THE IMAGE OF POLAND IN RUSSIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF HISTORICAL DISPUTES Report based on a public opinion poll carried out by the Levada Center in Russia for the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding Warsaw 2020 Report on public opinion research THE IMAGE OF POLAND IN RUSSIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF HISTORICAL DISPUTES Report based on a public opinion poll carried out by the Levada Center in Russia for the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding CENTRE FOR POLISH-RUSSIAN DIALOGUE Warsaw 2020 AND UNDERSTANDING Report on public opinion research THE IMAGE OF POLAND IN RUSSIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF HISTORICAL DISPUTES Survey: Levada Center Analyses and report: Łukasz Mazurkiewicz, Grzegorz Sygnowski (ARC Rynek i Opinia) Commentary: Łukasz Adamski, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz © Copyright by Centrum Polsko-Rosyjskiego Dialogu i Porozumienia 2020 Graphic design and typesetting: Studio 27 (www.studio27.pl) Cover photo: Lela Kieler/Adobe Stock ISBN 978-83-64486-79-1 Publisher The Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding 14/16A Jasna Street, 00-041 Warsaw, Poland tel. + 48 22 295 00 30 fax + 48 22 295 00 31 e-mail: [email protected] http://www.cprdip.pl Contents Commentary 4 Introduction – background and purpose of the study 8 Information about the study 9 Detailed findings 11 Summary 26 www.cprdip.pl 3 THE IMAGE OF POLAND IN RUSSIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF HISTORICAL DISPUTES Commentary By pursuing their particular, excessive ambi- peace in Europe, and of anti-semitism. Putin tions it was the politicians in interwar Poland played down to vanishing-point the totalitarian who submitted their nation, the Polish nation, to character of the USSR, its tactical coopera- the German war machine and generally contrib- tion with the Third Reich in destroying peace in uted to the outbreak of World War II. Europe, and its aggression during the first part of WW II. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, 19 December 2019. Each month then brought new moves with Poland in mind. First, the removal plaques in This statement by President Putin was an all- Tver commemorating victims of the Great Terror important moment in a Russian information and Polish POWs murdered in the USSR’s Katyn campaign aimed at undermining interpretations operation. Soon thereafter the State Duma accepted by European historians over the last appeared ready to cancel the resolution adopted thirty years that do not put the Soviet authorities by the Congress of People’s Deputies in Decem- in a favourable light. ber 1989 which condemned the Molotov-Rib- bentrop Pact. Finally, President Putin assumed Historical revisionism has been a feature of the role of historian in addressing the Western Vladimir Putin’s rule from the start. However, audiences through an article in National Inter- until Russia’s attack on Ukraine 2014 it did not est, a US international affairs magazine. It fea- take a radical form. While a ‘propaganda con- tured characteristic neo-Stalinist interpreta- cert’ was already under way, the lead came from tions of the causes of World War II as promoted Kremlin-serving journalists, political commen- by Russian diplomacy, with Poland presented as tators or political activists outside the govern- one of the main guilty parties. mental structures. Vladimir Putin as conductor preferred to stay in the shadows, but even he The scale and intensity of this operation prompt- would condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ed our Centre to ask about its impact in Poland when necessary. and Russia. In May 2020 we presented a report Information War and Propaganda About History, After 2014 other professionals joined the per- based on a public opinion survey conducted in formance, all skilled in attacking Poland, Poland by ARC Rynek i Opinia. The aim was to Ukraine or the Baltic States: the then Minister explore what Poles know and feel about Rus- of Culture Vladimir Medinsky, also head of the sia’s use of propaganda in describing history, Russian Military Historical Society; Speaker of and how they see Poland’s response. the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin; the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Nary- We now invite you to read the discussion shkin; and Russian diplomats. and findings from a public opinion poll con- ducted in Russia for the Centre for Polish- Finally, in December 2019 on four occasions Russian Dialogue and Understanding in June President Vladimir Putin himself openly took 2020 by the Levada Center, an independent the lead. He drew on documents widely known social research institute in Russia with a well- to historians to prepare an amateurish indict- deserved reputation. The detailed report on the ment that accused inter-war Poland of making findings was prepared by ARC Rynek i Opinia. an alliance with Hitler, of complicity in ruining 4 Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding Commentary The research findings turned out to be so inter- who have heard about them (39% of