Appendices Appendix A Department of State Report to Congress* INTRODUCfiON This report by the Department of State, prepared in consultation with the Department of Justice (including the Drug Enforcement Administration), the Department of the Treasury (including U.S. Customs Service), the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency, is submitted pursuant to Section 2013 of the Anti---Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570). This is the third semiannual report which Congress requires on official involvement in narcotics traffick­ ing by governments and senior officials; crimes in which U.S. drug enforce­ ment agents have been victims; and the issue of 'hot pursuit.' The report concerns the 24 major producing and major transit countries identified in accord with Sec. 481{h) of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Act). For purposes of this third report, the agencies consulted were asked to review earlier country-by-country findings in the INCSR and the previous 2013 report; and report appropriate changes, if any. These findings are provided in the appendix. To facilitate review of the findings in this latest report, the country summaries draw upon the 1988 INCSR for information on narcotics-related corruption in each of the 24 major countries. The report's preparation presents a number of problems to the narcotics control community, including the requirement for a separate Presidential certification process {distinct from the process established under Sec. 481(h) of the Act), the lack of any legislative history to guide interpretation and application of the language, and the requirement for disclosures of informa­ tion that the narcotics control community maintains only in investigatory and intelligence files. THE REQUIREMENTS Section 2013 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570), requires that, not later than six months after enactment and every six months thereafter, the President prepare and transmit to Congress a report on official involvement in narcotics trafficking and other topics. The responsibil­ ity for making certifications pursuant to this report has been delegated to the Secretary of State. *Section 2013, PL99-570 Reports and Restrictions concerning certain countries, 1 May 1988. 321 322 Appendix A SPECIAL REPORT Certification Under Section 48l(h), FAA On March 1, President Reagan gave Laos a national interest certification, citing a failure on the part of the government to cooperate fully with the U.S. on narcotics control, or to take adequate steps of its own, but finding that there are vital national interests which would be placed at risk should certification be denied. The President's decision was to grant a national interest certification under Sec. 481(h), with an understanding that the certification issue would be revisited May 1, to assess promised progress on the POW/MIA issue, specifically pledges of cooperation in early 1988 on joint excavations of crash sites, and to consider progress, if any, on narcotics control. At that time, it was said that, given the high national priority assigned to the POW/MIA issue by President Reagan, progress on this issue would be viewed as the principal measure of Lao sincerity in fulfilling its expressed desire for better relations with the U.S. The expectation was that any site excavations would occur in March and April, the dry season. The Department of State was advised April 8 of an official LPDR proposal for a joint site excavation at the end of April. AU .S. military team is now excavating a crash site in southern Laos. This excavation is considered to have met the MIA/POW conditions of the national interest certification. However, as reported under Subsection (a)(1)(A), the U.S. continues to obtain information on the involvement of Lao Government officials in narcotics trafficking. Despite information indicating the extensive involve­ ment of Lao government and military officials in the narcotics trade, it is encouraging to note that some senior officials have reportedly acknowledged to Western diplomats their country's narcotics problem. In February 1988, the Lao Government agreed in principle to accept its first narcotics control project, to be funded by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. An UNFDAC project formulation team met in Vientiane at the end of April to discuss technical aspects of the project's implementation. Appendix B State Department Report to Con­ gress on: Narcotics in Laos, 1988 A.l. STATUS OF ILLICIT NARCOTICS PRODUCTION & TRAFFICK­ ING Cultivation of illicit opium and marijuana, and production of heroin have increased significantly over the past two years in the Lao People's Democra­ tic Republic (LPDR). Prospects for a reversal in that trend over the coming year are doubtful. Estimates of the opium crop range between 150-300 metric tons for 1987, most of which is grown by the Hmong hill-tribes in northern Laos. Opium cultivation is deeply embedded in Hmong culture, and provides the economic mainstay for these traditional mountain peoples. Marijuana is cultivated largely along the Mekong river by lowland Lao, and smuggled across to Thailand. The increase in cultivation, production (including heroin refining), and trafficking of illicit drugs in this country can be attributed in large part to the lure of relatively high profits for one of the world's poorest countries. Also, the relative success of eradication efforts carried out by the Governments of Thailand and Burma has compelled traffickers in the Golden Triangle to shift more of their activities to Laos. There have been many reports that Lao officials, particularly those in the military and at the provincial level, have been involved in narcotics production and trafficking. U.S. officials are especially concerned by reports linking the mountain area's development corps and the army to drug trafficking. Reports of their involvement increased in 1987. The United States and other governments are also concerned by repeated reports of the establishment of heroin refineries in Laos as well as by increases in production of opium and marijuana. The Lao government has not focused on the elimination of narcotics production and trafficking as a national priority. The government declares that there is no abuse of illicit drugs in Lao society, except among older Hmong. Consequently, there has been no public campaign against the evils of trafficking and production, and the government does not appear to have any plans to eradicate opium poppies or marijuana. In addition, the rugged terrain, sparse population and woefully inadequate infrastructure of Laos makes central control difficult, especially in the Golden Triangle area. Despite lack of cooperation on narcotics control, Laos was certified in 1987 on grounds of national interest based on Lao government agreements to cooperate further on the POW/MIA issue and on embryonic consultations on narcotics control between the two governments. Our discussions on narcotics with the LPDR are continuing. In February 1988, the LPDR turned over remains thought to be of missing Americans; they have also agreed to one or more joint excavations within the next several months. Lao currency is nonconvertible, and there are no reports of narcotics­ related money laundering. 323 324 Appendix B A.2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1987 Lao officials have demonstrated an increased willingness to discuss narcotics problems, particularly when compared to a former attitude which refused to acknowledge drug abuse and trafficking as anything other than an external problem. The Lao were exposed to the full range of international sentiment on the issue at the United Nations-sponsored International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (ICDAIT) in Vienna in June 1987. At that time, Lao Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh stated: "The problems of abuse and illicit trafficking in drugs have taken on alarming proportions and caused disastrous social consequences in many countries. The Lao delegation shares the concerns of the international community faced with this situation." The Lao expressed similar sentiments in a letter from Acting President Phoumi to President Reagan in February 1987. Another step in persuading the Lao of the seriousness of narcotics problems was the visit in April of Secretary Aziz Bahi of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). His was the first INCB visit since the establishment of the LPD R in 1975. As one consequence of his visit, the Lao government will receive a mission from United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) in February 1988. The United States offered to finance a program of crop substitution and narcotics control training during talks held in Vientiane last August. The Lao government has not accepted that offer, but neither has it rejected it. In a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the talks the Lao and U.S. governments stated: "On the subject of narcotics, both sides recognized the seriousness of the problem and reaffirmed their intention to contribute to the international effort to combat it". The Lao government continues its efforts to persuade Hmong tribesmen to resettle in lowland areas and take up cultivation of crops other than opium. This policy is designed not only to reduce the cultivation of opium, but to halt the environmentally disastrous consequences of slash-and-burn agriculture. How successful the policy has been is open to question. United Nations funds have been used to establish a pilot village for dislocated Hmong, which so far has proven more successful than anything attempted by aid donors in the past. The bulk of the Hmong, however, remain attached to their traditional way of life which includes the growing of opium. Finally, international pressure on the Lao government has produced at least a shifting of lowland marijuana cultivation away from the banks of the Mekong. Whether fields have been moved from points openly visible from Thailand to others less obvious is uncertain. It is certain, however, that marijuana is no longer grown on the outskirts of the capital city.