Eastern Ukrainian woman, one of over 1 million internally displaced persons due to conflict, has just returned from her destroyed home holding all her possessions, on main street in Nikishino Village, March 1, 2015 (© UNHCR/Andrew McConnell) cal ploy; they have suggested calling Putin’s bluff. However, they also realize Peacekeepers the idea of a properly structured force with a clear mandate operating in support of an accepted peace agreement in the Donbas could offer a viable path to peace that is worth exploring.2 By Michael P. Wagner Putin envisions a limited deploy- ment of peacekeepers on the existing line of contact in Donbas to safeguard OSCE-SMM personnel.3 Such a plan ince the conflict in Ukraine September 5, 2017, when he proposed could be effective in ending the conflict began in 2014, over 10,000 introducing peacekeepers into Eastern and relieving immediate suffering, but it people have died in the fighting Ukraine to protect the Organiza- S could also lead to an open-ended United between Russian-backed separatists tion for Security and Co-operation in Nations (UN) commitment and make and Ukrainian forces in the Donbas Europe–Special Monitoring Mission long-term resolution more challenging. region of Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrai- to Ukraine (OSCE-SMM). Despite Most importantly, freezing the conflict nian government has repeatedly called halting progress since that time, restart- in its current state would solidify Russian for a peacekeeping mission to halt ing a peacekeeping mission remains an control of the separatist regions, enabling the bloodshed, so Russian President important opportunity.1 Many experts it to maintain pressure on Ukraine by Vladimir Putin surprised the world on remain wary and dismiss it as a politi- adjusting the intensity level as it de- sires. This plan would also prevent the Ukrainians and Russian-backed separatists Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Wagner, USA, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army War College. It tied for first place in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of from implementing many of the Minsk Staff Strategic Essay Competition. II Accord tenets—including instituting JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2017 Wagner 37 constitutional reforms and reestablishing civilian administration (ICA) to maintain 90,000 heavily armed combatants facing control of sovereign borders—effectively control of the separatist regions during each other.16 Countervailing trends that blocking Ukraine from seeking North the transition. An ICA would fill the void will dramatically reduce force require- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in local governance while the Ukrainian ments include the existence of a peace membership.4 A more comprehensive parliament would amend the constitu- agreement, relatively open agricultural peacekeeping mission than Putin’s could tion to implement the decentralization land outside the cities, and limited ethnic address these issues and ease Russia’s requirements of Minsk II and necessary tensions. Additional challenges a force economic and governance burdens, re- political changes to form legitimate local might face would likely include crimi- turn sovereignty to Ukraine, and deliver governance structures throughout the nality, conflicts surrounding returning important constitutional reforms to Donbas.9 The former UN Transitional IDPs, and the remnants of separatist and the people. Administration for Eastern Slavonia, nationalist militias as well as any stay- The existence of a legitimate peace Baranja, and Western Sirmium in Croatia behind Russian elements. Based on these agreement is rightly considered one after the Balkan wars offers precedence factors, a force of approximately 20,000 of the key components of a successful for such a transitional authority under peacekeepers would be suitable, if appro- peacekeeping operation.5 The Minsk II UN auspices.10 priately organized and outfitted. It would framework must be updated to address Most discussions of the appropriate require a wide variety of capabilities, in- outstanding questions such as sequencing size of peacekeeping and counterinsur- cluding unmanned aerial vehicles to help actions and authorizing a peacekeep- gency forces focus on force-to-population patrol the borders, rotary-wing aviation ing force with an international civilian ratios with minimal concern for other assets, target acquisition radar to identify administration. The mandate of the force considerations such as terrain, lengths of any indirect fire attacks in violation of should be tailored to match its size and borders, population density, and the ex- the peace agreement, and a robust intel- capabilities to avoid creating unrealistic istence of a legitimate peace agreement.11 ligence analysis and fusion capability to expectations.6 Operating with the consent These analyses are also not particularly better share information and ensure more of all parties under a viable peace agree- well grounded in history.12 The most focused and effective employment of the ment, this force would primarily deploy commonly cited ratio of forces to popula- force. The