I.T. OAKLEY critic who would turn the conclusion against itself, remarking that if it is true, we cannot be justified in believing it, or indeed the premises from which it is drawn. The convinced sceptic will of course embrace this conclusion, kicking away his ladder along with everything else. But in any case, 1 will regard my current pur­ pose as fulfilled Jl: my reader accepts that the conclusion is derivable from the currently unquesrioned.6 Notes Laurence BonJour, The Structure of 1 This was first pointed out to me by Mr. F.C. Jackson of La Trobe University. Empirical Knowledge 2 A.J. Ayer, “Knowledge, Belief, and Evidence” in A.J. Ayer, Metaphysics and Common Sense (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 121. 3 Hans Reichenbach, “Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain?”, Philo­ sophical Review 61(1952): 147-59. A basic problem for foundationalism 4 For recent discussions of coherence, see, e.g., Anthony Quinton, The Nature of Things (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19731, Ch. 8; Roderick Firth, The fundamental concept of moderate foundationalism, as of empirical founda­ “Coherence, Certainty and Epistemic Priority,” Journal of Philosophy 61(1964): tionalism generally, is the concept of a basic empirical belief. It is by appeal to 545-57; Nicholas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon basic beliefs that the threat of an infinite regress is to be avoided and empirical Press, 1973); and Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). knowledge given a secure foundation. But a new problem now arises: how can 5 Iowe this point to Mr. Robert Waldie. there be any empirical beliefs which are thus basic? For although this has often 6 1 have been greatly helped by comments on earlier drafts of this paper made by a been overlooked, the very idea of an epistemically basic empirical belief is more large number of people, in particular Or. R.M. Sainsbury of Oxford University and than a little paradoxical. On what basis is such a belief supposed to be justified, Mr. F.C. Jackson of La Trobe University. Earlier drafts were read at Dundee, once any appeal to further empirical premises is ruled out? Chisholm’s theo­ Edinburgh,Aberdeen and Warwick Universities. logical analogy, cited earlier, is most appropriate: a basic empirical belief is in effect an epistemological unmoved (or self-moved) mover. It is able to confer justification on other beliefs, but, in spite of being empirical and thus contingent, QUESTIONS apparently has no need to have justification conferred on it. But is such a status any easier to understand in epistemology than it is in theology? How can a 1 What condition usually thought to be required for knowledge does Oakley say is contingent, empirical belief impart epistemic “motion” to other empirical beliefs never satisfied? unless it is itself in “motion”? (Or, even more paradoxically, how can such a 2 Suppose I believe there is a white piece of paper in front of me, as a result of belief epistemically “move” itself?) Where does the noninferential justification seeing it. According to Oakley, what two other propositions does my belief for basic empirical beliefs come from? depend on for its justification? This difficulty may be developed a bit by appealing to the account of the 3 Oakley considers a case in which a person has beliefs p, q, r, and s, which general concept of epistemic justification which was presented [earlier]. I argued depend on each other for theirjustification. He then suggests conjoining each of there that the fundamental role which the requirement of epistemic justification those beliefs with another, unrelated proposition, t. What undesirable con­ serves in the overall rationale of the concept of knowledge is that of a means to sequence does he think results from this, and what theory is this supposed to truth; and accordingly that a basic constraint on any account of the standards of refute? justification for empirical knowledge is that there be good reasons for thinking that following those standards is at least likely to lead to truth. Thus if basic beliefs are to provide a secure foundation for empirical knowledge, if inference from them is to be the sole basis upon which other empirical beliefs are justified, then that feature, whatever it may be, by virtue of which a particular belief qualifies as basic must also constitute a good reason for thinking that the belief is true, If this were not so, moderate foundationalism would be unacceptable as an account of epistemic justification. This crucial point may be formulated a bit more precisely, as follows. If we let Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). 386 LAURENCE BONJOUR THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL, KNOWLEDGE 4 represent the feature or characteristic, whatever it may be, which distinguishes (5) The premises of such a justifying argument for an empirical belief cannot be hasic empirical beliefs from other empirical beliefs, then in an acceptable founda­ entirely a priori; at least one such premise must be empirical. tionalist account a particular empirical belief B could qualify as basic only if the premises of the following justificatory argument were adequately justified: Therefore, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief must depend on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (I);it follows (I) B has feature 4. that there can be no basic empirical beliefs. (2) Reliefs having feature 4 are highly likely to be true. Therefore, B is highly likely to be true. The elements of coherentism It B is to actually he basic, then presumably premise (1)would have to be true as well, but I am concerned here ody with what would have to be so for it to be Tbe very idea of iz coherence theory reasonable to accept B as basic and tise it to justify other beliefs. In light of the failure of foundationalism, it is time to look again at the apparent Clearly it is possible that at least one of the two premises of the argument alternatives with regard to the structure of empirical justification which were might be justifia ble on a purely iz priori basis, depending on the particular choice distinguished in the discussion of the epistemic regress problem. If the regress of of 4. It does not seem possible, however, that both premises might be thus justifi­ empirical justification does not terminate in basic empirical beliefs, then it must able. B is after all, ex hypothesi, an empirical belief, and it is hard to see how a either (1) terminate in unjustified beliefs, (2) go on infinitely (without circular­ particular empirical belief could be justified on a purely J priori basis. Thus we ity), or (3)circle back upon itself in some way. As discussed earlier, alternative may conclude, at least provisionally, that for any acceptable moderate founda­ (1)is clearly a version of skepticism and as such may reasonably be set aside tionalist account, at least one of the two premises of the appropriate justifying until all other alternatives have been seen to fail. Alternative (2) may also be a argument will itself be empirical. version of skepticism, though this is less clear. But the more basic problem with The other issue to be considered is whether, in order for B to be justified for a alternative (2)is that no one has ever succeeded in amplifying it into a developed particular person A (at a particular time), it is necessary, not merely that a justifi­ position (indeed, it is not clear that anyone has even attempted to do so);nor do cation along the above lines exist in the abstract, but also that A himself be in I see any plausible way in which this might be done. Failing any such elabor­ cognitive possession of that justification, that is, that he believe the appropriate ation which meets the objections tentatively developed earlier, alternative (2) premises of forms ( I) 311d (2)and that these beliefs be justified for him. [Earlier,] I may also reasonably be set aside. This then leaves alternative (3)as apparently argued tentatively that such cognitive possession by the person in question is the only remaining possibility for a nonskeptical account of empirical iiideed necessary, on the grounds that he cannot be epistemically responsible in knowledge. accepting the belief unless he hinise/fhas access to the justification; for otherwise, We are thus led to a reconsideration of the possibility of a coherence theory of he hds no reason for thinking that the belief is at all likely to be true. No reason empirical knowledge. If there is no way to justify empirical beliefs apart from an for questioning this claim has so tar emerged. appeal to other justified empirical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of distinct But if a11 this is correct, we get the disturbing result that B is not basic after all, justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite system of justified empir­ since its justification depends on that of at least one other empirical belief. It ical beliefs can only be justified from within, by virtue of the relations of its would follow that moderate foundationalisnl is untenable as a solution to the component beliefs to each other-if, that is, it is justified at all. And the idea of regress problem-and an analogous argument would show weak foundational- coherence should for the moment be taken merely to indicate whatever property ism to be similarly untenable. (or complex set of properties) is requisite for the justification of such a system of It will be helpful in the subsequent discussion to have available a slightly more beliefs.