REFERENCE AND MODALITY: A THEORY OF INTENSIONS Alik Pelman PhD Thesis 2007 University College London 2 I, Alik Pelman, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 3 Abstract The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental issues in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology; this suggests that reference is closely linked to the three realms. The overall purpose of this study is to elucidate the structure of some of these links, through a close examination of the “mechanism” of reference. As in many other enquiries, considering the possible (i.e., the modal,) in addition to the actual proves very helpful in clarifying and explicating insights. The reference of a term with respect to possible worlds is commonly called “intension”; so this is a study of intensions. The main contribution of the study is an outline for a “calculator” of intensions. It is argued that the intension of a term is a function of three variables: (a) the way in which the term “picks out” its referent in different possible worlds (semantics); (b) criteria of identity (metaphysics); and (c) the actual state of affairs (actuality). While considering different possible values for these variables, it is demonstrated how the variables combine to generate the term’s intension. In other words, the result is a calculator that when provided with the required values, yields the reference of the term in different possible worlds. By taking into account the possible gap between what we take the values of these variables to be and what they may in fact be, we also gain important insights into the epistemic aspect of reference. In addition, since a rigid designator is a term with constant intension, the proposed thesis provides an elaborate account of rigidity. The first chapter is devoted to the development of the calculator of intensions. Each of the following three chapters elaborates on one aspect of intensions, namely, the semantic, metaphysical and epistemic aspects. In the course of these chapters, various familiar puzzles pertaining to the respective philosophical realms are addressed (many of these puzzles are discussed in Kripke’s Naming and Necessity – a work that considerably inspired this study). In the fifth and last chapter the analysis of intensions is applied to two case-studies from relatively recent philosophical literature: the Kripke-Lewis debate over the identity theory of mind, and the debate over the significance of Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction. The novel accounts that these applications generate purport to illustrate the importance and originality of the proposed thesis. 4 In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that David Lewis, “General Semantics” 5 Contents Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................7 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................8 Endnotes .......................................................................................................................................19 1 A BLUEPRINT FOR A CALCULATOR OF INTENSIONS .................................22 Overview...................................................................................................................................22 1.1 The Dependence of Intensions on Other Factors – Three Cases......................23 1.2 The Intension of a Term as a Function of all Three Factors ..............................31 1.3 Rigidity.........................................................................................................................41 1.4 Applying the Intensions Calculator to the Initial Three Cases ...........................45 1.5 Discussion: Challenging Kripke’s Essentialism.....................................................53 Endnotes .......................................................................................................................................61 2 INTENSIONS: SOME SEMANTICAL ASPECTS....................................................73 Overview...................................................................................................................................73 2.1 A Fourfold Classification of Semantic Functions.................................................74 2.2 Natural-language terms – the Controversy over their Semantic Function.......76 2.3 Intension as a Means to Distinguish among Semantic Functions................... 100 2.4 Fine-Graining “The Actual Referent” Factor in the Formula ......................... 102 Endnotes .................................................................................................................................... 110 3 INTENSIONS: SOME METAPHYSICAL ASPECTS ........................................... 117 Overview................................................................................................................................ 117 3.1 Coarse-Graining the Intensions Formula............................................................ 118 3.2 Sortal Properties: An Analysis in Terms of First-Order and Second-Order Properties............................................................................................................................... 121 3.3 First-Order Properties: An Analysis in Terms of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions ............................................................................................................................. 127 3.4 Criteria of Identity vs. Supervenience: A Note About Hierarchical Relations 137 Endnotes .................................................................................................................................... 144 4 INTENSIONS: SOME EPISTEMIC ASPECTS...................................................... 149 6 Overview................................................................................................................................ 149 4.1 The Relation between the Way Things Are and the Ways They are Taken to Be 150 4.2 Reduction: A Relation between Different Ways things are Taken to Be ....... 162 Endnotes .................................................................................................................................... 176 5 TWO SAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS............................................. 180 Overview................................................................................................................................ 180 5.1 The Kripke-Lewis Debate over the Identity Theory of Mind – A Critical Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 182 5.2 Donnellan’s Referential-Attributive Distinction: An Argument against the Standard Interpretation and a Proposed Two Dimensionalist Analysis ...................... 199 Endnotes .................................................................................................................................... 212 REFERENCES......................................................................................................................... 217 7 Acknowledgements My first and foremost debt is to my Supervisors Paul Snowdon and José Zalabardo for their invaluable support, professionalism, and friendliness. Their insightful remarks, probing challenges and high standards forced me to think hard and to always look for better solutions to the problems with which I was engaged. I wish to express my gratitude to Marcus Giaquinto, Gabriel Segal, David Papineau, Dror Yinon and Levi Spectre for reading and commenting on drafts from this dissertation, and especially to Jonathan Yaari for countless ongoing discussions. Parts of this dissertation were presented at conferences in London, Baltimore, Lisbon, Manchester, Amsterdam, and Utah; I am grateful for commentaries, questions and remarks made by participants in these conferences. I thank Ruth Tovim for her dedicated proofreading and ready advice on language matters. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the following institutions for their financial support of this project: Universities UK, for the Overseas Research Scholarship (ORS); the department of philosophy at UCL; Goodenough College; the Kenneth Lindsay Scholarship Trust; and an anonymous donor. 8 INTRODUCTION i. Motivation and Overview This dissertation is about reference, i.e., the relation between language and reality; between words and world. Moreover, it is about reference not only in actual states of affairs, but also in possible states of affairs, or, as it is commonly put, in possible worlds. Rudolf Carnap called the reference of a term with respect to different possible worlds “intension” (spelt with “s”).1 So this dissertation is about intensions. Why reference? The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental issues in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology. A familiar example is Saul Kripke’s seminal work Naming and Necessity.2 (Indeed, this dissertation is considerably inspired by Kripke’s work and by the subsequent vast body of literature it generated). This suggests that reference is closely linked to the three realms. It is these links that are the main interest of the present dissertation. The overall purpose of this study is thus to elucidate the structure of some