mission should include civilian under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. tion is 20:1,000, with others suggesting police and a military formation consist- It would also require Chapter VII au- ratios as low as 2.8:1,000, depending on ing of a mix of armor and infantry forces thorization to compel compliance with levels of violence.13 Donetsk and Luhansk to ensure sufficient manpower to patrol the peace agreement; protect civilians; have a combined total of approximately the urban areas and sufficient firepower oversee the return of Ukraine’s estimated 7 million people and 53,200 square km to protect itself and the mission. Twenty 1.7 million internally displaced persons representing approximately 15 percent thousand troops would be sufficient to (IDPs); and safeguard critical civilian of Ukraine’s prewar population and field two brigades of peacekeepers in infrastructure to include roads, gas and 9 percent of its territory, along with a each oblast, or region, with a headquar- oil supplies, and power distribution facili- significant amount of its industrial capac- ters staff and the additional enabling ties.7 The force cannot effectively perform ity.14 The separatist-controlled portions capabilities. To put this in context, it is these missions if it is limited to operating account for an area roughly the size nearly the same number of troops as in solely along the line of contact. The force of Kosovo or one-third of the 53,200 the International Security and Assistance must have sufficient capacity to secure the square km of Luhansk and Donetsk, with Force’s Regional Command East during international borders, the separatist areas an estimated 2.8 million people still in the the Surge in 2010–2011 for about half of of Luhansk and Donetsk, and a 75-kilo- separatist areas.15 Assuming that up to 1.2 the population, just over one-tenth of the meter (km) artillery buffer zone on the million of the estimated 1.7 million IDPs land mass, less challenging terrain, and a Ukrainian side of the line of contact. This return to the Donbas, the peacekeeping more permissive threat environment.17 broader geographic area and a Chapter force could be responsible for a popula- Identifying troop-contributing VII authorization in the mandate would tion of up to 4 million people. Using countries that have sufficient capacity to give the mission a credible capability to pure ratio-based calculations, the size of execute a mission and are acceptable to all respond to violations and address issues a peacekeeping force could range from parties involved will be challenging. One that flair up. The existing OSCE-SMM of 11,200 to 80,000. option is to recruit from non-NATO, 1,078 personnel, including 600 monitors With this as a general range, we must OSCE member countries to avoid plac- from 44 countries, should remain in place also consider the other factors that could ing NATO troops close to Russia’s and integrate with the UN peacekeep- complicate or simplify the mission. Key borders, or relying on Russians to enforce ing force for protection as it executes its issues that tend to warrant a larger force a peace in a conflict that they are a party mission, expands its reach, and verifies include the dense urban terrain in several to. If NATO or Collective Security Treaty compliance.8 major cities, an international border of Organization countries participate, it Perhaps the most critical component just over 400 km, and a line of contact must be proportional. Another option of the agreement would be an interim approximately 500 km long, with around would be to select a power like Brazil or 38 Essay Competitions / Peacekeepers in the Donbas JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2017 12 India to lead the mission. Their participa- thehill.com/opinion/international/351512- Riley Moore, “Counterinsurgency Force real-peacekeeping-in-the-donbas-will- Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity,” tion could expand economic opportunity put-putin-to-the-test>; Carl Bildt, “Is Peace in Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 5 (2013), in Ukraine and help guarantee Russian the Donbas Possible?” European Council on 856–857, 859–860; David Michael Green, compliance out of fear of angering an- Foreign Relations, October 12, 2017, available Chad Kahl, and Paul F. Diehl, “Predicting the other power. Ukraine would welcome at <www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_is_ Size of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Armed any boost to its development efforts as peace_in_donbas_possible>. Forces and Society 24, no. 4 (Summer 1998), 3 Some reports indicated Vladimir Putin 487–491. it attempts to recover from the conflict suggested that Russia or another Common- 13 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterin- and seeks to disarm, demobilize, and wealth of Independent States country could surgency Field Manual (Chicago: University reintegrate tens of thousands of fighters. provide the troops. See “Russia Drafts UN Se- of Chicago Press, 2007), 22–23; Moore, In either case, OSCE monitors would be curity Council Resolution to Send Peacekeepers “Counterinsurgency Force Ratio,” 859–861.