Failsafe? The Effect of Advanced Automation on Commercial Aviation Liability Law Dayan M. Hochman, Esq. Institute of Air and Space Law McGill University, Montreal April 2016. A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master in Laws. ©Dayan Hochman, 2016. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………………3 Abstract (English)…………………………………………………………………………………4 Abstract (French)…………………………………………………………………….....................6 Chapter One……………………………………………………………………………………….8 Chapter Two……………………………………………………………………………………...17 Chapter Three…………………………………………………………………………………….51 Chapter Four/Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...94 Chapter One Table of Authorities………………………………………………………………107 Chapter Two Table of Authorities………………………………………………………...……108 Chapter Three Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………….112 Chapter Four Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………...…117 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank and acknowledge Dr. Paul S. Dempsey and the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University for giving her the knowledge, support and encouragement necessary to follow her passion, and complete this thesis. She would also like to specially thank Aaron Blaise Treeson for his unwavering support and for making it possible for her to pursue this degree and attain her dreams to become an aviation attorney. She would also like to thank her family, specifically Deanna Voisin, Mary Jane and Andrew Sobel, Charles Vigil, Lynn Brown, Andrea Leeman and Amanda Mills for their constant support throughout this process, even when the finish line seemed so far away. And finally, she would like to thank her classmates and now good friends, especially Alex Leonard, Kerianne Wilson, Sandy Belle Habchi, Neil Wolf and Catherine Anne Goldrick for showing her the beautiful city of Montréal. Vous averez toujours un piéce de mon coeur. Merci à tous. 3 ABSTRACT “Look at you, hacker: a pathetic creature of meat and bone, panting and sweating as you run through my corridors. How can you challenge a perfect, immortal machine?” — Ken Levine, System Shock 2 (1999). Modern aviation is most arguably defined by the presence of automation in the cockpit. From the inception of jet transport, computers have been an omnipresent symbol of assurance against the certain uncertainty of human error. In the business of commercial aviation, computers are considered to be the first line of defense against risk. Major manufacturers, such as Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier, Embraer, Dassault, and Eclipse have updated the design of their most modern aircraft to include state-of-the-art computing systems and “fly-by-wire” technology under the guise that the computers always know best. However, pilot certification programs and the international regulatory laws that govern them must be equally revised to insure the human component as the other side of the equation of modern day aviation is always up to task. Many of the most recent major accidents and incidents over the last three decades have been the result of automation errors or failures in human response to those errors. This thesis explores the effect automation and the incidents caused as a result thereof have had on the dissemination of liability amongst major aircraft manufactures, insurers, and airlines in the wake of such events. It also explores the effect, if any, these issues have had on products liability, aviation insurance, and private international air law. And lastly, this thesis suggests both regulatory and educational reforms the industry could adopt to reduce dangers associated with automation complacency1 in hopes of eventually reducing or even eradicating such risk. Despite the threat of catastrophic litigation and demands by the public and leading regulatory authorities 1 The references “automation over-dependence” and “automation complacency” are used interchangeably throughout this work. 4 for improvements in regulatory policy and laws, however, industry motivation to address problems with automation through specific improvements in training, technology and design continues to remain low; therefore creating a seminal question lingering amongst all members of the modern aviation industry: can the advanced complexity of automation ever be considered failsafe against the imperfection of man? This thesis sets out to explore this quandary. 