UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 27 Date 30/05/2006 Time 9:39:26 AM S-0863-0003-02-00001 Expanded Number S-0863-0003-02-00001 items-in-Peace-keeping operations - India/Pakistan - miscellaneous correspondence Date Created 14/10/1965 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0863-0003: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: India/Pakistan Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit TO: THE SECRETARY- GENERAL TK<t4SK<1- A1- •f PJione : 6II84S 85, LODI ESTATE S ! • NEWDELHI3. October 14, 1965 Dear U Thant, I am grateful to you for your kind and appreciative letter of October 2. The Indo- Pakistan conflict is still continuing, though not on the same scale as before the cease-fire was ordered. The cease-fire, such as it is (with charges of violations from both sides) seems to be somewhat precarious: and there is certainly no cease-fire so far as trie radio and the press are concerned. Each side refers to the otner as the enemy and the acutely hostile propaganda is going on. One can only hope that some time conditions will improve to enable you and the UN to proceed to the next step. I have been revolving \vithin my mind various considerations and finally reduced them to writing to clarify my own thoughts, I showed my note to a friend who had spent a number of years at the UN headquarters and is more intimate with its functioning than I am. With my basic approach, he agreed most warmly\ but he made one or two comments which I have appended to the note drawn by me. You will see from it that there is a suggestion of a high-powered Expert Committee to be appointed by the UN to work out a compre- hensive solution not only of the political pro- blem but of the economic and social problems. I have had in mind the possibility of a blue-print being prepared under sortie; such auspices to indi- cate the number of projects,for economic and social progress,not only of India, Pakistan and Kashmir bu.t also of Nepal, Bhutan\'and Sikkim — in fact all the units in the sub-continent south of the Himalayas. Phone : 6 I ! 8 4 5 85, LODI ESTATE NEW DELHI 3. V/hat I have in view is the effect that such a plan would have on the thinking of the millions of people in this sub-continent. They do not realize clearly at the moment how the vast funds that are now being diverted towards building up armaments could be used for constructive purposes. I have been labouring for a settlement of Indo-Pakistan problems, including Kashmir, for several years. One must continue to work with infinite patience and faith in the hope that some day, whether in my life-time or later, there may be an enduring and satisfactory solution. With warm regards, Yours sincerely, PROBLEM OF KASHMIR The prospects of a satisfactory settlement of In<3o-Pakistan problems app©a- f red reasonably brigttt in Jfovember, BS2, inaniediately after China's Aggression ia Befa, when the Governmftnta of the two countries eigmd a ^oint comuniqus accepting responsibility for "an equity 20 and hosnoiarabl© solution of Kashmir and other related pE»ob3anB"« Th© IK. and the USA were tmr©s@rv©<31y in favour of the ImplisraeiJtation of this agreement* A series of seven eossf ©renews between fee Homo Ministers of the tvjo countries followed) bat fcdted to produce a posi- tives solution* 2n retrospect it is evidezafc that if the Seradet ffiiion ted. supported at that time th© t\»o Western Powers in their efforts to promote a settleiaentj the result might have been different* la?* Hehru r©aliz;ed too late the necesetty for a fresh approach and ordered Sheikh Abdullah1 s release when h© was already in rapidly failing health* 6h©iMi Abdullah could hav© played a big, possibly a decisive} part ia achieving a settlement, had hs release corns at the @nd of 1962 f instead of ©igh.t@@ia months lator. I remember Sheikh Abdullah disclosing vjith me ia the midd3B of Mgy^ 1964 th© prospects of his mission, to see President &yit> Khaa at Bawalpindi* I suggested to him that IT© should say and do nothing that nrilght harden public opinion ia India and Pakistan against him* The line that was most likely to brirg suc- cess (\v@ agreed) was an appeal to both countries to com© together for a lasting HlMu-Muslim friendship as a preliminary to joint collaboration, in © number of fields to promote th© economic and social progress of th© himdreds of millions SjahobitiRg th© sub-continent* Sheikh Abdullah coti3d b© a bridgs«bui3d@r bet- ween the two countries and ©am the gratitude and confidence of Indie and Pakistan*. He vjas in complete agreaaant with this Hue of thinking, subject only to a proviso s was th©r© an$r'certainty that Nehru would live fep another year or even six months ? Without, him