Notes 1. Final &port of the Royal Commission on the Police, 1962 (Cmnd 1728). 2. Cmnd 1728, para. 9. 3. See Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40. 4. TheAUegation ofAssault onJohn Waters (Cmnd 718) (HMSO,AprllI959). 5. See Geoffrey Marshall, Police and Government (Methuen, 1965), p. 14. 6. 613 HC Deb 5s, Cols 1239-1303. 7. Attorney General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1955] AC 477. 8. 1930 2 KB 364. 9. See note 7. to. 1910 1 SLT 164. 11. R.C. Min. of Evidence, 11-27, Appendix 11, pp. 92-101. 12. R.C. Min. of Evidence, pp. 1330-62. 13. Cmnd 1728, para. 166. 14. Sir William Kerr Fraser PUS, Scottish Office James Smart Lecture 1981. 15. R v Commr of Police ex parte Blackburn [1968] 1 ALL ER 763. 16. Lord Scarman Report, Cmnd 8427. 17. See note 15. 18. Sir Philip Knights, 'Ultimate Command - The Responsibilities of Chief Constables in the 1980s', PoliceJourna~ 1981, pp. 381 et seq. 19. See Oliver, Police, Government and Accountability (Macmillan 1987), pp. 210 et seq. 20. See Oliver, Police, Government and Accountability, pp. 50 et seq. 21. Police Reform - The Government's Proposals for the Police Service in England and Wales, Cm 2281, June 1993. 22. James Smart Lecture 1980. 23. M. Brogden, The Police: Autonomy and Consent (Academic Press, 1982), p. 111. 24. 330 Pari. Deb. 3rd s.c. 1163. 25. &port of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, Cmnd 535, October 1969, para. 8. 26. Disturbances in Northern Ireland, report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, Cmnd 532, para. 7 (the Cameron Report). 27. James Callaghan, A House Divided (Collins, 1973). See also Brian Faulk- ner, Memoirs of a Statesman (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978), Chap. 3. 28. The Cameron Report, para. 10. 29. The Cameron Report, para. 12. 30. &port of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland, Cmnd 7497, 1979. 31. &port of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, October 1969, Cmnd 535, para. 13. 189 190 Notes 32. Cmnd 566, para. 3: 1O. Violence and Disturbances in Northern Ireland, 1969. Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry by Mr Justice Scarman. 33. Cmnd 535. 34. Callaghan, A House Divided, p. 50. 35. Officers who served with the Inspector General, with whom I discussed this point, were adamant that the IG was not a 'dominant' man and that this was a wrong impression. 36. See Callaghan, A House Divided, at pp. 55-6. See also The Cameron Report, pp. 102-4, for a description of the relationship between the government of Northern Ireland and the RUC. 37. Constabulary Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 Section 1 (3). 38. The recruited strength of the RUC as at 31 July 1969 was 3052; the authorised established level was 3500. In addition, the Ulster Special Constabulary, which had been mobilised for full-time duty with the RUC, had 425 men. 39. For an account of this, see Callaghan, A House Divided. Sir Arthur Young, former Commissioner of the City of London Police, was appointed and took up his post on 10 October 1969. See also Brian Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978), p. 70. 40. Cmnd 535, para. 81. 41. See Dervla Murphy, A Place Apart (Murray, 1978) and Michael Farrell, Arming the Protestants (Pluto Press, 1983). 42. Callaghan, A House Divided. 43. Cmnd 4154, August 1969; also quoted in Robin Evelegh, Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons ofNorthern Ireland, p. 16 (Hurst, 1978). See also Brigadier C.T. Shortis, Public Order in the 80s (Seaford House Papers, 1981); Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, p. 64, where the author describes a conversation in which the then Prime Minister of North­ ern Ireland claimed that he had secured the agreement of the Inspector General to the arrangement whereby the GOC should be supreme security commander; and Merlyn Rees, Northern Ireland: a Personal Per­ spective (Methuen, 1985). 44. Callaghan, A House Divided, p. 143. See also Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (Methuen, 1985), pp. 39 and 40; and Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, p. 70. 45. Observers acknowledge that this was out of date and seriously in need of revision. Part V of the ninth edition was issued in 1968 and does not appear to have been amended since that time. See Evelegh, Peace­ Keeping in a Democratic Society; G. Marshall, 'The Armed Forces and Industrial Disputes in the UK', published in Armed Forces and Society, February 1979; and Shortis, Public Order in the 80s. 46. QR for the Army 1961, paragraphs J1164a and amendment 92 of March 1975. 47. Shortis, Public Order in the 80s. 48. Hansard, August 1976, Col. 616. 49. Evelegh, Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society, p. 3. 