Personality and Institution Reflections on paradigmatic structures in Max Weber’s thinking Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Prof. Dr. Institute of Sociology, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany Silvana Mirella Aliberti, PhD Candidate Department of Medicine, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy Abstract The structure of scientific revolutions - if we follow Thomas Kuhn - is characterized by crises of knowledge and chances by changes of paradigm, a term that is mostly outside the natural sciences only used metaphorically. But also, in sociology, there are something like paradigmatic premises, questioning, research strategies, conceptual structures and perspectives of research in the competition between successful major theories. At least that could be said of Talcott Parsons’s system theory in the period after the Second World War, maybe also of the Critical Theory or later of the approaches of Niklas Luhmann or Pierre Bourdieu. Against this background, the publishers of the Max Weber complete edition, especially Wolfgang Schluchter and his students, were concerned with establishing a “Weber paradigm” more than half a century after the death of this “Myth of Heidelberg”. The essay proposes a combination of Weber’s concept of action with the development of (institutional) forms of order and their enforcement. The prerequisites of the Weber Renaissance since the 1970s are discussed and then a systematization of Weber’s questions based on its “basic sociological concepts” and their logic of grading are proposed. Aspects of a Weber Paradigm are developed from a presentation of the basic principles of the “Theory and Analysis of Institutional Mechanisms”, because the institutional analytical method was proven in various research contexts, especially in the interdisciplinary research of historians and social scientists. Keywords: Max Weber; institution; concept of action; interpretative sociology; paradigm. The Weber Renaissance A paradigmatic approach, especially in the social and cultural sciences, always has an affinity with the “Zeitgeist”, with a dominant interpretation of the world, to which even the most complex theorems can be selectively referenced. The Weber-Renaissance, which began in the 1970s, was in our opinion influenced also by a political situation. Against the distortion of Karl Marx by the so called “Marxism Leninism” invented in Moscow, neomarxism - connected with the student’s Movement -, generated despite some “scholastic” interpretations a new interest in 131 132 ACADEMICUS - INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL WWW.ACADEMICUS.EDU.AL 132 historically anchored social theories. That were a reason also for the great project of the Max Weber Complete Edition (edited by Horst Baier, M. Rainer Lepsius, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Schluchter).1 Marxist historical studies such as the writings of Karl August Wittfogel or Franz Borkenau were re-read (especially by “pirated prints”), followed by the works of some “opponents” and their socio-historical models, especially that of Max Weber, later also that of Norbert Elias with his theory of a civilization process.2 During the reign of the Nazi regime, there were some exiled scientists who made Weber’s work known in the United States. Then, the re-importation of his writings to Germany after 1945 has to be taken into consideration, however it was mainly reduced to methodological subjects. The large comparative studies on “Economic Ethics of World Religions” (Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen) found wider interest only since the 1970s.3 If one asks about the characteristics of Weber’s sociology, then of course his “concept of action” comes into play. We call it(with Rainer Prewo4) Handlungsbegrifflichkeit because Weber was not interested in theories of action as e.g. those designed by George Herbert Mead. Weber, also a historian, outlined a reconstruction approach instead of a constitutional theory of action.5 At the methodological level, his decision to begin with the action-orientation of the individual was meant polemically against all collective concepts or organological or collectivistic metaphors of “society”, whether they came from “left” or “right”. For this reason, in Weber’s theoretical reflections on the establishment of social relationships, he used – similar to Georg Simmel – the term “socialization” (Vergesellschaftung) instead of “society”. That is why his definition of sociology begins with “action” as the starting point for the individual constitution of the social. On this basis, subjective sense” (subjektiver Sinn) became the key concept for his construction of sociology as an understanding science (Verstehende Soziologie). Although Alfred Schutz6 rightly said that Weber did not have an explicit and philosophically accurate distinction, firstly between “action” (Handlung) and the process of their actual realization (Handeln) and secondly between “subjective” and “objective” meaning, Weber’s entire work deals only with “objective” relationships of meaning, worldviews and communicatively shared meaning. Yet the seemingly 1 Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (MWG). 