DIALOGUE QUARTERLY Volume-18 No. 4 April-June, 2017 Subscription Rates : For Individuals (in India) Single issue Rs. 30.00 Annual Rs. 100.00 For 3 years Rs. 250.00 For Institutions: Single Issue Rs. 60.00 in India, Abroad US $ 15 Annual Rs. 200.00 in India, Abroad US $ 50 For 3 years Rs. 500.00 in India, Abroad US $ 125 All cheques and Bank Drafts (Account Payee) are to be made in the name of “ASTHA BHARATI”, Delhi. Advertisement Rates : Outside back-cover Rs. 25, 000.00 Per issue Inside Covers Rs. 20, 000.00 ,, Inner page coloured Rs. 15, 000.00 ,, Inner full page Rs. 10, 000.00 ,, DIALOGUE QUARTERLY Editorial Advisory Board Mrinal Miri Jayanta Madhab B.B. Kumar Editor J.N. Roy Associate Editor Pranav Kumar ASTHA BHARATI DELHI The views expressed by the contributors do not necessarily represent the view-point of the journal. © Astha Bharati, New Delhi Printed and Published by Dr. Lata Singh, IAS (Retd.) Secretary, Astha Bharati Registered Office: 27/201 East End Apartments, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I Extension, Delhi-110096. Working Office: 23/203 East End Apartments, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I Extension, Delhi-110096 Phone : 91-11-22712454 e-mail : [email protected] web-site : www. asthabharati.org Printed at : Nagri Printers, Naveen Shahdara, Delhi-32 Contents Editorial Perspective 7 Kashmir Valley in Turmoil: Difficult Choices Mob Lynchings: Need to address the Deeper Malaise 1. North-East Scan Language, Culture, Communication and Identity 13 Patricia Mukhim The Manipur BJP government must now look to heal democracy 18 Pradip Phanjoubam Connectivity Improvements in Northeast India: the Role of Two Bridges 21 M. P. Bezbaruah 2. Improving Course-Content and Textbooks at the School Stage 23 Prof. H. S. Srivastava 3. Envisioning Education for New India: Curricular Reforms [Reflections on the Curriculum Renewal in School Education 2000-04] 33 J.S. Rajput 4. The Textbook Vision of Indian History 46 Ashish Dhar 5. Teaching to Hate 54 Neeraj Atri 6. Why Modern Mind Finds It Difficult to Understand Classical Indian Thinking 66 Dr. Binod Kumar Agarwala DIALOGUE, Volume-18 No. 4 5 7. Tagore’s India 81 Saradindu Mukherji 8. What Gandhiji Tried to Achieve 95 Dharampal 9. Understanding Bharat/India: Some Reflections on the Discourses of Raja Rao, Makarand Paranjape and Rajiv Malhotra 120 Sudhir Kumar 10. Indology in China 136 Prof. Dr. Shashibala 11. Of Sages, Indigenous Faith Movements and India’s Unity - North East India and the Global Context 142 Sujatha Nayak 12. Women in Indian Democracy: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly 158 Dr. Shamika Ravi 13. Influence of North East India on Culture and Sculptural Art of Arakan 169 Vinay Kumar Rao 6 DIALOGUE, Volume-18 No. 4 Editorial Perspective Kashmir Valley in Turmoil: Difficult Choices By now the Kashmir Valley has been in turmoil for nearly a year, beginning with the death of Hizbul Mujahideen Commander Burhan Wani in a security forces (SF) action in July 2016. Stone pelting at the SF and to thwart SF actions against the militants, shut downs, anti- India demonstrations and rising trend of attacks on the security forces and the police personnel across the valley, have defined the situation since them. Mob lynching of Dy. S.P. Mohd. Ayub Pandit on June 22 at Jama Masjid, Srinagar, and earlier killing of police S.I. Dar and 5 other policemen in Anantnag distt. in June 2017 are worrying developments, I do not remember an incident in which a mob had lynched a police officer on duty. The movement is led by leaderless youth, with, widespread use of social media to radicalise the youth and organize shut-downs demonstrations and stone peltings. In a way it’s the longest lasting campaign unlike in 2008 and 2010. A perception of wider alienation of Valley Muslims and consequent rising helplessness of the state govt., are causes of serious concern. Early end to the current situation is essential as it affects our international standing. With muscular policy option being exercised by the govt., and refusal to talk to the secessionist leaders, including the Hurriet leaders, no immediate way out or options are visible. The present situation in the Valley is a function of several developments in the state, since the last Assembly elections, resulting in the formation of the BJP-PDP coalition govt. Combined with the refusal of govt. of India (perhaps rightly so) to talk to Pakistan unless it stops terrorist actions in India, the ever existing sub-liminal alienation in the Valley got further exacerbated. Earlier the situation was managed between over ground political groups like NC, PDP & Congress etc., being active and the carrot of negotiations with Hurriyet and secessionist groups and with Pakistan to resolve the socalled Kashmir problem provided some kind