Review of Radical Political Economics “Portugal in Ruins: From ‘Europe’ to Crisis and Austerity” Samuel Weeks Department of Anthropology University of California, Los Angeles [email protected] Pre-Publication Version This article has been accepted for publication in Review of Radical Political Economics. Here is a link to the journal’s site on the SAGE website: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/rrp Review of Radical Political Economics Portugal in Ruins: From "Europe" to Crisis and Austerity Journal: Review of Radical Political Economics Manuscript ID RRPE-17-0134.R1 ManuscriptFor Type: Peer Original ManuscriptReview European economies, heterodox political economy, economic Keywords: and financial crises, international monetary arrangements and institutions Jel Classifications: To view Jel classifications, please clicK <a href= B51, F55, P16 'http://www.aeaweb.org/jel/guide/jel.php' target='_new'><b>here</b></a>.: Drawing from the tradition of heterodox political economy, this article engages the analyses of Nicos PoulantZas, Perry Anderson, João Ferreira do Aramal, and others to outline the central politico-economic contours of post-Carnation Revolution Portugal. Written in a narrative style, the account that follows examines the effects of EEC accession, EU structural funding, Common MarKet liberaliZation policies, and the euro currency. The article posits the troiKa's 2011 "rescue" of the Portuguese state - and the accompanying austerity measures - as having roots in the post-1974 process of "EuropeaniZation." In historiciZing the current political and economic predicament Abstract: facing Portugal, this analysis challenges the explanations for this situation commonly offered by troiKa officials and the business press. Furthermore, the article addresses how longstanding divisions among factions of the Portuguese left and center-left - which date from the beginning of the EuropeaniZation process - have become less acute since the November 2015 formation of a center-left/left parliamentary majority led by the Socialist Party. However, this unique three- party "anti-austerity" formation has had a limited margin to maneuver, given the continued power over domestic politics exercised by the EU and international creditors. https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rrpe Page 1 of 36 Review of Radical Political Economics 1 2 3 Review of Radical Political Economics 4 5 6 “Portugal in Ruins: From ‘Europe’ to Crisis and Austerity” 7 8 9 10 The Great Lisbon Earthquake, which took place on the morning of All Saints’ 11 12 Day in 1755, destroyed the vast majority of buildings in this imperial capital and its 13 14 15 surrounding regions. Triggering a tsunami and a bout of untamable fires, the earthquake, 16 17 estimated to have been in the range of 8.5–9.0 M, caused a death toll estimated to be as 18 19 high as 100,000 people,For thus making Peer it one ofReview the deadliest seismic events in recorded 20 21 22 history. Among the many buildings destroyed in Lisbon was the massive Carmo Convent, 23 24 a fourteenth-century gothic edifice built in the aftermath of a Portuguese victory against 25 26 invading Castilian forces. Unlike other structures in the post-earthquake period, however, 27 28 29 Carmo’s main nave was never rebuilt – in part because of financial considerations and a 30 31 Romantic-era aesthetic appreciation of medieval ruins, but also because it served as a 32 33 reminder to lisboetas of the catastrophic destruction wrought by the tremor. Over two 34 35 hundred years later, history once again reverberated from this locale during Portugal’s 36 37 38 leftist Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, as the convent complex housed the final 39 40 stronghold of Marcelo Caetano, the last head of the authoritarian Estado Novo regime, 41 42 and the security personnel who remained loyal to him. 43 44 45 The ruins of the Carmo Convent, which sit atop a hill near Lisbon’s downtown, 46 47 now overlook the shopping and tourism districts of Chiado and Baixa. From this elevated 48 49 vantage point, one can observe today the aftermath of another calamity: a multiyear 50 51 52 economic downturn that has caused widespread unemployment, threatened social 53 54 stability, and stretched thin the country’s safety net. Just as Carmo’s ceilingless nave 55 56 57 58 59 1 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rrpe Review of Radical Political Economics Page 2 of 36 1 2 3 continues to evoke a disaster of millennial proportions 265 years after the fact, the post- 4 5 6 2010 crisis and its myriad repercussions will likely mark Portugal for generations to 7 8 come. 9 10 Four Terrible Years 11 12 In June of 2011, just two months after Portugal’s request for an international 13 14 15 bailout from the EU-ECB-IMF “troika,” the recently elected Prime Minister Pedro Passos 16 17 Coelho predicted that the following two years would be “terrible” for the country 18 19 (Público 2011). ApparentFor now isPeer that Passos ReviewCoelho was being overly optimistic in 20 21 22 making this prediction. His forecast of a “terrible two years” turned into a terrible four 23 24 years, a verdict echoed by many political commentators. Even with the 2015 defeat of his 25 26 center-right coalition by a parliamentary left majority, few ways out of the country’s 27 28 29 disquiet seem to be in sight. 