Has Laudan Killed the Demarcation Problem? Kirsten Walsh Bachelor of Arts (Hons) (Melb) Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts (with Advanced Seminars component) History and Philosophy of Science The University of Melbourne Australia October 2009 Produced on archival quality paper. Abstract The „Demarcation Problem‟ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, „The Demise of the Demarcation Problem‟, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion. The Pessimistic Induction: From the failure of many specific past attempts at demarcation, Laudan infers that all future attempts at demarcation will fail. For his argument to be fully convincing, Laudan needs to show that each attempt has been a complete failure, and that these failures have never led to progress in the theory of demarcation. I argue that many past attempts at demarcation have only resulted in partial failure, and many of these failures have led to some cumulative progress. So I think we can draw a more optimistic conclusion: future attempts at demarcation may be even more successful than past attempts. The Pseudo-Problem: Laudan argues that the demarcation problem presupposes an „epistemic invariant‟: something common to all and only the sciences, which makes them epistemically special. But, says Laudan, this presumption is false – so, by definition, the issue is merely a pseudo-problem. I find Laudan‟s argument unconvincing. I present reasons for thinking that the demarcation problem does not, in fact, presuppose an extremely simple epistemic invariant. Furthermore, there may still be a satisfactory, moderately complex epistemic invariant to be found. So I do not think any false assumption is presupposed. The New Problem: Laudan argues that we should replace the original demarcation problem with a new demarcation problem. I take this to be the problem of demarcating between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed theories. I argue that scientific status is relevant to the confirmation of theories, so the two problems are closely related. I also argue that science has other purposes; so scientific status indicates other virtues besides well- confirmedness. Thus we do want to know which theories and activities are scientific, because this will help us to decide which theories and activities to pursue. So this new demarcation problem is not a suitable replacement for the original problem. My central question is „Has Laudan killed the demarcation problem?‟, and my answer is „No!‟. 1 Declaration This is to certify that (i) The thesis comprises only my original work except where indicated in the Preface; (ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; (iii) The thesis is 20,000-22,000 words in length, inclusive of footnotes but exclusive of tables, maps, appendices and bibliography. Kirsten Walsh 2 Acknowledgements This thesis is the culmination of my academic journey thus far. Starting out as a vague question, „Is the demarcation problem worth solving?‟, it evolved into its present form. I would like to thank a number of people who have contributed to the final result in many different ways: First and foremost, I sincerely thank my long-suffering supervisor Howard Sankey, who has ploughed through various drafts, making critical suggestions and posing challenging questions. He has motivated and encouraged me every step of the way – never reproaching me when the necessity of doing paid work got in the way of progress. For this, I am extremely grateful. Special thanks go to Neil Thomason for inspiring me in the early stages, encouraging me to present my work at conferences, and for reading an entire draft of my thesis during a flight to the US! I also thank Jason Grossman for his kind comments and helpful criticisms of Chapter One. This thesis evolved into its present form during a summer I spent at the University of Auckland under the supervision of Robert Nola who went above and beyond the call of duty. I thank him not only for his helpful discussions and feedback, but also for showing me around Auckland and the surrounds. I also thank Jan Crosthwaite, Rosalind Hursthouse, and the University of Auckland for providing me with the Summer Research Scholarship that made this work possible. For providing numerous distractions, as well as their unfailing support, I thank the History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) and Philosophy postgrads with whom I have shared office space, morning tea, and jugs of beer. In particular I‟d like to thank: Conrad Asmus for teaching me formal logic and reading a draft of my thesis; Alex Murphy for insisting that I use correct grammar and punctuation; Tama Coutts for being interested in everything philosophical; David Condylis for insisting that I should never trust a philosopher named „Larry‟; Ned Taylor for telling me what physicists do; Suzy Killmister for securing office space; and Kristian Camilleri and Steph Lavau for proving that theses can be finished. Special mention goes to the participants of „Help! My Progress has Stalled!‟ and „Operation Endless Victory‟: Aaron Retz, Bryan Cooke, Chris Soeterboek, Paul Carter, Sergio Mariscal, Steph Lavau, Steven Kambouris, and Vicki Macknight – I hope we are all victorious in the end! 3 A very special thank you to Erik Nyberg, my partner, colleague and friend. He always supported and encouraged me, stayed interested in the details of my interminable project, and made many helpful suggestions – especially by playing the devil‟s advocate during the editing of my final draft. Finally, I thank my parents, Adrian and Meredith Walsh, who have offered their unconditional support and gentle counsel at every turn of the road. Their foresight and values paved the way for my privileged education. I dedicate this thesis to Larry Laudan, for all the time we‟ve spent together.1 1 I haven‟t met Professor Laudan yet, but I hope to meet him one day! 4 Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 1 Declaration .......................................................................................................................................... 2 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 3 Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ 5 Table of Figures .................................................................................................................................. 8 0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 9 0.1 What is Demarcation? .......................................................................................................... 9 0.2 Laudan’s Three Sceptical Arguments ................................................................................. 11 1 The Pessimistic Induction .......................................................................................................... 13 1.1 Laudan’s Pessimistic Induction .......................................................................................... 13 1.2 Inductive Inference ............................................................................................................. 16 1.3 The Resemblance Assumption should be Rejected .............................................................. 19 1.4 Progress in the Philosophy of Method ................................................................................ 20 1.5 Reply: Scientific Method Changes ...................................................................................... 23 1.6 Reply: The New Tradition is not Epistemic ........................................................................ 27 1.7 Rejoinder: Testability is Epistemic ..................................................................................... 28 1.8 Rejoinder: The New Tradition is Progressive .................................................................... 29 1.9 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 32 2 The Pseudo-Problem .................................................................................................................. 34 2.1 Laudan’s Requirements and Pseudo-Problem.................................................................... 34 2.2 Requirement One: Accuracy ............................................................................................... 36 2.2.1 Objection: Demarcations can be legislative .............................................................. 36 2.2.2 Sub-conclusion: Reasonable accuracy is sufficient ................................................... 37 2.3 Requirement Two: Precision .............................................................................................. 37 2.3.1 Objection: Precise enough for the specific purpose .................................................. 38 2.3.2 Objection: Ordinary vagueness could be replicated