as India's Pria© Minister, the prospects of a negotiated settlement seemed to him bleak* Sheikh Abdullah ted not found a positive response from soxa® of Nehru's senior colleagues in the la&Ua Cabimt» *• 2 *~ - 2 - Nehru's physical condition was of course most unsatisfactory, though no one ex- pected th© end to come so quickly and he died within a week of this conversation. I recall it because Sheikh Abdullah has had apprehensions, particular^ since Nehru's death, about the willingness of the new Government of India under Lai Bahadur Shastri to strive for a fair settlement. As a border State, with its frontiers touching India and Pakistan, Kashmir has no hope, in his view, of a peaceful existence unless her status is such as to be acceptable without reser- vations to both her big neighbours* Events in the subsequent months seeojslfc to have strengthened his fears that India wouM prove unyielding on Kashmir* In another discussion with Sheikh Abdullah early in February, 1965, also in X New DeOM, when h© was on the ev© of undertaking his foreign tour, I begged him to remember that a settlement of the Kashmir problem was possible only with the willing consent of both India and Pakistan, For bringing about such a settle- ment it would be essential to exercise, I ventured to tell him,itke utmost cir- cumspection in all his speeches and actions. It was in the course of that dis- cussion that we evols/ed the proposal of a round table conference of India, Fakis* tan and Kashmir, The basic principle of such a rounfl table conference could be the Rawalpindi formula of November9 1962 - "an equitable and honourable solution of Kashmir and other related problems" - but extended In scope to include the people of Kashmir also. The p? ocedure followed by the British Government in thethirtles in regard to the future of Burma could, I pointed out, be followed in the case of Kashmir* Sheikh Abdullah was attracted by the proposal; but he had serious misgivings ; about free and fair elections in Kashmir being held to endorse any positive pro- posals that might emerge from the round table conference. He referred to the results of the two last general elections in Kashmir, in which th© ruling party secured overwhelming majorities, in the last one 59 out of 75 seats being un- eontested. Such results, he was certain, could not be obtained in any free and fair elections. It was a valid point, but not an insuperable obstacle : the / - 3 . elections could foe bsM raider conditions that would ensure fr©©dom from faaranee by the executive or vested interests* As a step towards a settlement 9 I asked him if bs would consider his party contesting the next general ©lections in 1967s &sp©eisl3y as h& was confident winning for hie group 45 to 60 ©eats in a fair ©lection* As the leader of the successful majority party s b© couM have a Ministry consisting of his own jsea* K© could farther negotist© with the Government of India for the creation of a separate portfolio at How Delhi for Kashmir affairs^ with perhaps himself as the Minister in charge with cabinet rank9 somewhat, on the lines of the Ministry for Scottish affairs in the British Governn&nt* Ho plebiscite wouid^ in those cir- cuBsstaaces^ b© necessary* These atsps could be taken x^ithin the framework of the Xndifln Ccmstitution and no one in India could reasonably oppose them, sheikh Abdullah ^as non-committal on this suggestion! he had not thought of such an approach and obviously needed time to consider its implications* This sketch of the baclcgromad is necessary for the rest of this note. If pa?ess reports ©re accuratet Sheikh -Abdullah was sharply critical of %dia in SOIJB of his utterances abroad In the spring of 1965, but not more than when h© spok© la India* His interview with Ch0ii*eiv.3L^i in A3giers t-aas indiscreet^ whatgvex* might have be©n the scop© of their talk* It has gravely prejudiced Iadian opinion against him and thus further complicated the problem of Kashmir1* Qa tha other sid© must be set th© steps taken by the Gweramsnt tf India in recent months for the complete integration of Kashmir with the rest of th© I&diaa Union* Uteilatoral action of this kinds after th© commitment accepted by fiehru in IToveotosrj 1B6S9 was bound to create ressfefcmsafc in Pakistan* The Rann of Kutoh affair^ followed by the large-scale infiltrations into JCashrair in the weeks pre- ceding 6th AUgnstf has created an explosive situation* Oae hopeful feature at present is that all th© Big P0wers hav@ positively supported the security Cooncil* s resolution of SOth S^ptenibai? calHng for a cease-fire and th© withdrawal of all armed porsonnel to their 5th of August posi- tions $ tha day on which infiltration was Qiseovored* • ••# 4 • «.