the total) esting that we decided to add a commentary to know that Russia took part in them (far fewer the report and share our observations, largely know of other partitioning powers). This shows inspired by the unprompted answers provided by that their knowledge about Polish-Russian rela- Russian respondents to open-ended questions. tions in the 18th century is shallow. Russians therefore are typically not aware of important context before the 20th century that might help Knowledge and Ignorance them understand the historical perspectives of Russia’s western neighbours. This makes them The survey aimed to explore what Russians more susceptible to propaganda today. know about key events in the history of Polish- Russian relations and how they interpret them. This influence can be seen in answers to The emerging picture reflects current historical the question about the countries which were awareness of Russian society and certain fea- responsible for starting World War II. While more tures Russian political culture, including atti- than 80% of Russians mention Germany in this tudes towards the admissibility of annexation context, one in five Russians points to the United and the politics of force or towards the ‘pan- Kingdom, one in seven mentions the USSR and Russian’ ideology, denying that Belarusians and USA, and one in ten indicates Poland. It is very Ukrainians can be nations. likely that specifically the last number is a direct result of the Kremlin campaign that has been Russians know about the former Common- running for months, aiming to deny any Soviet wealth (Rzeczpospolita in Polish, Rech Pos- responsibility for the start of WW II while blam- politaya in Russian) of the Kingdom of Poland ing other countries for it. Yet, it is worth high- and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They gener- lighting that 15% of Russians see the USSR as ally see it as a country not identical to Poland: one of the driving forces in the conflict. either Polish-Lithuanian or Polish-Lithuanian- Ukrainian-Belarusian. Only one in six Russians From the Polish perspective, Russian aware- reports negative connotations around ‘Rzeczpo- ness of the Katyn massacre is startling: only spolita’ (the Commonwealth) or the Polish word some half of Russians (54%) have heard about ‘Pan’ (Gentleman): more than 20% consider this it at all. Who do they think murdered the Polish term positive). Nearly one in three perceives the POWs? 43% of those who have heard about the Polish word szlachta (gentry) negatively. Katyn massacre say Germany. This represents 24% of the total respondents: in a Levada Center Those Polish expressions were used by the 2010 survey 18% of the respondents attributed Soviet propaganda to denigrate pre-communist the crime to Germany. Only 14% (19% in 2010) Polish past, to create and sustain negative con- of all respondents blame the USSR’s Stalinist notations. To some extent they still persist, but authorities. This result with the underlying trend the passing of time and the fact that they are highlight the challenge faced by Polish institu- not ‘heated up’ by the Kremlin mean that they tions working to spread among Russians knowl- are not now shared by a majority of Russians. edge of this massive Soviet crime. A noticeable group of Russians have a positive attitude towards Rzeczpospolita and related At the same time, Putin’s ‘monument’ propa- ideas; the largest percentage of respondents ganda finds fertile soil. Nearly 90% of Russians are neutral. have heard about Poland removing monuments to Red Army soldiers, but Poland can count on However, 42% of Russians have not heard any- only some 12% of Russians understanding why thing about the partitions of Poland. 71% of those this is happening. This issue has been used www.cprdip.pl 5 THE IMAGE OF POLAND IN RUSSIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF HISTORICAL DISPUTES efficiently by the Russian authorities to stir up for Russia taking other state’s land includes negative feelings against Poland among the references to historical entitlement (‘our’ land); Russian public. disputed legal title (terra nullius); historical/ strategic necessity; crude Darwinism (the strong get more); humanitarianism (defence of broth- Emotions erly nations, compatriots or fellow believers); and nationalism (by definition Russia is never When asked what they associate with Poland/ the aggressor). All these motivations appear in Poles, Russian respondents displayed signifi- official justifications for the annexation of the cant negative emotions. This perhaps reflects Crimea as devised for public opinion in Russia. the Kremlin’s ‘monuments’ campaign. One in four respondents did not point to specific prob- The survey findings have revealed a well-rooted lems but gave pejorative expressions (ungrate- belief in Russia that international relations are ful, traitorous, Russophobic, slippery, vindic- primarily a game between superpowers, with no tive, hostile, lying, hateful). Nevertheless, one rules protecting weaker actors: eternal impe- in three had no associations which shows that rial tendencies push stronger countries towards there is room for shaping attitudes.