Samuel Goda July 2019 OSCE and Donbas Missing Piece OSCE and Donbas - Missing Piece Samuel Goda This paper1 presents and analyses the hypothesis that • in de facto terms, the war in Ukraine is not the cause of the extremely deep crisis in relations between the West and Russia since the end of the Cold war, but rather a consequence of it, as well as the following events, developments and relationships: • Several milestones in negotiations to end the armed conflict in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, commencing with the Ge- neva talks and continuing with the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements; • The relationship between the Normandy format and the Trilateral contact group, which are the key platforms for peace talks and mediation at- tempts; • The key factor underlying this conflict – a lack of political will on the part of political elites to settle it. 1 The paper was written in the period between November 2018 and April 2019, with research finished before the second round of presidential electi- ons in Ukraine held in April 21, 2019. 2 OSCE and Donbas - Missing Piece Samuel Goda Introduction the Geneva Joint Statement on Ukraine from April 2014 and the two Minsk Agreements concluded in The Crimean scenario has exerted a certain attrac- September 2014 and February 2015 (the Kiev ag- tion for several regions of Ukraine, in particular Do- reement from February 2014 is not included into the netsk and Luhansk. Local business and political analysis, as it was aimed at resolving the internal elites panicked at the thought of losing their status political crisis). Finally, we analyse current negotia- in the national economy and political sphere in the ting tracks, especially the so-called Normandy for- wake of former President Yanukovych’ flight to the mat and the Trilateral Contact Group, which are the Russian Federation. Yanukovych was a prominent most important current negotiation platforms. representative of the “Donbass clan”. These dyna- mics combined with popular “anti-Maidan” move- ments in several cities in the South and East coa- Commencement of negotiations lesced to catapult this area of the Donbas region to the centre of resistance to the new government in Representatives of the U.S., the EU, Russia and Kiev. This resistance was led by several Russian citi- Ukraine reached an agreement at the level of the zens, the most prominent being the Russian Federal ministers of foreign affairs on 17 April 2014 ai- Security Service officer Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Strelkov), med at de-escalating the crisis in Eastern Ukrai- “experienced” individuals who were actively involved ne. The Geneva Joint Statement on Ukraine2, also in events in the Crimea, volunteers from the Russian called the “Geneva Agreement”, was the first at- federation and local inhabitants. It resulted in open tempt to reach an agreement at the international armed conflict between (regular and irregular) Rus- level. It is worth stressing that this meeting saw sian forces allied with Donbas local militia on the the U.S. and the EU acting as a single bloc. Fur- one side and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, National ther negotiations took place without the involve- Guard and (irregular) volunteer battalions on the ment of the EU and the U.S.. The main provisions other. This conflict has been raging for almost 4.5 of this very short joint statement are as follows: years, taking a toll of more than 10,000 fatalities and tens of thousands of wounded on both sides, along • Refraining from any use of violent means; with hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. • Illegal armed groups are to be disarmed and buil- Understanding the armed conflict in Donbas requi- dings illegally seized returned to their rightful ow- res several layers of analysis – this is why it is so- ners; metimes referred to as a “hybrid war” or, in the OSCE parlance, a “crisis in and around Ukraine”. It needs • Amnesty is to be granted except in the case of to be understood in a broader context, avoiding the capital crimes; simplistic and fundamentally wrong assumption that it is an internal conflict in which only Ukrainian • The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is to play a forces and militia in certain areas of Donetsk and crucial role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and Luhansk regions (CADLR) are engaged in conflict. local communities in implementing the particular The Russian Federation plays a key role, not only in de-escalation measures; the conflict itself, but also in its potential to settle it and put an end to the deadly clashes. • The need for an inclusive, transparent and ac- countable constitutional process and establish- This paper focuses on the question of a possible ment of a broad national dialogue. resolution of the Donbas conflict and international peace negotiations to achieve it. Most of the ongo- By its very nature, this