2 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process. 3 Cf. Friedrich H. Tenbruck: Das Werk Max Webers. 4 Rainer Prewo, Max Webers Wissenschaftsprogramm. 5 Cf. Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Rationales Handeln als großbürgerliches Aktionsmodell. The sen zu einigen halungstheoretischen Implikationen der „So zio logi schen Grundbegriffe“ Max Webers. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für So ziologie und Sozialpsychologie 31 (1979), pp. 199-236 and ibidem, Kulturwissenschaft und Handlungsbegrifflichkeit. Anthropo logische Überlegungen zum Zusam­ men hang von Handlung und Ordnung in der Soziologie Max We bers. In: Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian (eds.): Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Interpretation und Kritik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1994, pp. 602-661. 6 Alfred Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World. K. S. REHBERG, S. M. ALIBERTI - PERSONALITY AND INSTITUTION 133 “subjective” starting point did not disappear in any “heaven of ideas” because it always dealt with subjective motivational resources, as the “framework” for attitudes and habitus forms. This includes the question of “manhood” (Menschentum) which Wilhelm Hennis pointed out when he did not want to acknowledge “action” as the last point of reference: “Because,” he quoted Weber, “behind the action stands the human being”.7 This incentive was very fruitful, although the wording is still misleading: rather, one would have to remember the somewhat pragmatic-anthropological formula of Immanuel Kant, according to which “the materials for an anthropology [...] are to be found only in the actions of man which reveal his character”.8 However, this raises the problem of how to get from the starting point of the orientation of individual subjects to the level of aggregation of phenomena that would be sociologically traceable. Weber worked with a special ‘gradation’ of relationship levels and therefore there is no theoretical change from an individual perspective to a systems level.9 The starting point for Weber’s sociological basics (Soziologische Grundbegriffe)10 was the distinction between behavior and action. The subjective meaning, which is still based entirely on concepts of action is oriented toward other people and circumstances. That means, others and their attitudes are decisive for social action (§ 1). At the next level, systems of means to achieve something appear as orientation variables. These are conditions for an inner methodization of action (§ 2). As a further stage follows the reciprocity of orientations, the more complex interlocking individual orientation perspectives and their relative determination (§ 3). The fact that such social relationships can be codified and at the same time frequently arise within the framework of fixed norm systems becomes clearer in the introduction of regularities such as tradition (Brauch) and custom (Sitte) (§ 4). However, the essential qualitative leap lies where the successive orientations, to reacting and intertwined expectations enable the creation of institutional dimensions, i.e. a legitimate order and its validity (Geltung) (§ 5). Such validity claims and possibilities for a structured relationship will be more and more objectivated in the course of Weber’s category analysis: order itself becomes an issue. He understood personal relationships often as fight (§ 8). Then follow different opportunities of stabilization: statutes and association rules or constitutions (§§ 12 and 13). Now the organizational guarantees of an order are introduced, namely administrative staff and sanctioning authorities (see §§ 12 and 15). Only after all these 7 Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber. Essays in Reconstruction and ibidem, Max Weber’s Science of Man. 8 Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe. vol. XII: Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Ed by Wilhelm Weischädel. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2002, pp. 794-795. 9 That was the interpretation by Stefan Breuer, Herrschaft' in der Soziologie Max Webers. 10 Max Weber, Economy and Society. 134 ACADEMICUS - INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL WWW.ACADEMICUS.EDU.AL 134 preparations of an organized progress appears in Weber’s basic sociological terms power and the institutionally fixed dominance as crucial sociological categories. Weber’s concept of action as the key to understanding social processes and institutions Weber’s existential conception of the “person” is fundamentally different from all poststructural or postmodern theories. Intellectual discourses since the beginning of the twentieth