Durham E-Theses Sympathy and Reection in Hume's Philosophy: Mind, Morals, Art and Politics KIM, BYOUNGJAE How to cite: KIM, BYOUNGJAE (2018) Sympathy and Reection in Hume's Philosophy: Mind, Morals, Art and Politics, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12958/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Sympathy and Reflection in Hume’s Philosophy: Mind, Morals, Art and Politics By Byoungjae Kim Submitted for the degree of Doctorate in Philosophy Department of Philosophy 1 Abstract Hume, as an “anatomist” of human nature, believes that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”. The naturalistic and experimental analysis of human nature, as it informs his epistemology, is the basis for other areas. Thus, in order fully to understand his philosophy, we need to shed light on the connection between Hume’s experimental analysis of human nature in epistemology, and his naturalistic account in ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. However, too often, writers on the latter are not always fully informed on his general philosophy – and vice versa. A principal aim of this research is to bring together investigation of his naturalistic epistemology, and his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. This project brings close attention to bear on all of these areas, focusing on three key concepts: sympathy, general rule, and reflection. First, I examine the nature of sympathy. I argue against recent interpreters who use his concept of sympathy to construct a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. On my interpretation, Hume employs the concept of sympathy for his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy, not for his epistemology. Second, I show that the concept of general rule plays an essential role in his philosophy. On my interpretation, Hume first establishes the general rules of human nature. He then establishes the general rules of his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. Third, I uncover the role of reflection in his philosophy. According to him, it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to matters of fact; Instead, we should adopt the experimental reasoning that he terms “reflection” to observe and generalise matters of fact, thus establishing general rules in ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. In this way, we can see the intimate connections between these diverse aspects of his philosophical writings. 2 Sympathy and Reflection in Hume’s Philosophy: Mind, Morals, Art and Politics By Byoungjae Kim Submitted for the degree of Doctorate in Philosophy The University of Durham Department of Philosophy 2018 3 Contents Abstract.................................................................................................................................................. 2 List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 6 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 8 Chapter 1. Hume on the Problem of Other Minds ............................................................................... 11 1.1. Wittgensteinian Interpretation .................................................................................................. 11 1.2. Simulation Theory Interpretation ............................................................................................. 14 1.3. Causal Inference ....................................................................................................................... 17 1.4. Argument from Analogy .......................................................................................................... 17 1.5. Vivacity, Causal Inference, and Sympathy .............................................................................. 22 1.6. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 25 Chapter 2. Hutcheson on the Origins of Morality ................................................................................ 28 2.1. Background of Hutcheson's moral philosophy ......................................................................... 29 2.2. The Ontology of Morals ........................................................................................................... 30 2.2.1. Moral Realist Interpretation .............................................................................................. 30 2.2.2. Objection against Moral Realist Interpretation ................................................................. 31 2.3. Theory of Moral Judgment ....................................................................................................... 34 2.3.1. Non-cognitivist Interpretation ........................................................................................... 35 2.3.2. Cognitivist Interpretation .................................................................................................. 36 2.4. Theory of Moral Motivation ..................................................................................................... 37 2.4.1. Two Kinds of Obligation .................................................................................................. 38 2.4.2. The Mechanism of Motivating Actions ............................................................................ 38 2.4.3. Harmony of Two Kinds of Obligation, and Divine Providence ........................................ 40 Chapter 3. Hume’s Moral Philosophy ................................................................................................. 42 3.1. The Is-Ought Passage and the Experimental Method of Reasoning ........................................ 44 3.2. Moral Cognitivism ................................................................................................................... 50 3.2.1. The Context: Two Objections against Sympathy, and General Point of View ................. 50 3.2.2. Ideal Observer Interpretation ............................................................................................ 51 3.2.3. The Problem of Ideal Observer Theory ............................................................................ 52 3.2.4. The Concept of “Ideal” vs. “Universal” ............................................................................ 55 3.3. Theory of Moral Motivation ..................................................................................................... 56 3.3.1. The Metaethical Problem .................................................................................................. 56 3.3.2. Hume’s Theory of Motivation: The Idea-Belief-Desire Model ........................................ 57 3.4. Normativity and Reflection ...................................................................................................... 60 3.4.1. Normativity as Reflexivity ................................................................................................ 61 3.4.2. Normativity as Universality .............................................................................................. 63 3.5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 64 4 Chapter 4. Hume on Sympathy and Morality ...................................................................................... 67 4.1. Contemporary Use of the Term “Sympathy” and “Empathy” .................................................. 67 4.2. The Usage of the Term “Sympathy” in the Treatise ................................................................ 69 4.3. Sympathy in the Treatise .......................................................................................................... 71 4.3.1. Limited and Extensive Sympathy in Book 2 ..................................................................... 72 4.3.2. Extensive Sympathy as the Source of Morality in Book 3 ................................................ 76 4.4. Sympathy and Humanity in the Second Enquiry ...................................................................... 92 4.4.1. The Abandonment Interpretation ...................................................................................... 92 4.4.2. No Change Interpretation .................................................................................................. 96 4.5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 99 Chapter 5. Smith on Sympathy .......................................................................................................... 100 5.1. Smith’s Concept of Sympathy