Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts by Gregory Salmieri B.A., The College of New Jersey, 2001 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The College of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2008 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH College of Arts and Sciences This dissertation was presented by Gregory Salmieri It was defended on June 3, 2008 and approved by James Allen, Professor, Philosophy Allan Gotthelf, Visiting Professor, History and Philosophy of Science Jessica Moss, Assistant Professor, Philosophy Dissertation Advisor: James Lennox, Professor, History and Philosophy of Science ii Aristotle and The Problem of Concepts Gregory Salmieri, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2008 Copyright © by Gregory Salmieri 2008 iii Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts Gregory Salmieri, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2008 Abstract By a “concept” , I mean a unitary thought (of the sort normally represented by a word) that applies to a plurality of differing objects, and by “The Problem of Concepts” I mean the pervasive philosophical questions of how such thoughts are to be explained and by what standards they are to be evaluated. Aristotle is generally held to have been a Moderate Realist, who held that a concept is a putative grasp of a mind-independent universal object that exist somehow in or derivatively on the many particular objects to which the concept applies. I argue that Aristotle rejected the posit of such universal objects and instead understood universality as a feature of thought, which has a basis in reality and a function in cognition. With some notable exceptions, concepts are based on relations of difference in “the more and the less” between their instances and on the causal relations between the various parts and characteristics of each instance. A concept’s function is to serve as a term in deductions which enable us to represent the necessity of causal connections. I go on, then, to explore the manner in which, on Aristotle’s view, concepts compose propositions and bodies of knowledge and the way in which they are formed. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ................................................................................................................................................................ VII 1.0 THE PROBLEM...................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS ....................................................... 3 1.1.1 Concepts as unitary cognitions of indefinitely many differing objects ................................ 3 1.1.2 The Problem of Concepts: How can pluralities be unitarily cognized? ............................... 4 1.1.3 The normative import of the Problem .................................................................................... 7 1.2 SOCRATES, PLATO AND THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS ............................................. 12 1.2.1 Socrates’ “What is F?” question ............................................................................................ 14 1.2.2 The Socratic View of Concepts .............................................................................................. 23 1.2.3 Plato’s Theory of Forms as a theory of concepts ................................................................. 29 1.2.4 Aristotle on Platonic Forms and the need for universals .................................................... 35 1.3 THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS AS THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS ....................... 38 1.3.1 Competing construals of the Problem of Universals ............................................................ 40 1.3.2 Why speak of the Problem of Concepts rather than a Problem of Universals? ................ 43 1.3.3 Realism as a theory of concepts ............................................................................................. 44 1.3.4 Moderate Realism as a theory of concepts............................................................................ 48 1.3.5 Classifying theories of concepts ............................................................................................. 52 2.0 WAS ARISTOTLE A MODERATE REALIST? ............................................................................... 56 2.1 REFORMULATING OUR QUESTION IN ARISTOTELIAN TERMS ............................... 58 2.1.1 Concepts as simple thoughts of non-numerical unities ........................................................ 58 2.1.2 Five varieties of non-numerical unity recognized by Aristotle ........................................... 62 2.1.3 Moderate Realism and the five varieties ............................................................................... 67 2.1.4 Aristotle’s generic sense of “universal” ................................................................................ 68 2.2 ARISTOTLE’S REJECTION OF MODERATE REALISM ABOUT KINDS ..................... 71 2.2.1 Zoological kinds ...................................................................................................................... 71 2.2.2 Kinds as determinables .......................................................................................................... 76 2.2.3 The kind-form relationship as allowing for the unity of definition .................................... 82 2.3 ARISTOTLE’S ASSIMILATION OF KINDS TO MATTER ................................................ 86 2.3.1 Is something’s kind its physical matter? ............................................................................... 87 2.3.2 Kinds as intelligible matter .................................................................................................... 93 v 2.3.3 The ontological status of intelligible matter ......................................................................... 96 2.4 ARE ARISTOTELIAN FORMS PARTICULARS? ................................................................ 98 2.4.1 Balme’s embryological argument for particular forms ..................................................... 103 2.4.2 Balme and Lennox on the uncuttability of the uncuttable forms ..................................... 106 2.4.3 Sameness in kind revisited ................................................................................................... 108 2.4.4 An objection to the embryological argument ..................................................................... 109 2.4.5 Can any particular forms interpretation be maintained? ................................................. 112 2.5 UNIVERSALS AS INTELIGIBLE MATTER ....................................................................... 118 3.0 ARISTOTLE ON CONCEPTUAL COGNITION ........................................................................... 123 3.1 CONCEPTS AS UNITS OF THOUGHT ................................................................................ 125 3.1.1 Concepts as undivided thoughts .......................................................................................... 129 3.1.2 The Composition of thoughts and their objects ................................................................. 135 3.1.3 Indivisible thoughts .............................................................................................................. 139 3.2 ΓΝΩΣΙΣ AND INDIVISIBLE THOUGHTS .......................................................................... 145 3.2.1 Γνῶσις .................................................................................................................................... 145 3.2.2 Truth and error without division or combination ............................................................. 149 3.2.3 Indivisible thoughts as principles of ἐπιστήμη ................................................................... 158 3.3 CONCEPTS AS ΓΝΩΣΕΙΣ ...................................................................................................... 162 3.3.1 Discerning essence ................................................................................................................ 162 3.3.2 The universality of thought .................................................................................................. 170 3.3.3 Νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη as the highest degrees of γνῶσις ......................................................... 183 4.0 ARISTOTLE ON CONCEPTUALIZATION ................................................................................... 194 4.1 THE PROGRESSION TO ΝΟΥΣ IN POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II.19 ............................... 197 4.1.1 The meaning of “perception” in II.19 ................................................................................. 201 4.1.2 The nature of ἐμπειρία ......................................................................................................... 207 4.1.3 The advent of universals ...................................................................................................... 215 4.2 SEEKING AND PROVING WHAT SOMETHING IS ......................................................... 218 4.2.1 Varieties of εἴδησις that or what something is .................................................................... 222 4.2.2 Proving what it is by demonstrating that it is ...................................................................... 229 4.2.3 The primaries and how they are known ............................................................................. 233 4.3 FORMING NEW CONCEPTS ...............................................................................................