APRIL 14, 1968 PAUSE IN VIETNAM? T would be irresponsible not to welcome any prospect of peace in On Other Pages IVietnam, but it would be premature to conclude that such a prospect has already been opened up. There is a little hope; the aggressor is COMMENTS (continued) 2 frustrated and is not altogether unwilling to eXiPlorenew ways out of what 'CALCUTTA DIARY would always be a frustrating situation. Whether this search will have CHARAN GUPTA 4 any bearing on the basic issues in the conflict remains to be seen; much VIEW FROM DELHI has changed, but to what extent Washington will allow this change to affect KITCHE.N DIPLOMACY 6 its policy aims is not yet clear. First the nature and extent of the change. The Tet offensive began FROM A POLITICAl. COR- RESPONDENT 6 at the end of January; at the end of March Mr Johnson announced a limitation of the bombing of North Vietnam. What happened in the POLITICS, BOMBAY STYLE intervening two months has had consequences whose significance is yet to 1. AKHTAR 7 be fully assessed. One consequence has been a realization even in THE MADRAS SCENE hitherto confident American circles that not all the men and arms that the A. S. SATYAMURTHI 9 dollar can buy can win the war. The realization was painful and hence THE BLACK REVOLUTION reluctant. Even after the first shock the U. S. Government and its MARC GREENBERG 11 propagandists elsewhere claimed that the offensive had failed to realize "THE GRAND GESTURE" any of its objectives. In retro~pect, it can be seen that it has succeeded M. S. PRABHAKAR 12 in the area most central to the future of Vietnam; it has shown the futility THE PRESS of even the most massive foreign intervention to s\lppress the struggle JOHNSON'S CHOICE 13 of the Vietnamese people. REMEMBERING GORKY Far too many people have pretended to know in advance what General SARO] ACHARYA 15 Giap's objectives were, and presumed to pronounce on his success and KABI KAHINI 16 failure on the basis of what they thought he intended to do. Almost all FIRST SHOW 1 7 such calculations went wrong; he did not even care to oblige the pundits "SCHOLAR EXCHANGE" 1 7 by attempting another Dienbienphu at Khe Sanh. But it is now possible to see what he and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam have •LETTERS 17 achieved. First, they have established that North Vietnam, as Mr Robert McNamara once put it, cannot be bombed to the negotiating table. Second, and more important, the NLF has shown that the PlliPpet regime in Saigon and its supporters cannot be protected by the Americans and their allies. Washington and Saigon sought comfort from the thought that the Tet offensive had not inspired a general., uprising in South Vietnam; yet PIUNTE.r, AT MODERN' INDIA PRESS', 7, RAJA SUBODH MULLICK SQUARE, they must have pondered l.1owthe Vietcong !presence in the country could CALCUTTA-13 AND PUBLISHED BY SAMAR be s widespread and powerful without the support of the general population. SEN FROM 61, MOTT LANE, CALCUTTA-13 , FRONTIER ther Ki~ It will never be the same again in even emerge as a national hero on to a coalition Government in Sou vitably l! South Vietnam. The Americans had the eve of the election. Vietnam, with the NLF as the domi- g of Mah to destroy much of it in order to save Heavy bombing, over a much nant element. But neither Washingtoa t over t it; American bombing had to kill larger area than first indicated by Mr nor Saigon is likely to give the nces art thousands of those they had come to Johnson, continued even after his the recognition it deserves. Ford hting for protect. Ordinary people will never announcement, and now a big land Ministers of the' countries in the Am all mino forget it; even American reports have offensive is on, but Hanoi seized the rican camp in Vietnam, who metre- ldiers an .recorded the fact that after the first diplomatic initiative by agreeing to cently in Wellington, New Zealan~ ore than thrust of the Tet offensive, most of discuss a total and unconditional end specifically rejected the coalitionidea. dian pea the destruction and killing was caus- to the bombing and all other acts If this represents the unchangeable t great ed by reckless American bombing of of war against North Vietnam. Wash- American position, negotiations Cal 'ng was populated areas. Yet the Americans ington's bona fides will now be put bardly serve any purpose. However, n of nOl have not been able to demonstrate on test. It will probably ask for re- the racial turmoil that threatens o million that they can assure the security of ciprocal de-escalation, but clearly Little Golden America may in tum merican those who seek their protection. Hanoi cannot be expected to stop all profoundly influenoe the course of illion. The U. S. forces could not even aid to the NLF in South Vietnam. events in South Vietnam. The chic- ought a ensure their own security. Their In fact, Hanoi has made it clear kens are coming home to roost. 