Naval War College Review Volume 73 Number 1 Winter 2020 Article 4 2020 Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid ar—TW wo Failures of American Strategic Thinking Donald Stoker Craig Whiteside Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Stoker, Donald and Whiteside, Craig (2020) "Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid ar—TW wo Failures of American Strategic Thinking," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Stoker and Whiteside: Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of Dr. Donald Stoker is a senior fellow with Atlas Or- ganization in Washington, DC. From 1999 to 2017, he was professor of strategy and policy for the Na- val War College at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is the author or editor of eleven books. Clausewitz: His Life and Work (Ox- ford Univ. Press, 2014), is on the British army pro- fessional reading list. The Grand Design: Strategy and the U�S� Civil War (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010) won the prestigious Fletcher Pratt Award for the best nonfiction Civil War book of 2010, was a Main Selec- tion of the History Book Club, is on the U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s reading list, and is a common text in history and strategic studies courses. He is currently writing American Grand Strategy, 1775–2020 for Basic Books. His most recent work is Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2019). Craig Whiteside is an associate professor at the Na- val War College at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he teaches national se- curity affairs to military officers as part of their pro- fessional military education. He is a senior associate with the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and a fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. He has a PhD in political science from Washington State Univer- sity and is a former U.S. Army officer with combat experience. Naval War College Review, Winter 2020, Vol. 73, No. 1 Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 BLURRED LINES Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside mong today’s great ironies is that, despite the fact that the United States has been at war for the better part of two decades, rare is the American policy Amaker who speaks adeptly about our use of military power in a coherent manner� On the one hand, political leaders attempt to avoid categorizing our air strikes and raids targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in countries around the world as war, while on the other hand they conflate hostile Russian acts with some form of hyphenated war� This article argues that the adoption of two prominent and fashionable theoretical terms and their various iterations—the gray zone or gray- zone conflict (usually described as the space between peace and war) and hybrid war (often described as Russia’s new form of mixed-methods warfare birthed by General Valery Gerasimov)—is an example of an American failure to think clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and their vitally important connections� These terms, as well as the concepts arising from them, should be eliminated from the strategic lexicon� They cause more harm than good and contribute to an increasingly dangerous distortion of the concepts of war, peace, and geopolitical competition, with a resultant negative impact on the crafting of security strategy for the United States and its allies and partners around the world� If an effort to eliminate two such commonly accepted terms and the theoreti- cal approaches arising from them seems a fruitless effort to corral the contents of Pandora’s box, then examine the most recent U�S� National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy�1 You will not find either term in these documents even though, as we will see, both have appeared regularly in U�S� political and strategy documents for years� This demonstrates that it is possible to discuss security https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4 2 Stoker14 andNAVAL Whiteside: WAR COLLEGE Blurred REVIEW Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of challenges without reliance on problematic terms that confuse strategic issues rather than clarify them� This is what we hope to achieve in this article� There are four key problems with gray-zone conflict and hybrid war and the related variations of each� 1 � They are examples of poorly constructed new theories that more often than not cloud rather than clarify� 2 � They distort or ignore history, sometimes by claiming to be new when we have seen similar confusion in the past� 3 � They feed a dangerous tendency to confuse war and peace� 4 � They undermine U�S� strategic thinking via the construction of critical political and strategic documents on the basis of flawed ideas, even sometimes resulting in strategic guidance derived from a focus on tactical matters� After almost two decades of war, we should heed the lessons that writers such as Emile Simpson learned firsthand in Afghanistan: “What liberal powers do by blurring the conceptual boundaries between war and peace is often to militarise in a polarised manner pre-established patterns of political activity, which might otherwise not be part of the wider conflict�”2 As we will see, part of the cure for a poor understanding of some of our geopolitical problems is not to confuse geo- politics, competition among adversaries, or ham-handed influence efforts with war� The United States (and its allies) survived the Cold War (what some have termed more accurately the Cold Peace) without confusing whether it was at war or at peace with the Soviet Union—when such confusion could have produced nuclear Armageddon� We need to relearn how to make this distinction� A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS To support these claims, we must do something of fundamental importance: establish the basis for our discussion� This will give us a firm foundation for analysis, because without a secure base one cannot evaluate terms and concepts consistently and rationally� This is important because what some advocates of hy- brid and gray-zone ideas are doing is elevating the importance of these concepts to being a new theory of war. Proposing supposedly new tools or methods for analysis is to present new theory� How do we judge whether this theory is valid, rigorous, and testable? Carl von Clausewitz gave us the first steps� “The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled�”3 Theory, as Sir Julian Corbett tells us, “can assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook�” Theory should teach us to think critically, to analyze, Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020 3 Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 STOKER & WHITESIDE 15 to bring a questioning but informed eye to the problem at hand, and to consider both its depth and breadth� It provides conceptual tools and grounds us by defin- ing our terms and providing us a firm foundation for analysis, while teaching us to distinguish between what is important and what is not�4 The results of theory, Clausewitz insists, “must have been derived from mili- tary history, or at least checked against it,” thus ensuring “that theory will have to remain realistic� It cannot allow itself to get lost in futile speculation, hair- splitting, and flights of fancy�” Most importantly, particularly in any theory ad- dressing warfare, it “is meant to educate the mind of the future commander�”5 Historian Peter Paret has made similar points� “A theory that is logically and historically defensible, and that reflects present reality, has the pedagogic func- tion of helping the student organize and develop his ideas on war, which he draws from experience, study, and from history—the exploration of the past extends the reality that any one individual can experience�”6 A way to conceptualize the relationship between the political objective and how a state uses its power to obtain that objective is to view these elements as distinct but interrelated realms� The graphic below is presented as an analytical tool� We start with the political objective, or the political aim� As Clausewitz, Cor- bett, and other theorists make clear, nations and peoples go to war for political FIGURE 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND THE USE OF POWER https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4 4 Stoker16 andNAVAL Whiteside: WAR COLLEGE Blurred REVIEW Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of reasons; there is something they want to achieve, or they want to protect what they have�7 Some (e�g�, the Islamic State) might mask these objectives in religious terms or various euphemisms, but in the end when states go to war they are us- ing violence to get something they want—violence that is inherently political in nature� To ignore this is to ignore the very essence of every war, and to forget that bloodshed is involved is to refuse to accept war’s nature� It certainly is true that states also pursue political objectives without resorting to war; one wishes this were the preferred method, but the sweep of history demonstrates a human predilection for war� Elaboration of the political objective also should include a vision of what victory looks [W]hen new terms appear .