Research Report Innovation in the United States Air Force Evidence from Six Cases Adam R. Grissom, Caitlin Lee, Karl P. Mueller C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1207 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9184-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Innovation is central to the USAF’s identity and purpose. With its origins in the airpower revolution of the early modern era, the service has long embraced the role of developing innovative means of going “over, not through” strategic challenges confronting the United States. Recently, however, the Air Force senior leadership has initiated a wide-ranging conversation about whether the service is sufficiently innovative today and what can be done to make it more innovative for the future. This report contributes to that conversation by assessing six historical cases of potential Air Force innovation, some successful and others unsuccessful, in the context of the scholarly literature on military innovation. The insights we develop across these cases will, we hope, help senior Air Force leaders sharpen the emerging conversation and develop a common understanding of the distinctly Air Force approach to innovation. This report should therefore be of interest to all airmen engaged in the emerging conversation, but particularly Air Force senior leaders and strategic planners in Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and in the major commands. The research reported here was sponsored by Maj Gen Steven Kwast, Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review Office, and Maj Gen David Allvin, Director of Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters, United States Air Force. It was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-06-C-0001. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: http://www.rand.org/paf/ iii Contents Preface ............................................................................................................................................ iii RAND Project AIR FORCE .................................................................................................................... iii Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iv Figures............................................................................................................................................ vi Summary ....................................................................................................................................... vii Key Cross-Case Findings ....................................................................................................................... vii Key Implications for the Air Force ........................................................................................................ viii Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... x Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. xi 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 Purpose of the Report ............................................................................................................................... 1 Background: What Is Innovation? ............................................................................................................ 1 Study Approach ........................................................................................................................................ 3 Organization of the Report ....................................................................................................................... 4 2. Peacetime Strategic Reconnaissance (1946–1972) ..................................................................... 6 1945–1946: Framing the Strategic Problem and Establishing the Institutional Framework .................... 6 1946–1971: Developing Operational Solutions for Peacetime Strategic Reconnaissance ..................... 11 Findings and Implications ...................................................................................................................... 21 3. Close Air Support (1945–1951) ................................................................................................ 23 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 23 CAS in World War II .............................................................................................................................. 23 CAS Between World War II and Korea ................................................................................................. 25 CAS in Korea .......................................................................................................................................... 28 Findings and Implications ...................................................................................................................... 31 4. Nuclear Deterrent Survivability (1950–1957) .......................................................................... 34 Strategic Discontinuity ........................................................................................................................... 34 Coming to Terms with Vulnerability ...................................................................................................... 36 5. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (1965–1985) ................................................................... 43 The Air Force and the IADS Problem Before Vietnam ......................................................................... 43 Adapting to the IADS Threat in Vietnam (1965–1968) ......................................................................... 46 Operation Linebacker (1972) .................................................................................................................. 51 Innovating Against Soviet IADS (1975–1985) ...................................................................................... 53 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 57 6. Precision Strategic Attack (1990–1999) ................................................................................... 59 Anatomy of the Innovation ..................................................................................................................... 59 Emergence of the Innovation .................................................................................................................. 64 7. Airborne High-Value Targeting (1993–2001) .......................................................................... 69 iv HVT as a Strategic Problem ................................................................................................................... 69 The USAF’s Role in the Hunt for Bin Laden ......................................................................................... 72 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 84 8. Findings and Implications ......................................................................................................... 86 Cross-Case Findings ..............................................................................................................................