ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN JUNE 2017 This page left intentionally blank Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan June 2017 Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $225,000 for the 2017 Fiscal Year. This includes $13,000 in expenses and $213,000 in DoD labor. Generated on June 1, 2017 RefID: 3-15EF0A8 This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92) and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the fifth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2019. This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2016, through May 31, 2017. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2017, through November 30, 2017. TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1 Section 1 – Strategy and Objectives ............................................................................................... 6 1.1 U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ................................................................................................. 6 1.2 U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan ............................................................................................. 7 1.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Mission ............................................................................................. 8 1.4 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission ................................................................................... 9 1.5 Indicators of Effectiveness .................................................................................................. 16 Section 2 – Threat Assessment ..................................................................................................... 18 2.1 Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations ................................................................... 18 2.2 Current Security Conditions ................................................................................................ 19 2.3 Anticipated Security Conditions ......................................................................................... 28 Section 3 – Overview of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ............................... 30 3.1 Strategy ................................................................................................................................ 30 3.2 Budget ................................................................................................................................. 31 3.3 Force Size and Structure ..................................................................................................... 33 3.4 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 36 3.5 Assessment .......................................................................................................................... 39 Section 4 – Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army ...................................................... 41 4.1 Ministry of Defense ............................................................................................................. 41 4.2 Afghan National Army ........................................................................................................ 51 Section 5 – Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police ....................................................... 68 5.1 Ministry of Interior .............................................................................................................. 68 5.2 Afghan National Police ....................................................................................................... 75 Section 6 – Financing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ................................... 83 6.1 Holding the Afghan Ministries Accountable ...................................................................... 83 6.2 U.S. Contributions ............................................................................................................... 84 6.3 International Contributions ................................................................................................. 84 6.4 Afghan Government Contributions ..................................................................................... 85 Annex A – Indicators of Effectiveness for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior 87 Annex B – Acronyms.................................................................................................................... 92 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) began the third year of full responsibility for their nation’s security with a new plan to end the stalemate with the Taliban and restructure the force to become more agile and lethal over the next four years. During the December 1, 2016, through May 31, 2017, reporting period, the ANDSF completed their winter campaign plan, Operation Shafaq II, implementing operational readiness cycles (ORC), including collective training across all Afghan National Army (ANA) corps. While executing the winter campaign, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) worked to transform President Ghani’s plan to increase security and governance in Afghanistan by 2020 into a “Road Map” that restructures the ANDSF into a force that can achieve such a goal. During this reporting period, the ANDSF developed Operation Khalid to guide combat operations during the next year and to begin restructuring the force. U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) currently retains a force posture of approximately 8,400 personnel in Afghanistan, down from approximately 9,800 personnel in 2016, and conducts two well-defined and complementary missions: supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda, its associates, and other terrorist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliate in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K); and training, advising, and assisting (TAA) the ANDSF through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support (RS) mission. The drawdown of U.S. forces during this reporting period presented moderate to moderate-high risk to the mission, but the United States and coalition partners maintained sufficient numbers of personnel to conduct the TAA mission at the ministries, ANA corps, and Afghan National Police (ANP) zones. THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY CONDITIONS Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from as many as 20 insurgent and terrorist networks present or operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, ISIS-K, and al Qaeda, in what is the highest concentration of extremist and terrorist groups in the world. Despite the convergence of these groups in Afghanistan, the ANDSF retained control of all major population centers during this reporting period. Taliban capabilities and operations varied significantly by region. The group continued to exploit its limited successes and tout them as strategic victories through the proficient use of social media and propaganda campaigns. The combination of U.S. counterterrorism operations, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and a lack of support from the local populace have diminished ISIS-K’s influence and caused it to decline in size, capability, and ability to hold territory. At its height, ISIS-K had a presence in six provinces but it is now largely confined to four districts in Nangarhar Province. ISIS-K remains a threat to security in Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and a threat to U.S. and coalition forces, and ISIS-K retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks in urban centers. The ANDSF are generally capable of protecting major population centers, preventing the Taliban from maintaining prolonged control of specific areas, and responding to Taliban attacks. The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) have proven to be effective at leading offensive clearing 1 operations. While the ANDSF has had success in urban areas, the Taliban have experienced success in controlling some rural areas through exploiting opportunities to occupy cleared areas after the ANDSF failed to consolidate gains and establishing a persistent presence. Continued