Phenomenology and the Problem of Time Michael R. Kelly Phenomenology and the Problem of Time Michael R. Kelly San Diego , California , USA ISBN 978-0-230-34785-4 ISBN 978-1-137-31447-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-31447-5 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016942696 © Th e Editor(s) (if applicable) and Th e Author(s) 2016 Th e author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identifi ed as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Th is work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and trans- mission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Th e use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Th e publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Th is Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature Th e registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London For Austin Wallace Kelly Pref ace Th e fi nitude of Dasein in man is more originary than man himself (M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics ) Time occupies a central place in twentieth-century continental phi- losophy, especially for phenomenology. Phenomenology’s four primary movements arguably revolve around it: transcendental phenomenology, hermeneutical phenomenology, deconstruction, and phenomenological theology. 1 In 1905, roughly only fi ve years after his Logical Investigations founded phenomenology, Edmund Husserl declared time and the consciousness of time the “most diffi cult” and “most important” of all phenomeno- logical problems. 2 Time would become the bedrock of all intentionality, underlying every issue of signifi cant preoccupation in Husserl’s thought (e.g., subjectivity, immanence, embodiment, intersubjectivity, objectiv- ity, evidence, judgment). 3 One could say that Husserl’s refl ections on time-consciousness develop his view of intentionality so radically that they signifi cantly contributed to his shift from descriptive phenomenol- ogy to transcendental phenomenology. And as Husserl’s followers were to refl ect on his refl ections on time—often under the infl uence of Husserl’s most recognizable student, Martin Heidegger—they would increasingly fi nd reasons, fair or not, to question his theories of time or intentionality vii viii Preface for their dependence on consciousness (or the subject), even questioning the coherence of phenomenology itself. In 1927 Heidegger published his view of “temporality” as the very structure of the “care” that every “human being in the world” (Dasein) has for itself and its projects and commitments in its engagement with the world. Heidegger’s Being and Time and his view of time therein amount (in spite of its more radical intentions) to a hermeneutical and existential (in spite of Heidegger’s denial of the label) development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. With his account of time as the key to understanding not only the practical relation between the self and the world, but also subjectivity’s (Dasein’s) very way of being in the world, Heidegger believed a new dimension of intentionality—one that would make shine forth all the brighter the things themselves—had been uncovered but not to his mind clarifi ed. However one interprets his 1927 watershed work, it created a shift in phenomenology’s self- understanding and phenomenology’s tendency to become metaphilosophical in its quest to return to “the things themselves” by rethinking intentionality. Future phenomenologists made additions to the discipline by unpacking or interrogating (or both) Husserl’s and Heidegger’s respective thoughts about intentionality, aff ectivity, embodiment, etc. But when at its most radical, each later phenomenologist’s rethinking of intentionality can be found in—and the radicalness of their developments of phenomenology always amounted to—their rethinking of time. Th at Heideggerian tree, fully grown in 1963, would cast a shadow over phenomenology when French deconstructionist and recovering phe- nomenologist Jacques Derrida reinterpreted the importance of time and temporality by highlighting the notion of the “trace,” or that which never appears and yet makes all appearances possible. More diffi cult than the “most diffi cult” of all phenomenological problems, time becomes a prob- lem for phenomenology. Derrida interrogates the coherence of phenom- enology by interrogating its very notion of intentionality by interrogating its view of the time of the self to whom things appear, the temporality of Dasein “who” cares about its projects. Since the source of intention- ality—the self or subject or immanence—is never fully present to, but always lags behind, itself, Derrida draws a radical conclusion about—or exposes the inner logic of—the very possibility of phenomenology. Yet Preface ix Derrida’s 1967 Speech and Phenomena may be more eff ect than cause with respect to how time becomes a problem for phenomenology. In what follows, I off er a narrow approach to understanding these major shifts in phenomenology’s self-understanding and its internal cri- tique. Two rather simple thoughts have motivated and guided this work. First, how would the history of phenomenology look if Husserl’s inheri- tors more charitably interpreted his accounts of time-consciousness that they had available to them? Second, how would the history of phenom- enology look if earlier phenomenologists understood Husserl’s theory of immanence otherwise than as a synonym for subjective consciousness (in the shadow of modern subjective idealism)? My approach is to examine the three related notions of subjectivity, time, and intentionality. Examining these three interrelated notions can help us understand how phenomenology establishes its diff erence from modern subjective idealism (Descartes and Kant), how phenomenology developed, and how phenomenology gave rise to movements that declare its passing. Each subsequent and signifi cant phenomenologist of the sec- ond generation provides original insights that move this methodology forward. But in carving out his own unique contribution to phenom- enology, each distances himself from Husserl’s view of phenomenology and intentionality by challenging his views of immanence and time- consciousness. I specifi cally want to present a case for the infl uence of Heidegger’s more radical rethinking of intentionality, subjectivity, and time after Being and Time , most especially as it is found in his other book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Heidegger’s 1929 book on Kant not only is the start of the radicalization of his phenomenology, but it also is a text that factors centrally—and infl uentially—in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Derrida as they develop their unique styles of thought regarding these three issues in contrast to Husserl. For exam- ple, when Merleau-Ponty presents his view on time and intentionality in detail—in Phenomenology of Perception (1945) and Th e Visible and the Invisible (1961)—he critiques Husserl under the infl uence and lead of Heidegger, specifi cally referencing the Kantbuch ; likewise, when Derrida questions the phenomenological project—in Speech and Phenomena (1967)—he critiques phenomenology under the infl uence and lead of Heidegger, specifi cally referencing the Kantbuch and the infl uence of x Preface Merleau-Ponty’s later thought. Following these references to Heidegger will provide a thread—that which should barely be seen but still holds the fabric that is the article together—with which we shall explicate Merleau-Ponty’s and then Derrida’s distance or separation from Husserl; at the same time, this will be a tracing of the movement in phenomenol- ogy from phenomenology and the problem of time to time as a problem for phenomenology. My method for constructing this narrative will be to work with the Husserlian texts most referenced by these inheritors (Heidegger, Merleau- Ponty, and Derrida) in their discussions of his views on immanence (sub- jectivity), intentionality, and time as they formulate their criticisms and alternatives. Th ese texts are, primarily, Logical Investigations (1900–01), Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913), and On the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1893–1917). I also shall work through Husserl’s 1907 lecture “Th e Idea of Phenomenology.” I hope this method suits the theoretical interest of focus and the pragmatic interest of space, and will prove to be a useful way into these complex issues in phenomenology. Th ere is a large and continually growing body of secondary literature that defends (often quite persuasively) Husserl’s phenomenology against its phenomenological critics by appealing to his (then) unpublished writ- ings. 4 Where the thinkers I treat in this work do not reference Husserl’s unpublished work, I do not; and I do this so as to bring hopefully to the fore the philosophical/phenomenological issues rather than have them recede into phenomenological scholasticism. It is my sense that defenses of Husserl thought against these critiques can be found in the very texts that his critics reference. Hence, I propose to follow the arguments that phenomenologists after Husserl make to distinguish their program by reading those texts of Husserl that they critique or from which they draw.