5 RÉSEUMÉ L’aviation moderne se caractérise sans aucun doute par l'automatisation des diverses opérations de la cabine de pilotage. Ainsi, depuis les débuts du transport aérien, les ordinateurs ont contribué à pallier aux possibles erreurs humaines. Dans le secteur de l'aviation commerciale, les ordinateurs sont considérés comme l’un des moyens de défense les plus efficaces face aux risques. D’importants manufacturiers tels que Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier, Embraer, Dassault et Eclipse conçoivent désormais leurs avions en y incluant les toutes dernières technologies informatiques et des systèmes de commandes de vol électriques, au motif que les ordinateurs sont plus efficaces. Toutefois, les programmes de certification des pilotes et les réglementations internationales qui les encadrent doivent également faire l’objet d’une révision afin d’assurer que la composante humaine, l’autre partie de l'équation de l'aviation moderne, puisse également être mise à jour. Bon nombre des plus récents incidents et accidents majeurs dans le domaine de l’aviation au cours des trois dernières décennies ont été le résultat d'erreurs d'automatisation ou encore d’échecs dans la réponse humaine apportée à ces erreurs. Le présent mémoire abordera les conséquences de l'automatisation et les incidents provoqués par celle-ci quant à la responsabilité des grands manufacturiers, des assureurs et des transporteurs aériens à la suite de ces événements. De plus, ce mémoire étudiera également les effets, le cas échéant, que ces questions ont eu sur la responsabilité des produits, l'assurance dans le domaine de l’aviation ainsi que le droit international privé de l'aviation. Enfin, ce mémoire suggère deux réformes à la fois règlementaire et éducationnelle pouvant être adoptées par l’industrie. Ces réformes permettraient de réduire les dangers associés à l'automatisation de complaisance, dans l'espoir de finalement réduire et possiblement même éradiquer ce risque. Malgré les menaces de poursuites et demandes répétées par les autorités 6 publiques réglementaires visant une révision des politiques et des lois dans ce domaine, les motivations du secteur privé à résoudre les problèmes d’automatisation par le biais notamment d’amélioration au niveau de la formation, de la technologie et de la conception demeurent faibles. Par conséquent, cela engendre une question fondamentale persistante entre tous les membres de l'industrie de l'aviation moderne: la complexité de l'automatisation pourrait-elle un jour être considérée comme infaillible face à l’erreur humaine? Ce mémoire se propose d'explorer ce dilemme. 7 CHAPTER ONE: A Brief History of Advanced Automation in Commercial Aviation The concept and definition of automation in any context — notwithstanding that of aviation — has been deceptive and enigmatic throughout history. According to aviation human factors consultant Antonio Chialastri,2 “automation” is generally defined as, “the use of control systems and information technologies to reduce the need for human work in the production of goods and services.”3 Alternatively, the Oxford English Dictionary defines automation as: (1) automatic control of the manufacture of a product through a number of successive stages; (2) the application of automatic control to any branch of industry or science; and (3) by extension, the use of electronic or mechanical devices to replace human labor.4 However, another plausible definition for automation better suited to aerospace is, “the technique of controlling an apparatus, a process or a system by means of electronic and/or mechanical devices that replaces the human organism in sensing, decision-making and deliberate output.”5 In his book Automation, Chialastri asserts the presence of three definitive types of automation systems: mechanical, electrical, and electronic.6 In the early pioneering days of aviation, innovators such as the Wright Brothers relied entirely upon direct mechanical connections between cockpit controls and the moving parts of an aircraft to actively control the plane. Basic systems consisting of cables and pulleys connected the control yoke and stick and rudder pedals of an aircraft to three primary control surfaces: the ailerons, elevator and rudder. 2 See generally, Antonio Chialastri, Automation, Ed by Florian Kongoli, ed, (Rijeka: InTech, 2012). 3 Chialastri, supra n 2 79-80. 4 The Oxford English Dictionary, (1989), sub verbo “automation.” 5 Chialastri, supra n 2 at 79-80 (citing The Oxford English Dictionary, 1981, sub verbo “automation”). 6 Ibid at 85. 8 Rudimentary piston engines with fixed-pitch propellers fitted to early aircraft required only mechanical throttle, fuel mixture and carburetor heat controls to maintain thrust — establishing mechanical failure of the airplane structure or engine as the main concern for first generation pilots during flight.7 During the formative years of commercial aviation there were no instrumental aids available to help pilots fly. A piece of string attached to the wing to indicate airflow was the only gauge a pilot had to determine whether sufficient air lift existed to sustain an airplane in flight. Altimeters and anemometers,