Canterbury Christ Church University’s repository of research outputs http://create.canterbury.ac.uk Please cite this publication as follows: Bennister, M. and Heffernan, R. (2015) The limits to prime ministerial autonomy: Cameron and the constraints of coalition. Parliamentary Affairs, 68 (1). pp. 25-41. Link to official URL (if available): https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsu013 This version is made available in accordance with publishers’ policies. All material made available by CReaTE is protected by intellectual property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law. Contact: [email protected] The Limits to Prime Ministerial Autonomy: Cameron and the Constraints of Coalition Mark Bennister (Canterbury Christ Church University) Richard Heffernan (The Open University) Abstract In heading up a coalition David Cameron has had to confront two unusual constraints that prevent him from being a predominant prime minister. The first constraint, something unfamiliar to previous prime ministers, is his having to work with and through a coalition partner firmly placed to the Conservatives' left. The second constraint, equally problematic, but more familiar, is that Cameron has faced a restive Conservative parliamentary party in which a sizable minority of Tory MPs remained unreconciled to his political agenda. These two interrelated constraints mean Cameron has lacked the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by most past prime ministers. Two aspects of Cameron's premiership help cast light on his predicament: First, his relations with Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats; and second, the nature of his dependency upon Conservative MPs. We look at these in turn and conclude by assessing Cameron's effectiveness as prime minister. Keywords: Prime Minister; Coalition; Cameron; Clegg; Conservative party; Liberal Democrats 1 Prime ministerial power, for reasons we have argued elsewhere (Heffernan 2003, 2005, 2013; Bennister 2008, 2009, 2012), waxes and wanes, but prime ministers draw their authority from the fact that party leaders matter now more than ever and that modern prime ministers often matter more than previous ones. Because they operate in a political environment where political factors such as personalisation and centralisation to some extent strengthens their control, the prime minister remains a preeminent political actor. Should, however, a prime minister be powerfully personally resourced, not least by being electorally successful and politically powerful, he or she will additionally be a predominant actor, one less fettered by executive collegiality and more autonomous of their parliamentary party (ibid; for a recent discussion on the position of the prime minister see Dowding 2013; Heffernan 2013; Poguntke and Webb 2013; Foley 2013). Cameron's premiership is impacted by two major constraints. The first, something wholly unfamiliar to previous prime ministers, is his having to work with and through a party firmly placed to the Conservatives' left (excepting the crucial issue of resolving the sovereignty debt crisis by means of public expenditure cuts). Because the veto wielding Nick Clegg- and his party- can restrain the Tories, even if the Tories simultaneously restrain them, Cameron- and his Tory ministers- have had to compromise his and their policy ambitions. The second equally problematic, if more familiar constraint is that Cameron has had to manage a restive, often unhappy Conservative parliamentary party in which a sizable minority of rightward leaning Tory MPs remained unreconciled to his political agenda and have been prepared, if not to topple him as party leader and prime minister, to use their parliamentary voice and vote to challenge the policy of his coalition with which they disagree (for discussion of Cameron's premiership see Bennister and Heffernan 2012; Hayton 2014; Heppell 2013; Theakston 2012). These two interrelated constraints mean Cameron has lacked the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by most of his predecessors for at least some of their period of office. Prime ministerial power in the hitherto usual arrangement of a single party government arises from the prime minister, if having to work with and through senior ministers, being able to substantially lead their collegial executive and that executive being able to authoritatively lead the prime minister's party in parliament. Cameron, however, by leading a coalition, has found that (1) his authority within his executive and (2) his autonomy from his parliamentary party has been significantly restricted. If remaining a preeminent prime minister, he has found his chance of being predominant has been limited by his leading a coalition Cameron's relations with Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats Cameron is widely considered 'prime ministerial': for many, irrespective of what he does with the office, he 'walks' the prime ministerial walk. Cameron’s personal poll ratings, while poor, remain better than