50. The Guardian, 20 March 1978. Criticism of the 'unconstitutional' role of the army in the province has been voiced on many occasions, but particular reference should be made to an article by Professor Claire Notes 191 Palley, 'No-Go Area Between the Cabinet and the Army', The Times, 13 February 1973. See also 'The Dangers of Using the Army in Law and Order Situations', a speech by Enoch Powell, MP, to the Bexleyheath Political Forum, 4 October 1977; Captain K.O. Fox, 'Public Order: the Law and the Military', Anny Quarterly, April 1974; 'The Place of the British Army in Public Order', a paper by General Sir Edwin Bramall delivered to the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manu­ factures and Commerce, on 6 February 1980. See also Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle, p. 96. John Hume, MP, challenged the powers of the army after he had been charged on 18 August 1971 with failing to disperse (with others) when ordered so to do by an army officer purporting to be acting under the Special Powers Act. Hume had been convicted at the mag­ istrates' court and appealed on the grounds that powers attributed to the army under the Special Powers Act were unconstitutional. In the High Court at Belfast, Lowry LCj upheld the appeal and quashed the conviction. Reference was made to the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which imposed a restriction on Stormont from giving legal powers to the army. 51. The Cameron Report, Cmnd 532. 52. Fox, 'Public Order: the Law and the Military', p. 304. 53. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 was based on recommendations by Lord Diplock (Cmnd 5185) in his Report to the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activit­ ies in Northern Ireland. The Act gave soldiers broadly the same powers as those under the 1922 Act, but the precise circumstances in which they could be used were clearly defined. There were further Acts in 1975 and 1978, the latter being a consolidating Act which was itself considered in a report by Sir George Baker (Cmnd 9222) published in April 1984. 54. Fox, 'Public Order'. 55. Evelegh, Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society. 56. Patrick O'Farrell, 'The British Army in Northern Ireland', Pacific Defence Reporter, December/January 1975. 57. See Brigadier G.L.C. Cooper, 'Some Aspects of Conflict in Ulster', April 1973. Extract from BAR, No. 43. 58. Shortis, Public Order in the 80s. See also AF.N. Clarke, Contact (Secker & Warburg, 1983), for one man's view of the army's role in search situations; K. Boyle et al., Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (Martin Robertson, 1978), who quote figures supplied by the North­ ern Ireland Information Service that in 1973 the army searched 75000 houses; and Boyle et al., Ten Years on in Northern Ireland (The Cobden Trust, 1980). For an account of one difficult 'police action' involving the army, see Lord Widgery's Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday 30 January 1972, the so-called 'Bloody Sunday', which led to the loss oflife in connection with the procession on that day. 59. R. Fisk, The Point of No Return (Times Books, 1975), p. 101. 60. See Clarke, Contact. With regard to terrorist attacks, see Annual Report 192 Notes of Chief Constabk 1971: 'All this meant an end to our open stations and, in some areas, the saloon car. Instead we had to resort to high security fences, floodlighting, barbed-wire, sand-bagging and "hard-skinned" vehicles with crews wearing protective garments' (p. ix). 61. See ColonelJeromeJ. Haggerty, 'The War that Never Stopped Bleed­ ing', Military &View, Vol. 49, 1979. See also Chief Constabk's Annual Report 1973, pp. 12 and 13, which also speaks of good police/army liaison; and Chief Constabk's Annual Report 1974, p. 15, which gives details of the work of the army/police SPG throughout 1974. 62. Annual Report 1976, p. viii. On 1 May 1976 the Senior Deputy Chief Constable, Kenneth Newman, became Chief Constable of the RUC. Before transferring to the RUC, Newman had been Commander in Charge of the Community and Race Relations Branch (A7) at New Scotland Yard; he held a degree in law. 63. Hansard, 2 July 1976, Cols 879-923. 64. This is an unfortunate piece of terminology which the Chief Consta­ ble of the RUC was at pains to point out should really be 'the primacy of the rule of law', for which the police are primarily responsible in terms of enforcement. 65. Personal and private correspondence. See also Hamill, Pig in the Mid­ dle, in which the author describes the frustration of Merlyn Rees, as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, at the inability of the police to cope with the strike action which paralysed the Province in 1974 (the Ulster Workers' Council strike) and the unwillingness of the army to 'police' a civil matter such as a trade dispute.