Southern Illinois University Carbondale OpenSIUC Honors Theses University Honors Program 5-1991 The .SU . Protectorate in Panama: An Analysis of Recent U.S.-Panamanian Relations With Specific Reference to Operation Just Cause (December, 1989) Karen Cherese Nelson Southern Illinois University Carbondale Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses Recommended Citation Nelson, Karen Cherese, "The .SU . Protectorate in Panama: An Analysis of Recent U.S.-Panamanian Relations With Specific Reference to Operation Just Cause (December, 1989)" (1991). Honors Theses. Paper 300. This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact [email protected]. I The.V.S, Protectorate in Panama: I ."An .Analysis.... o(Recent. U.S:;-Panamanian.. -. ReJatlons. -.with 'SP~cltic Reference: to.Operation'JUst CauseJP¢cember, 19a9) I . .....-.. ~ ., . I I II by I Karen C. Ne 1son '. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I " J I,, I I A Thesis Submltted in Partial FuJfi Ilment of the Requlrements for the I' BaChelor of Arts in Poltlcal SClence wlth Umversny Honors I Department of Political Science I Southern III inois University I at Carbondale I May 1991 I I I I I," I '. T A8L1~ 01= CONT~NTS I. I Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1 I 2. DEVELOPMENT OF PANAMANIAN PROTECTORATE. 3 I' 3. HISTORICAL BASES FOR PANAMANIAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES 8 I 4. FACTORS IN U.S. DOMINANCE 12 I' 5. OPERATION JUST CAUSE: ANTECEDENTS 20 Rediscovery of Noriega I The Reagan Position I The Bush Response 6. ANALYSIS OF THE INVASiON 31 I Bush Administration Justifications I U.S. Public Opinion Options: Legal and Other I 7. CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-PANAMANIAN RELATIONS 43 I Sentiment Among the Panamanian People Economic Chaos I The L1kelihood of Democracy I CONCLUSION I I I, I I I CHAPTER I I INTRODUCTION In December 1989 the United States Intervened in Latin America once I again adding one more instance to the list whIch Included, among others, the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala, the 1965 intervention in the I' Dominican RepublIc, and the 1973 assistance given the Chilean mil itary in its successful overthrow of Allende In Chile. This latest case was the I massive U.S. mllitary Invasion of Panama. From Washlngton's point of view, "Operation Just Cause," as it was called, was indeed just. The United States was responding to the request of a fairly large proportion of the I Panamanian population that wished removal from power of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the mllitary ruler of Panama. Noriega's Involvement in I the world of drug trafficking and in questionable hemispheric radical political movements prevented him from projecting in Panama a positive I Image of the U.S.-installed clvllian leadership. Washington's public explanation was that at the request of its southern neighbor the United I States was Simply ridding a friendly nation of an individual many Panamanians viewed as a tyrant. Yet, behind this relatively simple explanation lies a more complex I one, one which was not openly discussed as U.S. troops set root on Panamanian soil. General Noriega was viewed by the Bush Administration I as a threat to the stabllity of Latin America, a stability whose peculiar characteristics the United States had sought to maintain for more than a I century. Although Panama is a small, relatively young Latin American country, it represents a major focal point in traditional definitions of the I U.S. national interest. Although "Operation Just Cause" was ostensibly carried out In the name of Panamanian Interests, in reality, It was on a set of Quest10nable national secur1ty assumptIons held by the I Bush AdministratIon that the massive assault on the small country was made. In his refusal to comply with U.S. orders to relinquish power, I Noriega challenged Washington's control over Panama, one that had been I exercised since 1903. I I I This paper will address the 1989 invasion In terms of the historical I relationship existing between the two nation-states, that of U.S. as protector and Panama as protectorate. The writer's intent is to I demonstrate that this relatjonshlp has resulted in a de facto loss of sovereign control by Panama and, as a result, continues to constitute a I breach of international law. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 2 I I I .CHAPTER 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PANAMANIAN PROTECTORATE I The protected state is dependent on the protection and control of a superior power. This relationship requires that the weaker nation-state I allow the protector to Involve itself in the domestic and foreign affairs of the country; the protectorate becomes the executor of decisions and I demands or interests of the superior protecting power. It yields decision­ making power to the protector by treaty or other agreement by which it I "[releases] its right of non-intervention" (Thomas and Thomas, 92). According to one view of international law; I There is no International duty of self-preservation falling upon the state to maintain itself as sovereign or I lndependenLlt would seem strange 1f a state could not consent to a less drastic curtailment of its sovereignty I by releasing Its right of non-intervention, which is a right of each Individual state flowing from sovereignty itself, although it may be admitted I that by such a treaty the state Is at least placed under the political tutelage of another, if not placed in the status of a protectorate. I (Thomas and Thomas, 92) 1 I Hence, a country may relinquish its right to be an independent actor with recognizable pol1tical, economic, and social pol1cies of Its own. I In the case of Panama, dependence on the United States was the result of the desires of three actors at the beginning of the present century: I indigenous rebels, the Roosevelt Administration, and Philippe Bunau­ Varilla. The rebels (led, in 1903, by four men: Jose Augustfn Arango, I Federico Boyd, Dr. Manuel Guerrero Amador, Tomas Arias, and C. C. Arosemena) had long sought freedom from Colombian rule but lacked the military capability to execute a successful "revolution" (LaFeber 1989, I 19).2 The Roosevelt Administration had secured an agreement with the Colombian government for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal I across the Panamanian isthmus. The Hay-Herdn Treaty of 1903 gave I 3 I I I Colombia a $10 mill ion down-payment and $250,000 annuity in exchange for "a 99-year lease on asix-miIe-wide canal zone" but, unlike its North American counterpart, the Colombian Senate refused to ratify the Treaty I (LaFeber, 1989, 18). Frenchman Philippe Bunau-Varilla was also experiencing difficulty in achieving his goal. His efforts to sell the New I Panama Canal Company's canal construction rights--before their expiration in 1904--to the Russian czar and the British government were fruitless I (LaFeber, 1989, 17; McCullough, 279). Therefore, three separate sets of frustrated goals led to plans for the liberation of the Isthmus from I Colombian rule, the bul1ding of an inter-oceanic canal, and Bunau-Var1lla's earning a $40 million personal profit. 3 I With Bunau-Varilla acting as special envoy, the Panamanian delegation made an agreement with the Roosevelt Administration whereby the U.S. would provide ml1itary assistance to ensure a successful revolt I and, in return, the newly independent Republic of Panama would sign a treaty granting the U.S. the right to construct an inter-oceanic canal across I the narrow isthmus ofthe new nation-state. The delegation returned to Panama and witnessed the independence of their country on November 2, I 1903. 4 Washington had fulfilled its obllgation. The time had arrived for Panama to commit to the treaty. I In 1903 U.S. Secretary of State John Hay and Panamanian "Envoy ExtraordInary and Minister Plenipotentiary" Philippe Bunau-Var1l1a signed the Hay-Bunau-Var111a Convention (McCullough, 387-388). Amador, I Arango, Arosemena, Arias, and Boyd gave Bunau-Varilla the authority to I act on Panama's behalf but within specific limits: First, no deals could be made that affected 'the sovereignty of Panama which was free, I States should pledge to uphold the new nation's 'sovereignty, territorial integrity, and public I order'....Third, a canal treaty would be drafted, but only after consultation with Amador and Boyd. I (LaFeber, I 989, 28-29) Bunau-Vari lla, who was motivated by the desire for fame, fai led to adhere I to any of the nationals instructions (McCullough, 277). Instead, he I 4 I I I deliberately kept the rebel delegation waiting in New York while in Washington he proceeded to redraft Secretary Hay's treaty proposal, which was similar in language to the Hay-Herran Treaty. However, Bunau­ I Varilla's version (which became the final treaty) gave a broader grant of power to the United States (McCullough 1977, 392).5 The treaty required I the U.S. to pay Panama $10 million for canal construction and a $250,000 annuity, but Article 3 of the treaty also gave the United States "all the I rights, power, and authority within the zone... which the United States would possess and exercise If it were the sovereign of the territory...to I the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any sovereign rights, power or authority" (McCullough, 393). This provision I permitted formation of a United States colony within Panama and was the first among several which transformed the newly independent country into a U.S.