those of his two party political opponents. Although his net approval ratings remain in negative territory, he has consistently outpolled Labour's Ed Miliband as preferred prime minister, even when Labour has maintained a poll lead. Although leading a coalition, Cameron has a reliable Commons majority, his possession of the premiership has 2 been assured, and the appurtenances of the office fall to him in the same way as if he were heading up a single party government. Cameron may appear as prime ministerial as any of his predecessors in public, but in private he is less prime ministerial by having to work with ministers not of his own party and through a party leader, Nick Clegg, who is largely beyond his control. This significantly qualifies his authority within both 'his' executive and the legislature. Clegg, someone not of Cameron’s own choosing, is beyond the reach of the prime minister’s patronage, power or personal charm. He, having formalised the position of deputy prime minister, holds not merely a title, but a cabinet position with certain formal powers. This position may specifically be a creation of this coalition (it can be reworked or revoked should a single party government take office again), but for the life of this coalition, Clegg's position is as solid as Cameron's. Now he is better resourced in Whitehall than he was previously his power has increased, not diminished over the life time of the coalition (as his standing- and that of the Lib Dems- in the country has weakened). And Cameron cannot reshuffle or remove him. This is, to say the least, an unusual experience in British politics. Nothing of its like has been seen since the Labour leader, Attlee, held the same post and sat of right in Churchill’s coalition cabinet. Coalition government involves compromise on the part of both the Tories and the Lib Dems; Cameron has to operate very differently to his predecessors. Five spots in his cabinet are not in Cameron's gift; Clegg appoints and reshuffles Lib Dem cabinet ministers (and he creates the 20 non cabinet Lib Dem ministers) even if the portfolios they hold are subject to Tory-Lib Dem negotiation and the subsequent agreement of Cameron and Clegg (Heppell 2014; Paun 2012). This restricts Cameron's prerogative powers of ministerial appointment and portfolio allocation. Additionally his power to agenda set by making use of his right to be consulted on matters of policy, if intact, is seriously qualified by his having to consult Clegg on such policy. Cameron thus has fewer carrots and sticks to oblige his coalition partners to back him when Lib Dems exercise a veto over policy initiatives. Of course, when Conservative and Lib Dem backbenchers have been onside, the coalition has been largely able to successfully pursue its policy agenda by using its partisan Commons advantage. Cameron has been able to forge policy through intra-party agreement within the coalition. Commons disputations between the coalition partners have been very rare, so the quid pro quo by which the Lib Dems nixed the effort to enact boundary changes of electoral benefit to the Conservatives was (so far) a one off response to Cameron's failure to stop Tory backbenchers sabotaging Lords reform. Such fall outs, over issues cleared in the coalition agreement, clearly rocked the coalition; if they created little short term enmity they surely helped sew long term distrust. Both Cameron and Clegg, however, chose not to allow the fall out over Lords reform and boundary changes to spill out into a damaging personal and public disagreement. While Clegg (and his surrogates such as David Laws) may get into protracted rows with the likes of Michael Gove on schools or with Iain Duncan-Smith on welfare reform, Clegg and Cameron have rarely let their private disputes spill over into the public arena. 3 Cameron and Clegg have very real differences prompted by their holding different beliefs and opinions, but they or their teams have tended not to leak or brief their arguments; both men and their surrogates trust each other and are straight with each other. This lack of enmity has been underpinned by the informal ‘no surprises’ agreement between Cameron and Clegg, and the more formal procedural necessity that Clegg sees all significant government papers that go to Cameron (Rawnsley 2013). In this regard coalition has suited Cameron; his instinct leans towards pragmatism. He accepts the restrictions coalition imposes. Cameron has not pursued initiatives he knows Clegg cannot or will not support: having to perform any form of u-turn in the face of Lib Dem pressure would considerably undermine his standing. And his instinct has been to ensure that other Tories do not pick fights with them either. This, as we shall see, infuriates Cameron's backbench critics who often use the coalition as a stick with which to beat him. Cameron’s coalition cabinet remains mostly a forum for the exchange of information with key policy being prompted by cabinet committee deliberation or routine policy being left to departments.