1947 ? casualties reached a level unprece- ti1at its readiness to discuss an end to e contr dented in the war, and it was small American bombing does not imply any A, the comfort that the casulties on the .;h,mge in its basic stand on iPolitical A Sermon On A Priest ther fac' other side were ,re/por:tedly ,much nsues. The statement in which it s not b larger. For weeks, some five thou- announced its readiness to meet U.S. THe beginning of Aldous Hux- e Qui' sand Marines were at General Giap's reprtsentatives "to decide on the un- ley's minor novel, Ape and not ~ mercy; the psychological effect of conditional cessation of the bombing Essence, was rather amusing. lilt as luck the siege, whether on the Marines and other war acts against the DRV" was the day of Gandhi's assassination; reach~ themselves or on people in the Unit- also St\id: "They (the Americans) but on Calvary the sightseers werein- ve ha ed States, has been no less shattering mUSl withdraw their troops and the terested in the contents of their picnic ith, hi! than the likely impact of another troop~ uf their satellites out of South baskets .. Ptolemy was perfectly right: it b~ Dienbienphu. Vietnam, and leave the internal affairs the centre of the earth is here,not The h It was the effect in America that of Vietk; m to the Vietnamese people. there.. And Gandhi, I reflected,just s cruel must have rattled Mr Johnson most. The position of /peace and independ- couldn't do anything but resist oppres- . Dew The anti-war camJpaign spread and ence of, the Vietnamese people i.s the sion non-violently and go to prisOD e ferti powerful voices began to question four-point position of the NRV, and and finally get shot. .So there he (Bob e Heb not only the merits of his war strate- the NLF political programme. This Brigges) was, bound and committed itted i gy but also the fundamental assump- political programme .... must serve to adultery no less irrevocably than 'on req tions about the wal1and its aims. An as the correct basis for a political solu- Gandhi had been bound and committ- e few anti-war candidate for the Presidency tion in South Vietnam." ed to non-violence". Then this bit annib£ severely mauled him at the New Getting North Vietnamese represen- of diologue: at the Hampshire primary and was on the tatives at the negotiating table will not uman. point of trouncing him at Wisconsin. be the central task for an acceptable "Do you think Gandhi was interested e axil His nomination was gravely in doubt, settlement; the party more directly in art?" I asked. ciety re-election increasingly problematical. concerned is the NLF. Meaningful "Gandhi? No, of course not." of the Faced with such a situation, the talks can begin only when the NLF "I think you're right," I agreed. labour crafty politician thought up a course joins them. Despite Saigon's objec- "Neither in art nor in science. outh that might afford him the only chance tions, the Americans may eventually And that's why we killed him," a mora of political survival. By simultaneous- agree to the NLF's participation, but "We?" and de ly withdrawing from the Presidential what role they will be pre:pared to ''Yes, we. The intelligent, the active, in its' race and announcing a partial halt to allow the NLF in the affairs of the forward-looking, the believen most s the bombing of North Vietnam, he South Vietnam is far from clear. in Order and perfection, Whereas stitutic That the internal affairs of South Gandhi was a reactionary whobe- tried to give himself a new image .. Denm; Vietnam must be settled in accordance lieved in people. Squalid little If Hanoi refused to respond, he would listed with the NLF's programme is one of -rindividuals governi9g themselves, the ci be free to escalate the war still fur- the four !points consistently insisted •...villageby village, and worshipping ther without inhibitions over effects one 0: upon by North Vietnam and the NLF; the Brahman who is also Alman. volt .~ on electoral prospects. If Hanoi did in other words, the NLF must control It was intolerable, No wonder we is no respond, he would be able to claim the Government of South Vietnam bumped him off," More credit for a major step to end a parti- after a political settlement.