NUCLEAR COLLISIONS: DISCORD, REFORM & THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES REGIME AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS NUCLEAR COLLISIONS: DISCORD, REFORM & THE NONPROLIFERATION Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Essay by Steven E. Miller Responses by Wael Al-Assad, Jayantha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan, and Ta Minh Tuan AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Please direct inquiries to: American Academy of Arts and Sciences 136 Irving Street Cambridge, MA 02138-1996 Telephone: 617-576-5000 Fax: 617-576-5050 Email: [email protected] Web: www.amacad.org Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Essay by Steven E. Miller Responses by Wael Al-Assad, Jayantha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan, and Ta Minh Tuan © 2012 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences All rights reserved. Copies of this publication can be downloaded from: http://www.amacad.org/projects/globalnuclearbooks.aspx. Suggested citation: Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, with responses from Wael Al-Assad, Jayantha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan, and Ta Minh Tuan (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012). Cover images (from left): Inactive Titan II missile in the silo at the Titan Missile Museum near Tucson, Arizona, April 3, 2008, © Richard T. Nowitz/Corbis; a view of the participants at the International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Tehran, Iran, April 17, 2010, © Vahid Salemi/AP/ Corbis; a view of the Tricastin Nuclear Power Plant in France, © David McGlynn/ Getty Images. ISBN: 0-87724-093-0 This paper is part of the American Academy’s Global Nuclear Future Initiative, which is supported in part by grants from Carnegie Corporation of New York, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The John D. and Catherine T. Mac- Arthur Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Flora Family Founda- tion, and Fred Kavli and the Kavli Foundation. The statements made and views expressed in this publication are solely the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences or the foundations supporting the Global Nuclear Future Initiative. Contents vii Preface 1 Chapter 1 Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Steven E. Miller 42 Chapter 2 A Different Point of View on Reform of the Nonproliferation Regime Wael Al-Assad 46 Chapter 3 The NPT: A Bear Pit or Threshold to a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World? Jayantha Dhanapala 50 Chapter 4 Living with an Imperfect NPT C. Raja Mohan 54 Chapter 5 How Do We Read the NPT? Ta Minh Tuan 58 Contributors Preface Nearly all of the 190 signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agree that the forty-two-year-old treaty is fragile and in need of funda- mental reform. But gaining consensus on how to fix the NPT will require recon- ciling the sharply differing views of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Strengthening the international rules is increasingly important as dozens of countries, including some with unstable political environments, explore nuclear energy. The result is an ever-increasing distribution of this tech- nology. In this volume, Steven E. Miller (Harvard University), Codirector of the Academy’s Global Nuclear Future (GNF) Initiative, outlines the main points of contention within the NPT regime and identifies the issues that have made reform so difficult. How these deep divergences can be managed, minimized, or overcome is a crucial question for the future—and a focus of the American Academy’s GNF project. For more than five decades, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has played an integral role in nonproliferation studies, beginning with a special issue of Daedalus on arms control published in 1960. Today, the GNF Initia- tive is examining the safety, security, and nonproliferation implications of the global spread of nuclear energy. Through innovative scholarship and behind-the- scenes interactions with international leaders and stakeholders, the Initiative is developing pragmatic recommendations for managing the emerging nuclear order. The GNF Initiative is supported in part by grants from Carnegie Corpo- ration of New York, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Flora Family Foundation, and Fred Kavli and the Kavli Foundation. The Acad- emy is grateful to these supporters and to the principal investigators for the Initiative: Steven E. Miller, codirector; Scott D. Sagan, codirector (Stanford Uni- versity); Robert Rosner, senior advisor (University of Chicago); and Stephen M. Goldberg, research coordinator (Argonne National Laboratory). I want to express my thanks to the authors for advancing the work of the Initiative. Leslie Berlowitz President and William T. Golden Chair American Academy of Arts and Sciences DISCORD, REFORM & THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME vii CHAPTER 1 Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Steven E. Miller International legal regimes depend on consent. Making and enforcing rules re- quires that states accept legal limits on their behavior and that they allow their behavior to be audited by some enforcement body. International legal scholar Michael Glennon offers a clear articulation of the volitional nature of interna- tional legal regimes: The international legal system cannot compel a state to subscribe to a rule unless it consents to do so. It cannot adjudicate the application of a rule to a state unless the state has accepted the jurisdiction of the tribunal to apply the rule. It cannot enforce a rule against a state unless the state has con- sented to the rule’s enforcement.1 Even when states have accepted a set of rules, Glennon further elaborates, they still have the option of withdrawing their consent. The viability, durability, and adaptability of treaty regimes, therefore, depend on the attitudes and perceptions of the states that participate in the arrangement. Without assent from member states, a treaty regime cannot survive or adapt. The problem of consent is particularly challenging in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its associated regime. This regime has an oddly schizophrenic history. On the one hand, it has attracted nearly uni- versal membership, its critical importance is routinely acknowledged, it has proven to be durable and resilient across four challenging decades, and it is given at least some credit for helping prevent the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it is chronically troubled, beset by crises and setbacks and possible defections, amidst fears for its future and doubts about its adequacy. 1. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security, and International Law (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010), 135. DISCORD, REFORM & THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 1 Precisely because of its perceived value as an impediment to the spread of nuclear weapons, there has long been worry about the wounds the NPT regime has suffered and the threats to its health and long-term durability. Writing more than a decade ago in the aftermath of the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Joseph Cirincione lauded the “remarkable” performance of the NPT sys- tem; but he lamented, “The regime has sustained serious setbacks and defeats; there may very well be more in the near future; and there remains a distinct possibility of a catastrophic collapse of the regime.”2 Thus the paradox of the NPT: crucial but fragile, resilient but menaced, effective but potentially inade- quate. Today the NPT regime is widely regarded as a system in distress. It is com- monly described as troubled, jeopardized, derailed, unraveling—eroding under the pressure of unresolved compliance crises, inadequate enforcement, diplomatic friction and distrust, spreading nuclear technology, and member-state dissatisfac- tion. There are mounting concerns about the regime’s effectiveness as a barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To many, the failure of the NPT system to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and to resolve the endless controversy over Iran’s advancing nuclear program is a disturbing symptom of the imperfection of the regime. As Pierre Goldschmidt has explained: Today’s nuclear nonproliferation regime is increasingly challenged by states that exploit ambiguity in the rules and rifts in the international community to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities without fear of reprisal. At present, lax and inconsistent compliance practices threaten nonproliferation efforts by giving some states more leeway for evading rules than should be toler- able in an effective nonproliferation regime.3 Not surprisingly, this state of affairs leads to pessimistic conclusions about the health of the NPT regime. French expert Camille Grand, for example, writes that these trends define “the emerging nuclear disorder.”4 Similarly, Graham Allison warns that “[t]he current global nuclear order is extremely fragile” and that it is marked by “growing cynicism about the nonproliferation regime.” He concludes that the trends are “currently pointing toward catastrophe.”5 In No- vember 2009, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, comprised