Observatoire de l’Asie du Sud-Est Democracy, Indonesian Military, and 2019 Elections Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman note OBSERVATOIRE ASIE DU SUD-EST 2019/2020 OBSERVATOIRE Yohanes Sulaiman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani in Cimahi, Indonesia. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at Indonesian Army Staff and Command School. Note d’actualité n°14 de l’Observatoire de l’Asie du Sud-Est Juin 2019 Is there a growing militarization of Indonesian democracy? This article argues that at this point, the military as an organization does not willingly and independently interfere in civilian affairs. Rather, the military’s involvement should be put in its context, notably the weaknesses of successive civilian governments, especially Joko Widodo administration, that forces it to ask for the military for support; personal ambition of General Gatot Nurmantyo, the Chief of the Military, who was using the military as a tool for promoting himself for the Presidential Election of 2019; and the institutional weaknesses of the military itself, that created the condition for the involvement of the military in political affairs. The Weaknesses of Civilian Government Introduction One of the characteristics of post-reformation Indonesian In the recent years, there have been concerns about cabinet is its lack of unity. Indonesian bureaucracy is the growing influence of Indonesian military in politics, notorious for its inability to cooperate, as many of the leading one scholar to warn about the “growing ministers are appointed due to their affiliation as part of militarization of Indonesian democracy.”1 Such opinion the ruling coalition, and not based on their competence. was not at all without foundation. Under the former As a result, they treat their ministries as their own fief, Chief of Staff General Gatot Nurmantyo, the Indonesian channeling the state money for the benefit of their military increased its involvement with the civilian political parties and supporters.5 bureaucracy in various social and economic programs, even without written orders from President Joko Any presidential attempt to reform the cabinet and Widodo.2 In January 2019, Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto, centralize the power would be politically suicidal. Gatot’s successor, announced that the military would President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first post-reformation revise the Regulation 34 Year 2004, which limits the elected president, put himself on the path of collision role of military in civilian affairs, in order to allow military with political parties and the parliament as he tried to personnel to serve in civilian ministries.3 Tom Power, get rid of some of his ministers, whom he believed to a scholar who specializes in Indonesian political parties, be more loyal to their parties than to him.6 His action argues that President Joko Widodo has been taking an ended up sparking a successful impeachment drive by «authoritarian turn» by mobilizing the military to promote his political opponents in the parliament, under a flimsy, his government’s achievements in order to support his unproven accusation of corruption.7 reelection during the 2019 Presidential Election, which has the obvious effect of expanding the role of the Not surprisingly, Wahid’s successors learned to live with military further in politics.4 unwieldy cabinets that may not have the presidents’ best interests at heart and to keep those party apparatchiks Such concerns, however, are overly alarmist. While the in the cabinet in order to prevent political parties from role of the military in civilian affairs has indeed been causing problems or to launch an impeachment. Even expanding over the past couple of years, it was caused President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was less by the military’s direct willingness to get involved reelected by a landslide majority of 60.80% in 2009 and in politics, than several external and internal factors whose Democratic Party held the largest number of working together. Notably, the weaknesses of the civilian seats in the parliament, with 20.85% of the total seats, government, due to red tape and the way to allocate did not dare to change the system, even though he ministerial seats, General Gatot Nurmantyo’s political grumbled in 2011 that more than 50% of his instructions ambitions, widely believed to harbor the ambition to to his ministers were not followed at all.8 A few months become the next president of Indonesia, and internally, later, he further complained that his ministers were not military’s organizational problems due to its doctrine responsive to problems in the society.9 that focuses on resilience, can be cited as factors for increased military involvement in civilian affairs. These President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was