document imposed obliga- ing negotiations are being mediated by the OSCE. tions mostly on Kiev, while not treating Russia as a This was not the case in the first attempts at ne- gotiations, however. In this paper we briefly analy- 2 “Geneva Statement on Ukraine”, more information: https://mfa.gov.ua/ se all the various formats and agreements, namely mediafiles/sites/japan/files/Geneva_Statement_on_Ukraine.pdf 3 OSCE and Donbas - Missing Piece Samuel Goda direct party to the conflict, thus affirming the false it would have been very ambitious indeed to expect narrative of the conflict being an internal Ukrainian a concrete roadmap and timeline, especially due to conflict. This underscores the different understand- the considerable importance of Ukraine in Russian ings of the situation in Eastern Ukraine and hence and EU foreign policy. The flexibility and room for different sets of interests regarding the question of manouver offered by the Geneva agreement was settlement. Following the talks, Ukraine, in order to in the following period leveraged more by Russian comply with the provisions of the Agreement, halted foreign policy. As noted in the foregoing, the basic operations in Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone in ideas of the Geneva agreement were echoed in the Eastern Ukraine the next day, 18 April 2014. Minsk I accords – both with positive and negative consequences. Skirmishing continued, however, and government buildings in several towns and cities remained occupied. In the night from 19 to 20 April, armed From Geneva to Normandy separatists carried out military operations in Slavy- ansk, in which three people were killed and two The situation in Eastern Ukraine subsequently deteri- pro-Ukrainian activists were assassinated. In reac- orated significantly. Hybrid war methods combined tion, the president at the time, Oleksandr Turchynov, with conventional means - continuous fighting and appealed to the belligerents to return to and respect shelling, engagement of irregular armed battalions, the ATO.3 In the ensuing period, Russia announced use of heavy weaponry and informational warfare that the Geneva agreement was no longer viable.4 coupled with an ever-worsening socio-political situ- “With militias in the Donbas region refusing to dis- ation in the region prompted the international com- arm and end their occupation of government facil- munity to engage once again. ities, no progress has been made on constitutional reform, and the activities of the OSCE mission have Francois Hollande, Angela Merkel, Petro Poroshen- become the only element of real implementation. ko and Vladimir Putin met together in Normandy An attempt by the OSCE to have a roadmap for the on 6 June 2014, on the margins of celebrations implementation of the Geneva Declaration, agreed marking the 70th anniversary of D-Day. It was the initially, failed (even though the Geneva Declaration first meeting between Poroshenko and Putin since was re-confirmed in the Normandy format in early the crisis had broken out in Ukraine. This meeting July 2014).”5 This was the de facto end of the Ge- provided the foundations for a primary mediating neva Agreement. In the wake of the tragic incident framework for the crisis in Donbas region – the so- in Odessa, German foreign minister Frank-Walter called Normandy format (also called the Normandy Steinmeier called for a second meeting in Geneva four – N4 – or Normandy group). in a TV interview televised on the German public broadcasting station ARD on 4 May 2014, through All these labels designate subsequent meetings which he hoped to achieve a greater role for the and contacts between high-level representatives OSCE in mediation attempts at the local level across – heads of state or ministers of foreign affairs or Ukraine – however, no second round of negotiations ever took place. As Vladimir Socor puts it, “The Ge- 3 Konończuk, W. - Wierzbowska-Miazga, A.: “The Geneva Disagreement neva statement sought to create a framework for on Ukraine“. Available at: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy- ses/2014-04-24/geneva-dis-agreement-ukraine; Socor, V.: “Dead in Geneva: negotiating a resolution to the conflict. It wrongly The Compromise with Russia on Ukraine“. Available at: https://jamestown. defined the conflict as internal to Ukraine, however, org/program/dead-in-geneva-the-compromise-with-russia-on-ukraine/ overriding Kiev’s objections.”6 As some experts saw 4 “Putin says Geneva agreement no longer viable after Ukrainian military ac- tion“. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ it, the text of the joint statement was vague and did may/02/putin-geneva-agreement-not-viable-ukraine-military-action not call the conflict by its real name. To a certain 5 Wolff, Melyarenko, T. – Wolff, S.: “The logic of competitive influence-seek- extent this is undeniably the case. With the advan- ing: Russia, Ukraine, and the conflict in Donbas“. In Post-Soviet Affairs, 34:4, p.