“The Korea Project: Planning for the Long Term” 1st Annual Conference of the CSIS-USC Korea Project August 20-21, 2010 | Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California Working Paper Series “Iraq: Lessons Learned in the Context of Regime Change in North Korea” By Rusty Barber Director, Iraq Program, United States Institute of Peace Note that these working papers may not be cited or referenced in any way. Introduction Attempting to frame the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction experience in ways that may be useful to anticipating a post-regime North Korea is a difficult proposition. To begin with, North Korea’s profile today is markedly different from that of Iraq prior to the latter’s invasion in March 2003 by U.S. and British forces. Though isolated and impoverished, North Korea does not bear the combined legacy of thirty years of unrelenting war and sanctions, nor does it possess the deep ethno-sectarian schisms that have nearly torn Iraq apart, threatening to ignite a broader regional war along matching fault lines. And while North Korea is under constant pressure from an international community bent on mitigating the danger posed by its nuclear arsenal, the existential threat it faces exists primarily in proportion to its own belligerent behavior. Finally, it is impossible to isolate the Iraq enterprise’s dominant feature: the American invasion and occupation. The demise of the Baathist regime at the hands of external forces naturally affected every aspect of the effort to stabilize the country in the wake of Saddam’s fall. Grandiose visions for what post-Saddam Iraq might look like paired with inadequate planning and a woeful ignorance of Iraqi culture and political dynamics quickly sapped the goodwill of Iraqis toward their liberators and created power vacuums that un-reconciled regime elements, agents of sectarianism and neighboring states moved quickly to fill. The resulting distraction and massive shift in resources to cope with a determined insurgency and avert civil war crippled the broader effort to improve basic services, reform Iraq’s civil institutions and lay the foundations for long-term economic and social stability. From the moment it assumed authority in May 2003 to the rushed transfer of power to a shaky Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) found itself in a desperate race to keep pace with events it failed to foresee and was vastly under-resourced to contend with. A maximalist agenda to transform Iraq into the Middle East’s first democracy ran up against a minimalist approach to the time-frame and resources necessary to bring about such a thing. 1 Turning back to North Korea, while regime collapse resulting from internal upheaval seems a remote possibility at the present time, highly combustible events such as the March sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, remind us that the risk of violent confrontation with the South is dangerously plausible. Similarly, the disposition of the North’s nuclear forces remains an ever- present trigger point for confrontation with the international community. A more benign unraveling of the regime, such as occurred in the former Soviet Union, is the best-case scenario but one difficult to envision given its extreme nature and vice-grip on power. In short, while we can hope for a non-violent context for eventual regime change in North Korea, it is only prudent to imagine and prepare for one that is less so. But whatever the circumstances of such a transition, North Koreans will face enormous challenges similar to those with which Iraqis are now grappling: In the near term, what must be done to ensure security and the provision of essential services? In the longer term, what sort of governance system do we want, how do we approach reform of our security, economic, justice and education sectors so they serve the needs of our people instead of those of the regime? In addressing these questions, I have chosen to view the Iraq experience through the lens of post- conflict stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), drawing heavily on the framework developed by my colleagues at the U.S. Institute of Peace. 1 The outcome of years of research and field experience drawn from post-conflict environments ranging from Haiti and Bosnia, to Afghanistan and Iraq, the framework establishes five desired “end states” for a society emerging from conflict and the conditions necessary to achieve them: Safe and Secure Environment , Rule of Law , Stable Governance , Sustainable Economy , and Social Well-Being (graphic depiction on page 19). In addition to highlighting aspects of the Iraq experience possibly instructive to a future Korean context (the handling of Iraqi security forces, for example), it is also my purpose to introduce a way of looking at post-conflict society as an organism comprised of closely interconnected parts. In this sense, security, rule of law, governance, civil society and economic growth are all interdependent components of a just and stable society – and attempting to develop any one area in isolation of its peers jeopardizes the overall success of the endeavor. It is a crude rule of thumb that domestic and international responders have roughly one year to establish progress toward these end states sufficient to convince ordinary citizens and spoilers alike that a secure state capable of establishing and defending the rule of law, is a fait accompli. Equal parts opportunity and vulnerability, it is a crucial period during which responders must seize the initiative to establish security, guarantee essential services and effect political reconciliation – or risk surrendering it to those seeking profit in chronic instability. This is a malleable rule, of course, but one borne out by the Iraq experience. For this reason, this paper focuses primarily on the 13-month tenure of the CPA, which commenced shortly after Saddam’s fall and ended June 28, 2004. Acutely aware of the time constraints of its self-imposed shelf- life, the CPA labored mightily to achieve a tipping point of success beyond which the chances of backslide into chaos would be less likely. Which aspects of that yet ongoing struggle may apply themselves to the questions facing the two Koreas, I leave to those far more expert in Korean affairs to discern. 1 Beth Cole et al., Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009) 2 The following is a short-list of key principles associated with successful S&R missions, loosely adapted from Guiding Principles . I attach them both in reference to the Iraq experience and for any guidance they may offer to a future context in the Korean Peninsula: 1. Building host-nation capacity: The affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. Neglecting local ownership and capacity risks alienating the population and rendering S&R efforts unsustainable. 2. Breaking the vessel in order to save it: Applying foreign templates to reform local institutions without a clear understanding of the nature and role of those institutions can lead to inappropriate solutions. Better to build on existing formal and informal structures, wherever feasible, to develop local capacity and gain trust. 3. Managing expectations and communication: Constant and clear communication helps manage expectations about the realities of donor and state resources and the progress of reconstruction. It also counters spoiler narratives that undermine peace. 4. Unity of effort: Cooperation among all actors involved, including those of the host-nation, international agencies and foreign governments, is as critical to success as it is difficult to achieve. It begins with a shared understanding of the situation - derived from an assessment – enabling the creation of an overarching strategic goal and plans to accomplish it. 5. Regional engagement: Linked to unity of effort, regional engagement entails encouraging the host nation, neighboring countries and other regional stakeholders to partner in promoting the affected nation’s security and economic development for the benefit of all. A key element of this activity is identifying the interests, issues and unresolved conflicts of neighboring states and assessing their impacts on the S&R mission. 6. Nesting: Short term objectives must be “nested” in longer-term goals in order to build sustainable peace. For example, micro-grants and neighborhood projects intended to stimulate local economies and provide temporary employment can lead to disillusionment and harm the S&R mission if they are not connected to a development strategy that leads to sustained employment. 7. Prioritize to stabilize: The opening days and months of an S&R mission provides an opportunity to maximize initial efforts to establish security, win the trust of the population and set the “tone” for transition. It is also a time when hopes for the future are at their highest and resistance among spoilers less organized. Prewar planning for post-Saddam Iraq It is now received wisdom that while prewar planning for the invasion of Iraq was generally solid, misguided and inadequate preparations for its occupation and reconstruction set the stage for the near total collapse of public order that followed. Given that operational planning began less than six months prior to the invasion, is hard to imagine how it could have been otherwise. By comparison, preparations for the occupations of Germany and Japan commenced two years prior to the end of WWII. Aside from a late start, prewar planning also suffered from a lopsided focus on preparing for humanitarian crises versus how to go about rewiring the institutional 3 framework of an entire society emerging from three decades of war and sanctions. While fears – justified at the time – of massive refugee flows and food shortages failed to materialize, American military and civilian authorities were shocked by the state of collapse in which they found Iraq upon arrival.