elected in factors were further exacerbated by the heightened 2014 by 53.15% of the votes. His governing coalition political atmosphere due to 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial in the beginning only held 37.14% of the total seats election, which showed that President Joko Widodo, in in the parliament, making it a minority government. spite of his accomplishment, could be defeated in the His attempt to craft a small cabinet with loyal and Presidential Election of 2019. competent ministers was thwarted by his own vice- president Jusuf Kalla, who forced Jokowi to give fifteen In other words, while the military as an institution does cabinet posts for political parties. Similar to previous not purposely involve itself in civilian affairs, it does get presidents, he also faced entrenched vested interests, involved inadvertently due to the political choices of ineffective local government, rampant corruption, and various actors and its own internal weaknesses. 5 - Marcus Mietzner, “Soldiers, Parties and Bureaucracts: Illicit Fund-Raising in Contemporary Indonesia,” Southeast Asia 1 - Tom Pepinsky, “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia and the Research, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2008) 241-2 Problem of Surplus Officers,” Personal Blog, February 22, 2019. 6 - Jose Manuel Tesoro, “Nation Adrift,” Asiaweek.com, July 7, (https://tompepinsky.com/2019/02/22/civil-military-relations-in- 2000, Vol. 29, No. 26. (http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/ indonesia-and-the-problem-of-surplus-officers/) asiaweek/magazine/2000/0707/nat.indo.main.html) 2 - Mawa Kresna, “Jendral Gatot dan Reformasi TNI [General 7 - Fana Suparman, “Meluruskan Fakta Sejarah Lengsernya Gus Gatot and TNI Reformation],” Tirto.id, 8 December 2017 (https:// Dur [Straightening historical facts on the resignation of Gus tirto.id/jendral-gatot-dan-reformasi-tni-cBfA) Dur],” Berita Satu, January 12, 2016 (https://www.beritasatu.com/ 3 - Erik Purnama Putra, “Panglima: Perwira TNI akan ditempatkan nasional/340330/meluruskan-fakta-sejarah-lengsernya-gus-dur) di Kementerian [Chief of the Military: Military Officers will be 8 - “Ada Kelemahan Kepemimpinan [There’s a weakness in placed in ministries],” Republika, 31 January 2019 (https://www. leadership],” Kompas, July 13, 2011 (https://nasional.kompas.com/ republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/19/01/31/pm6ovb430- read/2011/07/13/03525586/Ada.Kelemahan.Kepemimpinan) panglima-perwira-tni-akan-ditempatkan-di-kementerian) 9 - “SBY Mengeluh Kabinetnya Belum Responsif [SBY complained 4 - Tom Power, “Jokowi’s authoritarian turn,” New Mandala, that his cabinet wasn’t responsive enough],” Suara Pembaruan, 9 October 2018 (https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis- December 2, 2011 (https://sp.beritasatu.com/home/sby-mengeluh- authoritarian-turn/) kabinetnya-belum-responsif/14354) 2 competing bureaucracies that made it very difficult for him to coordinate the various ministries in order to push for national initiatives.10 Such weaknesses of the Indonesian civilian government General Gatot Nurmantyo’s Ambition make it very difficult for any president to get things done. However, Jokowi’s legitimacy stems from his A second factor that creates the perception that the reputation as a doer, a builder. Therefore, Jokowi military is getting more and more involved in politics is started to rely more on the military, both for political the behavior of General Gatot Nurmantyo, former Chief support and as way to get his priorities done – notably of Staff, who was widely believed to harbor presidential infrastructure building in eastern part of Indonesia.11 ambition. Under his leadership, the military has been He appointed Army General Gatot Nurmantyo as the getting more and more involved in non-military tasking, head of the military in order to strengthen his support in arguing that it is for the sake of national interest. the military12, which inadvertently dragged the military to As mentioned in the previous section, it is true that the roles that supposedly belong to civilians. civilian government under President Jokowi was asking the military for their assistance to get things done. General In essence, it is much more feasible for Jokowi to rely Nurmantyo, however, pushed it further by increasing the on the military organizations to get things done quickly military’s involvement in civilian bureaucracy, in various in a short term than to spend a lot of time and political social and economic programs, even without written capital to reform the government and civil service. In fact, orders from President Joko Widodo.17 Jokowi’s efforts to reduce the number of civil servants,13 streamline regulations14, and increase the accountability The military was a good springboard for his presidential of civil servants such as by imposing e-budgeting in ambition: