S M A I L ^ E K I ] THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION - Sarajevo, 2005. PUBLISHERS: Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law, Sarajevo KULT/B, Sarajevo The Fund of the Sarajevo Canton for Protection and Conservation Cemeteries of Fallen Soldiers, Sarajevo FOR THE PUBLISHERS: Prof. dr Ismet Dizdarevi} EDITOR: Prof. mr Muharem Kreso REVIEWERS: Prof. dr Mustafa Imamovi} Prof. dr Norman Cigar Prof. dr Nijaz Durakovi} Prof. mr Muharem Kreso COVER: KULT/B, Sarajevo TRANSLATION: Branka Ramadanovi} PROOFREADER: Muhamed Me{i} James Forrester Tim North INDICES: Azra Fi{er DTP: Meldijana Arnaut PRINTING HOUSE: [tamparija Fojnica, Fojnica FOR THE PRINTING HOUSE: [ahzija Buljina CIRCULATION: 1.000 THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION - TABLE OF CONTENTS A FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION ........................ 11 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS .................................................. 13 V O L U M E O N E I ATTACK ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF DEFENCE OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1. Constitutional Determination of the Armed Forces of the SFRY 21 2. Break-Up of the Constitutional Concept of Defence of the SFRY 40 3. The Illegal Headquarters of Supreme Command ...................... 81 4. Reduction of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina 99 5. Disarmament of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina ........................................................... 133 6. From the Anti-Fascist to the Greater Serbian Army ................ 168 II THE GREATER SERBIA PROJECT AND THE PLANNING OF THE CRIME 1. The Revival and Escalation of the Greater Serbia Project ............... 197 2. Methods, mechanisms and procedures for the planning and preparation of crime .................................................................... 217 III THE GREATER SERBIA PROJECT AND THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY UNTIL MARCH 1991 1. The Presidency of the SFRY and Its Parallel Informal Group ... 259 2. The Failure of Introduction of the State of Emergency and the Arranged Military Coup in March 1991 ..................... 303 845 IV DEFINING THE BORDERS OF GREATER SERBIA 1. The War Plan “RAM (FRAME)” ............................................. 363 2. Realization of the “RAM” War Plan ........................................ 417 3. Failure of Mobilization and Its Supplement ............................. 503 V CONSTITUTION OF THE GREATER SERBIA FIFTH COLUMN IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1. The Fifth Column Activity and Organized Destruction of Government Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovin................... 533 2. Crisis Headquarters of the Serb People - Organs of the Occupying Power ............................................. 586 3. The Greater Serbia Strategic Goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina 613 VI DIRECT PREPARATIONS FOR THE AGGRESSION 1. Arming of the Fifth Column ..................................................... 645 2. The Integration of Command on Occupied Territories ............. 736 3. Taking the Starting Positions .................................................... 774 V O L U M E T W O VII THE ARMED FORMATIONS OF THE GREATER SERBIA AGGRESSOR AND THEIR LOGISTICS 1. The “Yugoslav People’s Army” — Army of Yugoslavia ............. 851 2. Volunteers and Volunteer JNA Units ................................ 884 844 3. Armed Units of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina ...................................................... 892 4. “The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH” ................................. 931 5. Other Armed Formations and Groups from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia .................................... 970 6. Armed Formations of the Union of Communists — Movement for Yugoslavia ........................................................ 1002 7. Foreign Mercenaries ................................................................. 1005 8. Logistical Support and Reinforcement in Manpower ............... 1011 VIII THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1. The Croatian Nationalist Ideology .......................................... 1045 2. The Negotiations in Karadjordjevo and Gradac ...................... 1052 3. The Greater Croatia Fifth Column in Bosnia and Herzegovina ..................................................... 1061 4. Occupation of a Part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina .......................................................... 1086 a) Covert Aggression (November 1991 — January 1993) ........ 1087 b) Overt Aggression (January 1993 — March 1994) ............ 1138 5. Logistical assistance of the collaborationist units of the Croatian Army ....................................................... 1201 C O N C L U S I O N C O N C L U S I O N ............................................................... 1249 SOURCES AND LITERATURE ............................................. 1271 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................ 1297 I N D E X - Biographical names ............................................... 1315 - Geographical names ................................................. 1381 - Relevant state, military and other notions ...................... 1431 847 THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION - VOLUME TWO 1. The “Yugoslav People’s Army” — Army of Yugoslavia In order to realize and conceal the Greater Serbia project, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement focused on “concrete ‘cooperation’ with the representatives of the Serb people and with the Serb people as a whole”, particularly with the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in attempts to present it as involved in a conflict. Thus it ensured that, during the aggression against Croatia, it could carry out manoeuvres and movements of JNA forces through Bosnia and Herzegovina, “which was of vital importance to the JNA”. Among other things, this enabled the “mobilization in Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be very successful”. In this way, they resolved and, “at least to a certain extent, mitigated the problems in the JNA caused by the failure of mobilization in the other parts of the country”.1 In the assessment of the mentioned leadership, and particularly of the military one, the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were one of the cornerstones for the formation of the common state of all the Serbs. Therefore, General Kadijevic believed that “without Yugoslavia there would be no integral state of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (“...that there will be no integral Bosnia and Herzegovina outside the Yugoslav state...”).2 1 V. Kadijevic, MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA - VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE, Belgrade 1993, p. 147. 2 Ibid., p. 146; D. Domazet, ULOGA JNA KAO SRPSKE IMPERIJALNE SILE U BOSANSKOHERCEGOVACKOM RATU, Hrvatski Vojnik, February 1998, p. 6. In relation to this, he “invested major efforts to have the leaderships of Bosnia and Herzegovina both before the after the multi-party elections change their attitudes towards Yugoslavia and to understand that without Yugoslavia there will be no integral state of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In this way, using even military means, General Kadijevic sought to impose on the part of the Bosnian-Herzegovina leadership, mostly 851 In accordance with such assessments, on July 29, 1991, General Kadijevic had sent a threatening letter to the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demanding it to immediately repeal the Decision on Non-Sending of the July Cycle of the Recruits into the Commands, Units and Institutions of the JNA outside the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.3 At the meeting with the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 24, 1991, in Sarajevo, General Kadijevic presented the positions on the role of the JNA in the current political situation in Yugoslavia.4 He developed those positions “more specifically” in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, pointing out, among other things, that “the Army shall not dictate solutions by using arms”, “that no creation of armed formations beyond the Ministry of Interior and JNA forces may be allowed. Any attempt at creation of paramilitary formations must be prevented in a most energetic manner […] Bosnia and Herzegovina has the duty to meet its obligations towards the Yugoslav People’s Army, starting from recruitment, all the way to funding”, etc.5 the Bosniak one, the concept of the future Yugoslav state, that is, Greater Serbia. In this, he excluded any idea of existence of the integral state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 146). 3 ARHIV INSTITUTA ZA ISTRAZIVANJE ZLOCINA PROTIV COVJECNOSTI I MEDJUNARODNOG PRAVA U SARAJEVU (hereinafter referred to as: AIIZ), inv. No. 2-1372; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2817, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, No. 694-1, July 29, 1991, Belgrade — to the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 4 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2818, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Cabinet of the Federal Secretary, Belgrade, December 26, 1991, NOTE from the presentation of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, General of Army Veljko Kadijevic, at the meeting with the leadership of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Sarajevo, on December 24, 1991. Kadijevic’s positions on the role of the JNA in the current political situation in the country did not correspond to the actual situation in Yugoslavia. Namely, they involved the use of empty phrases, such