30 31 The former prime minister was hardly alone in his misplaced optimism; making 32 33 buoyant economic predictions that do not become reality has ostensibly become as 34 35 common in Portugal as football analysis. Whether made by the domestic or international 36 37 38 business press, or government or troika officials, pronouncement after pronouncement 39 40 have turned out to be consistently wrong. Given that the country’s commercial and 41 42 residential properties remain plastered with “for sale” and “to let” signs – especially those 43 44 45 not located in the few areas in the country buoyed by tourism – it has become obvious 46 47 that Passos Coelho’s “two terrible years” will instead mark the beginning of an extended 48 49 period of economic malaise. 50 51 52 The irony of Portugal missing its bailout targets was that Passos Coelho and his 53 54 first finance minister, Vítor Gaspar, pledged initially to make more structural changes to 55 56 57 58 59 2 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rrpe Page 3 of 36 Review of Radical Political Economics 1 2 3 the economy than those mandated by the troika. Indeed, few of the crisis-ridden 4 5 6 peripheral Eurozone countries have kept to the bailout’s terms as diligently as has 7 8 Portugal. However, as the country’s economy continues to stagnate – as it has for five of 9 10 the past seven years – thousands of restaurants, cafés, civil-construction outfits, and retail 11 12 shops have closed, due in part to a collapse in demand caused by troika-mandated salary 13 14 15 and pension reductions, rent, and tax increases and an unemployment rate over ten 16 17 percent. Scores of small businesses have ceased all operations, shedding thousands of 18 19 jobs in their wake. TheseFor so-called Peer “micro companies,” Review which employ fewer than ten 20 21 22 workers, make up 86 percent of all enterprises in Portugal and account for 40 percent of 23 24 jobs in the private sector (OECD 2013; cited in Wise 2013). In such conditions, many 25 26 working- and even middle-class families struggle to get by, afraid to spend and fearful 27 28 29 that one or both household income earners will lose their jobs. 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Figure 1 – Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Portugal, 2008-14 (Data Source: Base de Dados Portugal Contemporâneo) 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 3 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rrpe Review of Radical Political Economics Page 4 of 36 1 2 3 From Revolution to “Europe” 4 5 6 To understand Portugal’s current predicament, it is first necessary to analyze how 7 8 Portuguese society emerged in the mid-1970s from the near 50-year dictatorship of 9 10 António de Oliveira Salazar and how the resulting configuration metamorphosed as the 11 12 country sought EEC membership during the early 1980s. The main point of reference in 13 14 15 this trajectory is the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, when junior officers in the 16 17 Portuguese military overthrew the country’s authoritarian government headed by Marcelo 18 19 Caetano, who had assumedFor power Peer shortly before Review Salazar’s death in 1970. The ostensible 20 21 22 grievance of these “Captains of April” – who referred to themselves as the Armed Forces 23 24 Movement (MFA) – centered on the terms of their deployment to the prolonged and 25 26 unwinnable colonial wars in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. When overtures 27 28 29 to Caetano via official channels were rebuffed, the young officers decided that the only 30 31 way to end the wars in Africa was to offer Portugal a new political model, which they 32 33 dubbed the “three Ds”: democracy, development, and decolonization. 34 35 From mid-1974 to late 1975, the revolutionary period known as PREC (Processo 36 37 38 Revolucionário em Curso), six provisional governments tried to strike a balance between 39 40 the macroeconomic challenges facing Portugal and the immediate needs of its citizenry. 41 42 The MFA program was ambitious, if not excessively bold; within weeks of 25 April 43 44 45 1974, the group had called for immediate elections and a “new political economy [to be] 46 47 at the service of the Portuguese people, in particular the segments of the population who 48 49 have previously been the least favored” (Gonçalves 1976).