are capable of quickly deploying compa- sovereignty and territorial integrity. The poten- ny-sized land force units, special forces or sup- tial crisis scenarios that were discussed included porting maritime patrol and mine countermea- a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from con- sures operations. The land forces are the main ventional aggression to unconventional threats military branch in the Baltic states (in each of such as information warfare, cyber-attacks, sab- them,