Afghanistan HUMAN “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” RIGHTS Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police” WATCH “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police” Copyright © 2011 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-806-6 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Saga Building Damascus Road, Saifi District 11-4399 Riad El Solh Beirut, Lebanon Tel: Tel: +961-1-217670, Fax: +961-1-217672 Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 51, Avenue Blanc 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] First Floor, Audrey House 16-20 Ely Place London EC1N 6SN, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1st Fl, Wilds View Isle of Houghton, Boundary Road Parktown, 2198 South Africa 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org SEPTEMBER 2011 ISBN: 1-56432-806-6 “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police” Map of Afghanistan .......................................................................................................................... iii Glossary ........................................................................................................................................... iv Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 10 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 12 I. Background: The Ghosts of Militias Past ....................................................................................... 15 A Maze of Militias ................................................................................................................... 15 Token Disarmament ................................................................................................................ 17 Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) .................................................................................. 18 Community Defense Forces (CDF) ............................................................................................ 21 Community Defense Initiative (CDI)/Local Defense Initiative (LDI) ........................................... 22 Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure ................................................................................ 24 A Magnet for Insurgent Attacks ............................................................................................... 24 II. The Growth of Abusive Militias in the North ................................................................................. 27 Militias in Kunduz .................................................................................................................. 29 Khanabad District: Multiple Killings .................................................................................. 32 Imam Sahib District .......................................................................................................... 37 Kunduz District ................................................................................................................. 39 Militias and Sexual Predation ................................................................................................. 41 III. The Wardak Experiment: The Afghan Public Protection Program ................................................. 43 Creation of AP3 in Wardak ....................................................................................................... 43 Local Disquiet about AP3 ........................................................................................................ 44 Empowering a Notorious Commander ..................................................................................... 45 Weak Vetting .......................................................................................................................... 47 Allegations of Abuse .............................................................................................................. 48 Converting AP3 to ALP ............................................................................................................ 49 IV. The Afghan Local Police: “Community Watch with AK-47s” ........................................................ 53 Development of the ALP in Pul-e-Khumri, Baghlan ................................................................... 58 ALP Abuses in Pul-e-Khumri ............................................................................................. 60 Development of ALP in Shindand, Herat .................................................................................. 70 Controversy over Recruitment ........................................................................................... 75 Abuses by the ALP in Shindand District ............................................................................. 76 The ALP in Uruzgan ................................................................................................................. 81 ALP in Khas Uruzgan ........................................................................................................ 82 V. ALP Recruitment and Vetting ....................................................................................................... 84 Assurance of Shuras .............................................................................................................. 84 Politics of Implementation: IDLG and ASOP ............................................................................. 87 From Attackers to Protectors: Reintegration Efforts and the ALP .............................................. 88 VI. Lessons from the Experience of the Afghan National Police ........................................................ 92 VII. Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 96 To the Government of Afghanistan ......................................................................................... 96 To the Taliban and other Insurgent Forces .............................................................................. 99 To the United States and the International Security Assistance Force...................................... 99 To the US Department of State .............................................................................................. 100 To the US Department of Defense and CIA ............................................................................. 101 Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................ 102 ii Map of Afghanistan iii Glossary ABP Afghan Border Police ALP Afghan Local Police AMF Afghan Militia Force ANA Afghan National Army ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police ANP Afghan National Police AP3 Afghan Public Protection Program APPF Afghan Public Protection Force APRP Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program ASOP Afghan Social Outreach Program CDI Community Defense Initiative CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan DDR Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups IDLG Independent Directorate for Local Government ISCI Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure LDI Local Defense Initiative NTM-A NATO Training Mission Afghanistan NDS National Directorate of Security VSO Village Stability Operations iv Summary What we should not do is take actions that will reintroduce militias of the former power brokers. There has been some good work here to get those things back in the box and we shouldn’t seek to go back there. —US Gen. Dan McNeil, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, rejecting a British plan to create tribal militias, January 2008 We have a proverb about a child who is always sick. Instead of trying to cure his sickness, his family changed his name. We are doing the same thing with ALP [Afghan Local Police]. We have all these problems in society, like warlords and mafia, but we do not treat them, we give them a new name. —Maj. Gen. Esmatullah Dawlatzai, senior Ministry of Interior official, October 26, 2010 ALP is the exit strategy. —International civilian official, Kabul, October 9, 2010 In Afghanistan armed groups are proliferating. A decade after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Taliban-led insurgency has intensified in many parts of the country. In response, the Afghan government and its international supporters, as part of the international exit strategy, are expanding the national army and police at high speed. The government has reactivated various irregular armed groups, particularly in the north. Hundreds of small militias have