of political space, hope and movement. In effect since 1996 when the DIALOGUE, Volume-18 No. 4 7 Govt. of India engaged with the secessionists, no progress has been made, but it created an environment of optimism in the Valley which were further enhanced by the Govt. of India’s engagement with Gen. Musharaff. Briefly the Valley was thriving in an environment of hope and expectations, however, impractical and improbable. The myth of solution was being sustained by all the stakeholders, situation, though always remained fragile. Whatever we say or do Pakistan is always a large brooding presence in minds of the Valley muslims; besides the apprehension of outsiders (including political parties like the Congress & BJP) having a say or influence in the Valley and the state. All this, was since the 1989-90 defined a by strong communal underpinnings which have not diminished. The Islamic element of the Valley politics, disclaimers not withstanding, is currently driving the discontent and violence in the Valley. Use of social media to radicalise the youth is the latest phenomenon and has sinister potential to involve IS etc. who are adept at using social media to recruit and radicalise. In this background of no talks with the secessionists in the Valley and Pakistan, the induction of BJP in the govt. was like a red rag to the bull in the Valley and aroused the dormant fears of pre-1947 Dogra, and Jammu (read Hindu) domination. It can be said with conviction that the entry of BJP in a coalition govt. in the state is an important factor in the present situation in the Valley, whatever may have been the considerations, given the environment in the Valley. The experiment seems to have backfired. The revival of the dormant armed militancy is another consequence, but that can be dealt with as by itself it is not serious yet. It is also not clear as to how much control Pakistan and United Jihad Council (UTC) led by Salahuddin exercises on the new crop of radicalised militants. A successor Commander of Burhan Wani of the Hizbul Mujahideen had resigned saying he was fighting for Islam and not Pakistan. Now there is no easy exit and perhaps the PDP has hurt its political prospects rather seriously. The hardline towards Pakistan is justified, but the same approach to the Valley separatists requires correctives. While no quarter need be given to the armed militants, and its supporter Pakistan, the same stand vis-à-vis Hurriet and others of the kind needs a nuanced approach. After all they are Indians and doors need to be kept open, for if nothing else, to wean maderates among them from Pakistan. 8 DIALOGUE, Volume-18 No. 4 More difficult is to engage the agitating youth, who do not seem to have an identifiable leadership or organization or clear set of demands. They have no faith either in the Hurriet or other over-ground political parties like the NC, PDP, Congress etc. In present stand of the govt. they see denial of existence of the “Kashmir problem needing solution” (a long held view in the Valley) and hence their frustration and its manifestation in defiant and violent actions. Pakistan, and the militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen are taking advantage of it. Engaging the youth remains the most difficult and desirable step. Another important point is to ensure that in the current conflict the mainline political parties do not become irrelevant or are side-lined, as they remain the best bet to defuse the situation. It happened in early 1990’s when the militancy broke-out and it took years to manage their come back. Another lession from the past is that between 1987 and 1989, the NC led state govt. in the face of growing alienation and loss of credibility progressively became irrelevant till the armed militancy broke out and centre had to intervene. Of course, the ground situation is not the same with the police and security forces in control. It is the political management which remains problematic. All these years since the Independence, significant number of the Valley Muslims have nurtured a belief that Kashmir problem is yet to be resolved and Pakistan and Islam form an important element of it. For them acceptance of status quo as final, poses an existential threat to the Muslim majority state. It is this fear of domination of outsiders and presence of BJP in the Govt. which is driving the current unrest. It is a difficult dilemma and engaging the youth remains the key to defusing the crisis. Mob Lynchings: Need to address the Deeper Malaise The incidents of mob-violence or lynchings in the recent past cutting across caste, communal and social divides, instead of arousing our conscience and start an introspection on the causes and remedies has led to mutual recriminations, accusations and seeking bizarre kind of justifications from the past.