i Theism & the Metaphysics of Modality Sarah Nicola Adams Submitted in Accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science September 2015 ii The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. © 2015 The University of Leeds and Sarah Nicola Adams. The right of Sarah Nicola Adams to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. iii Acknowledgements I am very grateful to Cambridge University Press and Robin Le Poidevin for offering me a PhD studentship in analytic philosophy of religion and an Editorial Assistantship to the journal Religious Studies. Without this support, it would not have been possible for me to undertake this research. Studying for a PhD would also not have been financially viable if I wasn’t offered a position as a subwarden – thanks Accommodation Services! Living in undergraduate halls for four years was certainly not easy, but my fellow subwardens helped make the experience more tolerable than it otherwise would’ve been. Thanks to Gordon Clubb, Olivia Jarema, Nicholas Loubere, Faiz Sheikh, Saagar Singh-Sachdev, and Karishma Vakta-Smith. (To the occupants of Bodington, Lupton, and St Marks: Sartre’s right – hell really is other people!) Boundless heartfelt gratitude goes to my supervisors, Robin Le Poidevin and Scott Shalkowski, who’ve gone beyond the call of duty in aiding me throughout my studies and helped me achieve more than I thought I could. Supervisions were always intellectually challenging, and neither I, nor this thesis would have improved so much if it wasn’t for their help, encouragement, and much needed moral support; I’m very fortunate to have benefitted from the exceptional expertise of these two wonderfully kind human beings. (Thanks to Robin also for keeping me in good supply of Guernsey jumpers!) Much gratitude to David Efird for agreeing to act as my external examiner, and to John Divers, not only for agreeing to be my internal examiner, but also for sparking my interest in modality when I was an undergraduate at Sheffield. Similar thanks to the inimitable Stephen Makin for introducing me to metaphysics with some unforgettable lectures, and to Mrs Bull at the Bulmershe School in Woodley, for bringing philosophy to my attention in the first place. The School of PRHS has been extremely welcoming and supportive. Thanks to Denise Alsop, Sarah Cason, Trish Davies, Louise Hawksworth, Jo Luff, Jenneke Stevens, and Roz Walsh, for their help on matters administrative. Thank you to Ross Cameron and Elizabeth Barnes for letting me dog-sit Willow to earn some extra cash (though I’d definitely have done it for free). Thank you to Adrian Wilson for the numerous pep-talks when we’ve been the lone people (bar, of course, Chris Kenny) bobbing about the department at odd hours. Thanks to Gerald Lang for talking me out of quitting the MA! Thanks to Nick Jones for much valuable teaching experience and to Pekka Väyrynen and Donnchadh O’Connail for acting as my tutoring mentors. Thanks to all the academic staff who’ve made Leeds such a great and lively place to study philosophy. I’m particularly grateful to audiences at the CMM, CPR, and PG seminars for listening to presentations of my work, to John Divers, Jason Turner, Robbie Williams, Ross Cameron, Helen Steward, and Mark Wynn for useful discussions of points relating to my research, and to Donnchadh for proof-reading two of my chapters. Outside of Leeds iv I’m grateful to audiences at the White Rose PG Forum at Hull, the Glasgow and Birmingham Philosophy of Religion Seminars, and the Religious Studies at 50 Conference. One of the things I’ve most valued about my time at Leeds has been the friendships I’ve made with my fellow graduate students. Thanks to: Becky Bowd for visiting me in hospital when I was admitted with an unknown illness; Liz Bruton for Irish wit; Ann Hanley for cake; Wouter Kalf and Sean McNally for football; Coreen McGuire for help moving house; Kerry McKenzie for straight-talking advice; Laura Sellers for arm waving; Fran Fairbarn, Rob Muckle, Joe Crolla, and Jessica Henderson for making the 2011-12 academic year a really great one; Jordan Bartol for his voice; Dominic Berry, Jade Fletcher, Will Gamester, Dave Race, Nahuel Sznajderhaus, and Elizabeth Watkins for their friendship, encouragement, and conversation; and to all the others who I haven’t the space to mention. The most extra-special debt of thanks is owed to Michael Bench-Capon, Richard Caves, Thomas Brouwer, Jon Robson, Robert Pezet, and Carl Warom. I’ve benefitted immensely from the wisdom of these clever, gifted, and generous people, and I’ll forever be grateful for their help. I must of course also separately thank the man now known as Jon Livingstone-Banks, who’s