Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity ~ A era of unprece- dented peace appears to be at hand as the twenty-first century draws near. The world’s major powers enjoy cooperative relations, democracy is taking root in many countries that have long suffered under authoritarian rule, and the world economy is becoming increasingly liberalized and integrated. Contrary to the dire predictions of a return to a Hobbesian world, the end of the Cold War has not been accompanied by the fragmentation of international order and the emergence of rivalry among atomistic national units.’ A sobering reality, however, must temper optimism about the emerging international landscape. The peace and prosperity of the current era rely too heavily on a single ingredient: American power. The United States serves as a critical extraregional balancer in Europe and East Asia, is the catalyst behind multilateral efforts to combat aggression and peacefully resolve long-standing disputes, and is the engine behind the liberalization of the world economy. But America’s preponderance and its will to underwrite international order will not last indefinitely. Even if the U.S. economy grows at a healthy rate, Amer- ica’s share of world product and its global influence will decline as other large countries develop and become less enamored of following America’s lead.2 ~~~ Charles A. Kupckan is Associate Professor of International Relations at Georgefourn University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The author would like to thank participants in seminars at the following institutions for their thoughtful comments: Hebrew University, Columbia University, University of California at San Diego, Council on Foreign Relations, Georgetown University, University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, Okazaki Institute (Tokyo), the American Center (Tokyo), and the Danish Institute of International Affairs (Copenhagen). The critiques of Michael Barnett, &chard Betts, Albert Fishlow, Gary Hufbauer, Clifford Kupchan, Joseph Lepgold, Gideon Rose, Peter Trubowitz, Ole Waever, Fareed Zakaria, and the reviewers of International Security were particularly helpful. For research assistance, I would like to thank Jason Davidson, Delphe Park, and Mira Sucharov. 1. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, ”Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. 2. For general analysis of the secular processes through which the locus of preponderant power changes over time, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam- bridge University Press, 1981). During the second half of the twentieth century, US. economic output has fallen from roughly one-half to one-quarter of gross world product. See Jeffrey Frankel, Regional Tradirig Blocs in the World Economic System (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), p. 6. Internntronal Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79 0 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 40 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.23.2.40 by guest on 30 September 2021 After Pax Americana 1 41 Furthermore, the American electorate will tire of a foreign policy that saddles the United States with such a disproportionate share of the burden of manag- ing the international system. America‘s unipolar moment will not last long. To assume that international order can indefinitely rest on American hegemony is both illusory and dangerous. How should the prospect of waning American power affect the conduct of American grand ~trategy?~Several prominent schools of thought suggest that the decline of American hegemony need not be cause for concern; peace will outlast American preponderance. The optimists contend that democracy, glo- balization, the spread of international institutions, and changes in the sources of state power are eroding national boundaries and making warfare an obso- lete tool of ~tatecraft.~The end of the twentieth century, however, is not the first time in history that students of international politics have proclaimed an end to war. In the years leading up to World War I and again during the interwar period, scholars and diplomats alike argued that economic interde- pendence;technological innovation, and societal aversion to the horrors of war were making armed conflict a historical artifa~t.~If today‘s optimists prove to be as wrong as yesterday’s, there is good reason to be worried about the potential consequences of a relative decline in U.S. power.6 Even if the optimists are right that international politics have entered a more peaceful era, the waning of American hegemony still provides cause for alarm. ~~~~ - ~~ ~ 3. Even if American hegemony lasts for decades more, debate about crafting a posthegemonic order should take place now, while US. preponderance is still sufficient to maintain the status quo. It is far more prudent to put in place the foundation of a durable order by design than simply to wait until current arrangements unravel. Many analysts agree that US.preponderance will not last, but few have given thought to how the prospect of decline should affect US. grand strategy. One exception is Christopher Layne. Layne calls for a US.grand strategy of offshore balancing to conserve US. resources and to help protect the United States from getting dragged into distant conflicts. He fails to address, however, how to promote peace as the United States withdraws from existing commitments. Instead, he makes the case that the United States should simply stand aloof from the regional conflicts likely to emerge in the wake of an American retrenchment. See Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America‘s Future Grand Strategy,” lnternntional Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1999, pp. 86-124. 4. On the democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, Graspiizg the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Michael Doyle, ”Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Reviezu, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169. On the declining utility of warfare, see Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York Basic Books, 1986); and John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York Basic Books, 1989). 5. See, for example, Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1911). 6. Important critiques of the democratic peace hypothesis have been collected in two edited volumes: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Deinocratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy fhe Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.23.2.40 by guest on 30 September 2021 International Security 23:2 1 42 Although scholars disagree about whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more stable, most agree that both are less stable than unipolar ~ystems.~The end of America’s unipolar moment and the return to multipolarity thus threaten to trigger structural sources of competition that may well override other sources of peace. Indeed, the ongoing debate between realists and institution- alists of various stripes essentially revolves around pitting structural sources of competition against ideational and institutional sources of cooperation.8 Structure, however, may be the solution, not an endemic source of rivalry that must be overcome by antidotes such as democracy, globalization, and international institutions. If order devolved from structure itself, rather than from efforts to tame systemic forces, that order would be more durable and self-sustaining. The prospect of the end of American hegemony thus raises a crucial question: Is it possible to construct a stable multipolarity? I argue that the United States should prepare for the inevitable decline of its preponderance by encouraging the emergence of regional unipolarity in each of the world‘s three areas of industrial and military power-North America, Europe, and East Asia. Unipolarity at the regional level will offset through structural forces the fragmentation and rivalry that otherwise would likely accompany the decline of American hegemony. Because even global wars start at the regional level, securing peace within regions is an essential first step toward securing peace globally. I introduce the notion of ”benign unipolarity” to map out the logic upon which my analysis rests. Benign unipolarity refers to a hierarchical structure in which a preponderant geographic core establishes a hub-spoke pattern of influence over a weaker periphery. As in an empire, the core exerts a powerful centripetal force over the periphery by virtue of its uncontested preponderance and the size and scope of its economy. In contrast to a classical empire, however, regional order emerges from a consensual bargain between core and periphery, not from coercion. The core engages in self-restraint and agrees to subject the exercise of its preponderant power to a set of rules and norms 7. On the greater stability of bipolarity, see Kenneth N. Waltz, ”The Stability of a Bipolar World,” DaedaIus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and Mearsheimer, ”Back to the Future.” For arguments in favor of multipolarity, see Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, ”Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-106. For general discussion of polarity and stability, see Stephen Van Evera, ”Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 5-57; and Michael Mastanduno, ”Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88. 8. See the exchange between John Mearsheimer and his critics in ”Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-93.