85 7. Chinese Immigration in the Russian Far East: Regional, National, and International Dimensions Pavel A. Minakir * In 1993, the issue of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East exploded onto the Russian political agenda. Hyped by local political elites and the media in Primorsky and Khabarovsk provinces, this issue led to the escalation of tensions between Russia and China during 1994. This burgeoning conflict, in addition to its immediate dampening effects on economic performance in the Russian Far East, complicated Moscow’s effort to reestablish central political control of the region. As a result, the issue of Chinese migration has had a significant effect on Moscow's regional, national, and international policies. From the outset, the anti-Chinese campaign waged in the Russian Far East media forced the Russian leadership to confront a series of issues. First, it raised questions about the magnitude of illegal Chinese immigration and its impact on the escalation of criminal activity in the region. Second, it stimulated discussion of the roles played by Chinese entrepreneurs in the current process of socio- economic development in the Russian Far East. Third, the widespread “China bashing” prompted analysts to investigate the sources of anti-Chinese hysteria prevalent in Russia. Finally, the issue prodded scholars to reflect upon Russia’s real interests in Northeast Asia, and the role that relations with China could play in realizing those interests. Together these issues have defined the importance of Chinese migration in the Far East for the course of Russia’s political development in general. There are several aspects to the problems posed by Chinese immigration in the Russian Far East. Not only does the process affect the situation in the specific region, but it carries broader implications for center-periphery relations in Russia. Similarly, Chinese immigration is one of the most complex global issue, and a potential source of Russian-Chinese conflict. _________________ * Pavel A. Minakir is director of the Economic Research Institute, Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 86 Russia’s expansion into the Far East precipitated Chinese immigration by default. By the end of the 19th century, roughly 500,000 Chinese lived in the Russian Far East, representing an important component of the regional labor force, especially in the agriculture, trade, and service sectors. The total population of the Russian Far East for that period did not exceed 1.5-2 million. Although the Russian scariest government closely monitored the situation and regulated migration processes, it did not impose unusually severe restrictions. It was not until the construction of the East-China railroad that the co-habitation of Russian and Chinese populations in the Far East became a politically charged issue. At this time, a Russian colony was established in China’s Northeast region that, for practical purposes, legitimized the Chinese presence in the Russian Far East. The formation of a similar Russian colony in Manchuria also became an important impetus for Chinese immigration into Russia, as this colony served as a cultural and economic lure for Chinese entrepreneurs. Despite this brief interlude, the Chinese colony in the Far East was neither oppressed nor supported by the Russian government prior to the 1917 revolution. (The Governor of Amur and the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly addressed this topic from 1908 to 1916, pointing to a number of serious problems associated with the Chinese presence in Russia’s sparsely populated Far East.) Following the revolution, the colony was ceded practical autonomy as a Soviet administrative district. At the same time, the influx of Chinese immigrants was effectively contained by tight border controls. At the end of World War II, Chinese migration increased again due to the active formation of a satellite regime in China. This highly active migration was associated with intense training of Chinese experts and students on the territory of the Russian Far East. This migration was completely controlled by the Russian “center,” as part of Moscow’s political and economic offensive in East Asia. In fact, because Moscow’s ideological manipulation of the Soviet and Chinese populations was so effective, there was tremendous local tolerance for Chinese immigration in the Far East. During this period, a Chinese market for Far Eastern industry was beginning to take root. Efforts to build a market and industry in China diverted valuable resources and manpower from rebuilding the Russian economy and resolving internal problems of the Far East. Simultaneously, there was a growing technological and economic dependency of China on Soviet enterprises, especially in the machine-building sector of industry. By the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, this dependency had almost completely dissipated. 87 The increasing acrimony in Sino-Soviet relations after 1956 generated hostility towards Chinese immigrants in the USSR, especially in the Far East. In particular, there was a sharp decline in the number of Chinese students and interns that immigrated to the region. The tension in the relationship in the 1960s—caused by the events at Damansky and the placement of China on the list of strategic military-political enemies of the USSR—effectively put a brake on Chinese immigration altogether. The Chinese minorities in Khabarovsk, Blagoveschensk, and Vladivostok, which by then had already been reduced to negligible levels, were simply evicted. Some were deported directly to China, while others were sent to unknown (at least to the locals) destinations, via the coercive methods perfected over many years by the totalitarian regime. It was no longer commonplace to see Chinese minorities conspicuously roaming the streets in these areas. Moreover, anti-Chinese propaganda was so intense that a definite “Chinese syndrome” materialized in a very short period that characterized the Chinese immigrants as aggressive and staunchly anti-Soviet. In addition, Chinese minorities in the border regions of the Russian Far East were cut off from the Amur and the Ussuri rivers by barbed wire and fabricated barriers. The rivers were practically ceded to the Chinese, which angered the local Russian population in the Far East. As a result, an uncompromising regime was created along the Chinese border that generated virulent anti-Chinese propaganda. Such propaganda trumpeted the horrors of potential Chinese aggression—conjuring up threats of advancing Mongol hordes and the inevitable genocide of the Russian male population—and threw the local Russian population into a state of constant anxiety regarding the influx of Chinese into the region. For a long time thereafter, China became for the Russian Far Easterners a source of constant fear and the object of instinctive hatred, predicated on the firm belief that China was determined to annex the Primorsky Territory and the Trans-Amur region. It was against this socio-psychological backdrop that the dramatic events in the economic sphere began to unfold, precipitating the resurgence of Chinese immigration and its attendant political problems. The Economic Dimension of Immigration The political and military rapprochement between the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China and the deepening commitment to economic reform in Russia reinvigorated Chinese immigration to the Far East. With economic ties becoming the linchpin in Sino-Soviet relations, previous Chinese migration patterns were quickly restored. This trend was cemented in 1991, as China’s economic reform 88 efforts began to outpace the Soviet transition, thus turning the Russian Far East into an increasingly attractive market for China’s Northeastern provinces. By 1991, the paths of Russian and Chinese economic development began to radically diverge. In Russia, the economic reform program had yielded rapidly declining demands for domestic industrial production and consumer goods. The Russian Far East, in particular, began to slide rapidly into a protracted socio- economic crisis. By 1985, for example, specialized sectors of the area’s economy that previously produced more than 30 percent of the industrial production in the region were already on the decline. Traditionally abundant natural resource reserves were depleted. Investment levels in the early 1970s were too low to generate the material resources needed to sustain industrial production levels in the 1980s. The result was a decline in production levels within specialized industries that immediately affected the Far East’s fiscal status. Table 7.1 Production Dynamics By Industry Sector Economic Sector 1985 1990 1991 Timber (mill.m3) 26.1 23.5 19.6 Wood Processing (mill.m3) 6.2 5.4 4.5 Fish Creel (million tons) 6.2 4.6 4.1 Food production in the fish 1,504.1 1,655.9 1562.0 industry SOURCE: Russia’s Far East: An Economic Review (Khabarovsk, RIOT), 1995, pg. 63. At the same time, China achieved significant success with economic reform, having experienced substantial growth rates in the emergence of private enterprises, manufacturing output, and production of consumer goods and foodstuffs. This strengthened Chinese export potential, as well as the demands for importing raw materials and machinery. As a result, the two economies began to complement each other in a fashion similar to the earlier stage of development in the 1950s and 1960s. This, in turn, created the basis for political accommodation between the two states that came to fruition during Gorbachev's