Dissertation A Need for Speed? Identifying the Effects of Space Acquisition Timelines on Space Deterrence and Conflict Outcomes Benjamin Goirigolzarri This document was submitted as a dissertation in September 2019 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of William Shelton (Chair), Bonnie Triezenberg, and Jonathan Wong. PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL For more information on this publication, visit http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD432.html Published 2019 by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. R® is a registered trademark Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. 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Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Abstract Department of Defense leadership have asserted that slow space acquisition timelines may threaten American space superiority, but the link between acquisition timelines and space conflict has not been rigorously investigated in prior research. This dissertation questions that assertion through a mixed-methods approach of game-theoretic modeling informed by case study analysis. I found that acquisition timelines primarily drive underlying strategies, but not necessarily the outcomes of space conflict and deterrence and that the US should tailor its strategy to the conditions it faces. If an actor is slow, they can mitigate that disadvantage by investing in relatively simple redundancies and resiliencies supporting their space architecture and by remaining reserved through conflict. As timelines improve, I find the appropriate strategy is to invest in more complex systems and to take an increasingly assertive posture in conflict. Given leadership’s statements and this dissertations’ conclusions on American space acquisition timelines, the United States should prioritize relatively simple investments that support its resilience in space. iii iv Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Figures........................................................................................................................................... vii Tables ............................................................................................................................................. ix Equations........................................................................................................................................ ix Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... xi Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... xiii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 9 Threats in Space ....................................................................................................................................... 9 Current US Space Acquisition Timelines ............................................................................................... 12 How Might Space Acquisition Timelines Affect Deterrence? ............................................................... 14 How Might Space Acquisition Timelines Affect Space Conflict? ......................................................... 16 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 19 Research Questions/Hypotheses ......................................................................................................... 19 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 21 Methodologies Considered ..................................................................................................................... 22 Case Studies ....................................................................................................................................... 22 Expert Interviews ............................................................................................................................... 23 Surveys ............................................................................................................................................... 23 Wargaming ......................................................................................................................................... 23 Game-theoretic modeling ................................................................................................................... 23 Methodologies Selected .......................................................................................................................... 24 Case Studies ....................................................................................................................................... 24 Game-theoretic model ........................................................................................................................ 31 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 39 Findings......................................................................................................................................... 40 Model Results ......................................................................................................................................... 40 Cases with Effect ................................................................................................................................ 41 Cases with No Effect .......................................................................................................................... 45 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 47 Policy Implications ............................................................................................................................. 48 Final Thoughts .............................................................................................................................. 51 Appendix A: GIST Model Modifications ..................................................................................... 52 Objective Function ................................................................................................................................. 52 Prospect Theory .................................................................................................................................. 52 Space Assets ....................................................................................................................................... 54 v Space Vulnerabilities .......................................................................................................................... 55 Political Capability ............................................................................................................................. 55 Space Weapons .................................................................................................................................. 56 Investments ......................................................................................................................................... 59 Appendix B: IED Case Study ....................................................................................................... 60 Background............................................................................................................................................. 60 Pre-Detonation Technology Developments ....................................................................................... 61 Post-detonation Technology Developments ....................................................................................... 62 Effects of Speed ...................................................................................................................................... 63 Parameters for Model Exploration