Case 2:03-cv-03997-WHW-CCC Document 29 Filed 05/09/07 Page 1 of 15 PageID: <pageID> NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY : EARL TURAN ARNOLD and CARL : SMITH, : : OPINION Plaintiffs, : : Civ. No. 03-3997 (WHW) v. : : STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT : OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, : DIVISION OF STATE POLICE, OFFICE OF : THE NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY : GENERAL, PETER G. VERNIERO, JOHN : J. FARMER, JR., CARSON J. DUNBAR, : JR., CARL WILLIAMS, TROOPERS : NELSON and CASTELLANI, and THE : COUNTY OF BERGEN, BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE Defendants. Walls, Senior District Judge Plaintiffs Earl Turan Arnold and Carl Smith filed this action against the named defendants alleging violations of their civil rights under federal and state law as well as the common law torts of false imprisonment, slander, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs’ claims derive from the allegation that they were victims of unlawful racial profiling on January 20, 1997. Plaintiffs allege Defendants State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of State Police, State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Office of the Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety, John J. Farmer, -1- Case 2:03-cv-03997-WHW-CCC Document 29 Filed 05/09/07 Page 2 of 15 PageID: <pageID> NOT FOR PUBLICATION Peter G. Verniero, Carson, J. Dunbar, and Colonel Carl A. Williams, Jr. (collectively “State Defendants”) move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), to dismiss all counts against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 Their motion is unopposed. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, State Defendants’ motion is decided without oral argument. The motion is granted. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Earl Turan Arnold and Carl Smith allege that on January 20, 1997, they were the subject of unlawful racial profiling by Troopers Nelson and Castellani on the New Jersey Turnpike. Smith was driving and Arnold was a passenger. Plaintiffs allege that Nelson and Castellani stopped their vehicle because they were African American and because the vehicle had a Georgia State license plate. The troopers obtained consent from Smith to search the vehicle and found five ounces of cocaine. On April 10, 1997, Arnold and Smith were both indicted by a Bergen County grand jury for possession of cocaine in an amount exceeding five ounces. Plaintiffs filed various pre-trial motions during the criminal proceedings, arguing that the traffic stop was a product of selective enforcement. On January 21, 2001, the indictment against them was dismissed. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated their federal civil rights and their rights under state law. Plaintiffs allege the following claims against all defendants: (1) an equal protection claim grounded in the allegation that the defendant troopers subjected plaintiffs to unlawful racial 1The State Defendants do not include Trooper Nelson, Trooper Castellani, or the County of Bergen, Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. -2- Case 2:03-cv-03997-WHW-CCC Document 29 Filed 05/09/07 Page 3 of 15 PageID: <pageID> NOT FOR PUBLICATION profiling; (2) a malicious prosecution claim; (3) a defamation claim; (4) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982; and (5) federal and state constitutional claims.2 On January 21, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, alleging violations of their civil rights under federal and state law as well as the common law torts of false imprisonment, slander, and malicious prosecution. On August 22, 2003, Defendants removed the case to the Federal District of New Jersey. Plaintiffs moved for default judgment against Defendants, and default was entered on November 14, 2004. On February 4, 2004, Defendants filed a motion to vacate the entry of default and for an extension of time to answer or otherwise reply. The motion to vacate was granted on August 31, 2004 and Defendants filed an Answer on September 29, 2004. On August 22, 2005, the Court administratively terminated the action without prejudice, pending a decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Gibson v. Superintendent of State Police et al., 411 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 2005). On January 24, 2006, Defendants requested that the matter be stayed pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari in Gibson, supra, by the United States Supreme Court. On March 20, 2006, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gibson. On March 27, 2006, Defendants notified the court of the denial by letter and requested that the stay be vacated. On April 4, 2006, the Court vacated the stay. The State Defendants now move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 2Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not specifically allege a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Plaintiffs assert federal constitutional claims, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the appropriate vehicle for bringing such claims. Accordingly, the Court will treat these claims as though they were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. -3- Case 2:03-cv-03997-WHW-CCC Document 29 Filed 05/09/07 Page 4 of 15 PageID: <pageID> NOT FOR PUBLICATION Complaint against them with prejudice. LEGAL STANDARDS Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) Fed. R .Civ. P. 12(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The pleadings are “closed” after the complaint and answer are filed, along with any reply to additional claims asserted in the answer. See Owens v. Horn, No. 02-cv-0356, 2006 WL 1620220, at * 1 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2006); Williams v. Walnut Park Plaza, 68 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). “Under Rule 12(c), judgment will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bayer Chemicals Corp. v. Albermarle Corp., 171 Fed. Appx. 392, 397 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 2006) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations and quotations omitted)). “The standard applied to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to that applied to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Haynes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 Fed. Appx. 956, 958 (3d Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (citing Turbe v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991)). “In reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(c) motion, [the court] must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bayer, 171 Fed. Appx. at 397 (quoting Jablonski, 863 F.2d at 290-91 (citations and quotations omitted)). The court, however, “need not -4- Case 2:03-cv-03997-WHW-CCC Document 29 Filed 05/09/07 Page 5 of 15 PageID: <pageID> NOT FOR PUBLICATION accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Bayer, 171 Fed. Appx. at 397 (quoting Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, the court generally does not consider matters outside the pleadings. Mele v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2004). The court, however, may consider matters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Lo Sacco v. City of Middletown, 745 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Conn. 1990); 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004). DISCUSSION 1. Claims Against Division of State Police, Office of the Attorney General, and Department of Law and Public Safety The State Defendants move to have all claims against the Division of State Police, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Department of Law and Public Safety dismissed on the grounds that they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of a foreign state.” U.S. Const., amend. XI. Although the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). The amendment precludes federal -5- Case 2:03-cv-03997-WHW-CCC Document 29 Filed 05/09/07 Page 6 of 15 PageID: <pageID> NOT FOR PUBLICATION jurisdiction over a state absent the state’s consent to suit. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). This prohibition against naming a state as a defendant extends to state agencies or departments of the state. Id. at 101-02. As the Court explained in Edelman, “the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment” because the state is the real party in interest.