Sabang 96°E 97°E98°E Malahayati Andaman Sea Banda Aceh Lhokseumawe Lamno 5°N 5°N Calang Langsa Panga ACEH PROVINCE Meulaboh Belawan 4°N 4°N Medan ACEH PROVINCE, INDONESIA Blangpidie SUMATERA Provincial capital UTARA Town, village Simeulue Provincial boundary 02550 km Nayak 3°N 3°N Simeulue Indian Ocean Banyak ° 96°E 97°E 98°E 95 E 2°N Annex C Case study: Indian Ocean tsunami, Aceh province, Indonesia, 2004 The tsunami that struck the coast of Aceh province in Indonesia on 26 December 2004 created an unprecedented humanitarian challenge and an equally unprecedented international response. Military assets were sent by 16 foreign governments; 14 United Nations agencies, 38 local humanitarian groups and 195 foreign or international humanitarian organizations participated in a three-month relief effort. Foreign military assets played a pivotal role in the response, particularly the emergency relief phase. However, with so many military and civilian actors involved, there were inevitably problems regarding coordination and command. Background On Sunday 26 December 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale struck under the seabed of the Indian Ocean, about 200 kilometres off Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia. The quake caused tsunami waves that hit 12 countries around the Indian Ocean. The tsunamis travelled at 600–800 km per hour in the open sea and were up to 20 metres high when they hit the coasts at speeds of up to 60 km/h. States of emergency were declared in Indonesia, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The disaster not only triggered reactions from the usual humanitarian community but also generated enormous public concern and the deployment of an unprecedented number of military forces. Thirty-five states contributed 75 helicopters, 41 ships, 43 fixed-wing aircraft and more than 30 000 personnel, including air traffic controllers, medical teams and engineers, to the affected countries. The largest tsunamis hit the west coast of Sumatra, affecting a 500 km stretch of coastline of Aceh province and sweeping nearly 5 km inland. According to Indonesian Government estimates, 125 866 people died and approximately 419 682 were displaced.37 An assessment by the Indonesian Government and international donors estimated the damage and losses in Indonesia at US 4.45 billion.38 The roads linking the badly affected town of Meulaboh to Medan and the provincial capital Banda Aceh collapsed. Many local officials were lost in the disaster; those who survived found that their offices had 37 A further 94 000 people were reported missing and are presumed dead. Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI), TNI consolidated report on relief and coordination in Aceh, Mar. 2005, obtained during interview with authors. 38 Consultative Group on Indonesia, Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment, 19–20 Jan. 2005. 88 The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response been destroyed and, in many cases, that family members were dead or missing. In these circumstances, the local government apparatus, right up to the provincial level, was hardly functioning and could do almost nothing to assist the survivors or mount a relief effort. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared a three-month state of emergency. The initial critical needs and challenges Following the tsunami, communications networks were compromised and even satellite systems were affected. Access to the coastline closest to the earthquake’s epicentre—the west coast of Aceh—was extremely difficult, with bridges and roads washed away and the few airstrips and harbours damaged. The destruction of the main coastal road, which provided the primary arterial transport link along the west coast, prohibited heavy vehicle access to settlements and communities along its route. The already diminished local infrastructure was overwhelmed by the massive influx of assistance. There was enormous congestion at airports, on roads and across telecommunications and power networks. Relief actors also made huge demands on other resources, taking up any available land, housing, office space, vehicles, drivers and local non-governmental organization staff. Banda Aceh airport was only partially functional. Witnesses report that the airport was a scene of total mayhem, with relief supplies strewn around the runway. Flights landed, tossed out humanitarian aid supplies wherever they could and took off immediately. There did not seem to be anyone in charge. By the end of December 2004 the airport, whose air traffic control tower was damaged, had to handle an average of 132 flights daily. Under normal circumstances, it had to manage only eight flights per day. The runway of the airport in Meulaboh was cracked, preventing access by aircraft. There were no other landing sites available in Aceh for larger fixed-wing crafts. All the main seaports on the north and west coasts of Aceh were also severely damaged. As a result, most of the disaster relief aid and supplies were channelled through Medan and quickly filled up all available storage spaces at the airports and seaports there. The relief effort also had to contend with an uncertain security situation. Aceh was still in the throes of conflict between the pro-independence Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and government security forces. Earlier in 2004 there had been reports of gross human rights violations on both sides. Although martial law had been lifted in the province in May 2004, Aceh remained officially in a state of civil emergency. At the time of the tsunami, UN security status for Aceh was Phase III in Banda Aceh and Phase IV for the rest of Aceh.39 The Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentera Nasional Indonesia, TNI) was concerned about the potential for security incidents if agencies were allowed unrestricted access to all areas and so provided escorts for foreign military assets, UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs moving into Phase IV areas.40 39 Phase III Security temporarily concentrates all international staff at designated areas within the operations area. Phase IV Security warrants all international staff to be relocated outside the operations area. Phase V Security requires all international staff to leave the operations area. 40 The TNI provided security for, among others, International Organization for Migration convoys from Medan to Banda Aceh, Meulaboh and Naganraya. The TNI also escorted the distribution and medical teams of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in and around Meulaboh. Case study: Indonesia 89 The arrival of foreign military assistance, especially air assets, from Australia, New Zealand and Singapore on 28 December provided the local government with the capability to gain access to the affected and remote areas. However, coordination between the providers of these assets and the TNI took a few days to regularize because of the imprecise information available on the situation in Aceh. The existing domestic disaster management structure Indonesia’s National Coordinating Body for Disaster Management (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi, Bakornas PBP) is responsible for the coordination of disaster relief. Its tasks include formulating disaster management policy, preparing and issuing guidelines and directives, and coordinating disaster management before, during and after a disaster. It is also tasked with preparing and issuing guidelines and directives on disaster prevention, mitigation, rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction. When the tsunami struck it became clear that Indonesia lacked an appropriate disaster response mechanism. In practice, Bakornas had neither real assets, nor implementation, policy-making or enforcement powers. Furthermore, the existing response structures varied in different areas and there was insufficient communication between the different provincial disaster management offices (Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksana Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi, Satkorlaks). According to the lessons learned and best practices workshop report: the legal framework for disaster management in Indonesia emerged as somewhat weak, fragmentary and at times duplicative. Although complex command and con- trol structures were put into place in response to this exceptional event, in practice there appeared to be no clear, unique attribution of roles and responsibilities among various components of the public administration. Ad hoc decrees and regulations were issued to respond to the emergency, creating structures with uncertain power and [resources] which were sometimes duplicative of what already existed.41 UN preparedness and assessment The workshop report also found that: the United Nations did not have an adequate contingency plan. In certain cases, it stepped operations directly, bypassing the government and further weakening the latter’s planning and coordinating role. The initial response was also made less effective by the fact that in some cases assessments were not carried out early enough and their results were not shared broadly enough. Certain sectors, such as protec- tion, and special vulnerable groups, such as pregnant mothers, were also reportedly overlooked.42 41 Government of Indonesia and United Nations, ‘Post-tsunami lessons learned and best practices workshop: report and working groups output’, Report of workshop, Jakarta, 16–17 May 2005. 42 Government of Indonesia and United Nations (note 41). 90 The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response The national response to the disaster