been like a brother to me since my first day as an undergraduate at Sheffield. I’m lucky to have spent my entire philosophical education with him; I’ve valued his friendship, his help, and his company. Penultimately, but not even almost-least, I’m very grateful to my parents, Janet and Mark, my grandfather, John, and my late grandmother, Elsie, who, I’m sad to say, I haven’t been able to see nearly enough over the last few years. They’ve each inspired me in their own way, and despite having little to no idea what I’ve been doing for all of this time (or why it’s taken me so long!), they’ve always been extremely supportive of my academic endeavours and have always encouraged me to be more confident in myself. Finally, my utmost appreciation goes to my sister, Danielle. No-one’s read or discussed at length more of my work than she has; and no-one’s talked me out of more of my panics! I’m extremely fortunate to be close to someone who shares my love of philosophy and who’s always willing to help me out whenever I need it, in whatever way; I can’t thank her enough. My girlfriend Andrea has also been there for me throughout, and I may not have made it this far without her love and support (or her simply just telling me when I’m being ridiculous!). As sad as I am about finishing my studies, this is certainly outweighed by how much I’m looking forward being able to spend more time with her; she is the best. v Abstract Much cutting-edge research has been produced in the quest to find out which metaphysical account of modality is best. Comparatively little rigorous investigation has been devoted to questioning whether such accounts are compatible with classical theism. This thesis remedies some of this neglect and charts some of this previously under-explored territory existing at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Such an investigation is important since salient among the tenets of classical theism are ones that are characteristically modal. Not only is the classical monotheistic deity supposed to exist and possess the various divine-making properties necessarily; many of these properties themselves seem to include a modal component. An omniscient being is one who could not fail to know some proposition (once it’s true); and an omnipotent being is such that, for an appropriate set of tasks, it could perform them. Classical theism also comprises modal commitments about non-divine individuals: everything distinct from God is supposed to be necessarily dependent upon God; and human beings are supposed to have been granted the freedom to do otherwise. In short, the unique metaphysical properties of a classical monotheistic deity burden the theist with substantial metaphysical and ethical commitments any theory of modality must uphold; this thesis questions which one may do so best. However, the discussion must be limited to a small number of theories. Those examined here explain modality in terms of something ultimately non-modal; either by reducing modality to something else (e.g., a particular ontology of possible worlds), or by denying that modal discourse has the function of describing, in a truth-apt way, some part of mind- independent reality. So this project is a partial investigation into a more specific question: which of these theories which deny that modality is fundamentally real best fits with theism? vi Table of Contents Introduction …………………………………………………………... 1 1. Modality, Possible Worlds, & Theism……………………………….. 1 2. Chapter Outline……………………………………………………... 10 Chapter One: Is God’s Nature Intrinsic? …………………………... 14 1. Introduction……………………………………………………….... 14 2. Preliminaries………………………………………………………... 15 2.1. Intrinsicness………………………………………………… 15 2.2. Dependence………………………………………………… 17 2.3. Strategy……………………………………………………... 20 3. An Argument From Essence………………………………………... 20 3.1. The Argument………………………………………………. 20 3.2. Counterexamples to P2………………………………………23 4. An Argument from Aseity…………………………………………... 26 4.1. Aseity………………………………………………………... 26 4.2. The Argument………………………………………………. 27 4.3. A Spurious Reply……………………………………………. 29 5. An Argument from Power Possession………………………………. 30 5.1. The Argument………………………………………………. 30 5.2. A Reply………………………………………………………31 6. What is it to be Omnipotent……………………………………….... 32 6.1. The Irrelevance of Scope……………………………………. 32 6.2. Strength……………………………………………………... 33 6.3. Maximality & Exclusion of Competition…………………….. 34 6.4. Uniqueness………………………………………………….. 35 7. Replies……………………………………………………………… 37 7.1. The Relevance of (i)-(iv)…………………………………….. 38 7.2. An Acceptable Dependence? ……………………………….. 39 7.3. Powers, Bases, & Necessary Connections…………………… 40 8. Other Problematic Attributes……………………………………….. 44 8.1.