Can the Australian Constitution Protect Speech About Religion or by Religious Leaders? Mitchell Landrigan A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Law November 2014 Abstract This thesis considers whether speech about religion or the speech of religious leaders may, if burdened, be protected under Australia’s Constitution. Such ‘burdens’ may include religious tolerance laws, blasphemy law or defamation laws if those laws limit constitutionally protected speech about religion or by religious leaders. Two elements of the Constitution - one written and one implied from its provisions - could protect burdened speech about religion or by religious leaders. First, section 116 of the Constitution, which prohibits the Commonwealth from making laws for proscribed purposes, including prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Secondly, the implied freedom of political discourse. In relation to the implied freedom of political discourse, the High Court has recognised that Australians must be able to communicate effectively about government and political matters so that they can make the electoral choices prescribed for them in the Constitution. If religious leaders speak about ‘government or political matters’ in the way that the High Court conceives of that phrase, then the religious leaders’ expression may, if burdened, fall within the protective scope of the implied freedom of political discourse. This thesis examines these two areas of constitutional law. It explores the objectives of section 116. It reviews the debates about the aims of section 116 as these were described during the Australian Constitutional Conventions in the 1890s. The thesis analyses the High Court’s decisions under section 116 and assesses what kind of constitutional protection section 116 provides for speech about religion. In relation to the implied freedom of political discourse, this work reviews the decided cases on the implied freedom (and the literature) and considers whether speech about religion or by religious leaders could constitute speech about government and political matters in the way the High Court has described government and political matters. The thesis then applies the tentative conclusions about the protective scope of the implied freedom of political discourse, to three detailed case studies. These case studies involve actual instances of speech by religious leaders and the leader of a religious lobby group. The studies assess whether the speech in each instance could fall within the protective scope of the implied freedom of political discourse if the speech was subject to a burden. Acknowledgements It would not have been possible to write this dissertation without the support of several people. Professor George Williams, my supervisor, provided clear direction, careful insights, patient feedback and prompt reviews of drafts. Always approachable, Professor Williams was (and is) encouraging without ever being pressuring and - critically - provided a strong sense of focus for the research. Most importantly, he helped me to maintain my interest in the research from start to finish, so much so that the thesis actually became more and more enjoyable to write. Professor Williams supervised my research throughout the preparation of the thesis without the aid of a co-supervisor, which makes me all the more thankful for his dedicated research supervision. The academic staff of the Faculty of Law, UNSW, provided me with terrific feedback on draft chapters and carefully examined my progress with the PhD research at our annual panel reviews. Professor Andrew Lynch, in particular, read all the material I submitted at each annual review and provided me with encouraging insights, as well as - it should be said - many generous and carefully considered criticisms. His helpful feedback greatly improved the quality of this work. My friend Dr Bill Lawton remained enthusiastic about my area of research from the outset. His insights into religious history and its relevance to this work have, not infrequently, been breathtaking in their interestingness. I will miss our regular breakfast conversations about the research. My partner Philippa and my daughter Emma have been equally strong sources of encouragement. For the most part, the detail of this research has been something of a mystery to them. This, however, did not deter them from always expressing an interest in the research, even if it meant that (as it often did) I failed to be more sociable towards them while getting it done. This work is dedicated to the memory of my grandmothers. Contents CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 1 I. THE ENQUIRY.............................................................................................. 1 II. RESEARCH FOCUS ..................................................................................... 2 III. MATTERS OUTSIDE SCOPE OF RESEARCH .......................................... 4 A. Separation of Church and State .......................................................................................... 4 B. Politicians and Other Political Figures ............................................................................... 5 C. State and Territory Laws - and Laws in Other Jurisdictions .............................................. 5 D. Proportionality and a Critique of Rationale for the Implied Freedom ............................... 6 IV. METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 6 V. THESIS OUTLINE ........................................................................................ 9 CHAPTER 2 – ORIGINS AND OBJECTS OF SECTION 116 ........................ 12 I. AIMS OF CHAPTER ................................................................................... 12 Preamble and Section 116 ................................................................................................ 12 Existing Literature ............................................................................................................ 12 Specific Questions ............................................................................................................ 13 Chapter Overview ............................................................................................................. 14 II. RELIGIOUS CONTEXT: 1788 – 1890s ...................................................... 15 III. THE DRAFTING OF SECTION 116 .......................................................... 20 A. Constitutional Conventions .............................................................................................. 20 B. Recognition Formally Proposed ....................................................................................... 22 C. A Safeguard for Religious Freedoms? ............................................................................. 24 D. Recognition is Accepted ................................................................................................... 29 E. Section 109 (116) is Accepted .......................................................................................... 31 F. Arguments Against Section 116 ....................................................................................... 33 IV. SECTION 116: DETAILED CRITIQUE ..................................................... 37 A. Constitutional Significance of Recognition ...................................................................... 37 B. Objectives of Section 116 ................................................................................................. 39 C. Eight Observations about Section 116 ............................................................................. 40 V. CONCLUSION............................................................................................. 48 CHAPTER 3 – THE HIGH COURT AND SECTION 116 ............................... 50 I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 50 A. Conclusions from Chapter 2 ............................................................................................. 50 B. Objectives of Chapter ....................................................................................................... 51 C. Chapter Overview ............................................................................................................. 52 II. A DEFINITION OF RELIGION .................................................................. 53 A. A Tension: Religion and Free Exercise ............................................................................ 53 B. Scientology Case .............................................................................................................. 53 1. Indicia of a Religion ......................................................................................................... 55 2. Canons of Conduct and Belief in Supernatural ................................................................ 58 3. Are All Religions Equal? .................................................................................................. 59 III. WHAT IS THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION? .................................. 59 Early High Court Decisions .............................................................................................. 60 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case ................................................................................................ 64 Stolen