University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 10-28-2010 Rethinking Ethical Naturalism: The mplicI ations of Developmental Systems Theory Jared J.. Kinggard University of South Florida Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the American Studies Commons Scholar Commons Citation Kinggard, Jared J.., "Rethinking Ethical Naturalism: The mpI lications of Developmental Systems Theory" (2010). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3651 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Rethinking Ethical Naturalism: The Implications of Developmental Systems Theory by Jared J. Kinggard A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Alexander Levine, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Brook Sadler, Ph.D. Roger Ariew, Ph.D. Thomas Williams, Ph.D. Date of Approval: October 28, 2010 Keywords: naturalized autonomy, anti-essentialist biology, non-essentialist normativity, ontogenetic, phylogenetic Copyright © 2010, Jared J. Kinggard To Gramps… Off we go into the wild blue yonder Acknowledgements I am especially thankful for the dedication, time, and support of my chairs, Dr. Levine and Dr. Sadler. Thank you for the countless hours spent helping me complete this project, and of course for all the conversations that aided in me maintaining some semblance of sanity. I also want to thank Dr. Williams for his part in this process, and I owe a gigantic debt of gratitude to Dr. Ariew for stepping up when I needed it most. Thanks to all the professors and staff of the USF philosophy department. I could not have completed this project without the knowledge I gained from the seminars and lectures. Finally, thanks to all my friends and family. Without all your love and support I would have never completed this milestone. I owe a special thanks to my wife Michelle, and my Mom, Dad, Kathy, and Lennie. Last but not least, thank you Marley—you have literally been right by my side through the entire process. Table of Contents Abstract iii Introduction 1 1. Naturalism 7 1.1 Naturalism considered 7 1.2 My Naturalistic Commitments 14 1.3 The best option we have for gaining an understanding of our world is to use our best and most relevant empirical theories 15 1.4 Why naturalism commits one to the notion that the difference between the human animal and the rest of the animal kingdom is one of degree not kind 17 1.5 Naturalism and Freedom 21 1.6 Ethical Naturalism: An Overview 23 2. DST and the Implications of its Acceptance 36 2.1 Synopsis of DST 36 2.1.1 Joint Determination 39 2.1.2 Context sensitivity and contingency 42 2.1.3 Extended inheritance 43 2.1.4 Development as construction 45 2.1.5 Distributed control 46 2.1.6 Evolution as construction 47 2.1.7 Conclusion 50 2.2 Some Implications of Accepting DST 51 2.2.1 DST’s Challenge to Essentialism and Preformationism 51 2.2.2 DST’s Challenge to the Biology/Culture Divide 56 2.2.3 DST’s Challenge to the Concepts of Nature and Nurture: Reconceptualizing the Natural 58 2.2.4 General Ethical Implications Involved in Accepting DST 60 3. DST & Naturalized Autonomy 65 3.1 Some Necessary Conditions for a Naturalized Account of Autonomy 66 3.2 A Naturalized Account of Autonomy under DST (NADST) 81 3.2.1 The Denial of a Primary Determinant for Autonomous Actions 83 3.2.2 NADST Promotes a Non-Essentialist Normativity 87 3.2.3 Responsibility Within NADST 89 i 4. The Source of Inclination 106 4.1 Introducing the Three Views of Inclination 106 4.2 The Extreme Anti-Rationalist View 107 4.3 The Extreme Rationalist View 116 4.4 Schapiro’s Middle Way 135 4.5 Defining Instinct 140 4.6 Returning to Schapiro 149 5. Ethical Naturalism Reconsidered 158 5.1 Contemporary Ethical Naturalism 158 5.2 Duke naturalism: Flanagan 159 5.2.1 Analysis of Flanagan’s Naturalism in Reference to DST & Autonomy-as-Available-Alternatives 173 5.3 Pittsburgh Naturalism: McDowell 184 5.3.1 Analysis of McDowell’s Naturalism in Reference to DST 193 5.4 The Consequences of Reconceptualizing the Natural for a Naturalized Ethics 198 Conclusion 203 Bibliography 209 ii Abstract Biological research has the capacity to inform ethical discussions. There are numerous questions about the nature of sexual orientation, intelligence, gender identity, etc., and many of these questions are commonly approached with the benefit of implicit or explicit biological commitments. The answers to these sorts of questions can have a powerful impact on social, ethical, and political positions. In this project I examine the prospect of naturalizing ethics under the umbrella of developmental systems theory (DST). If one is committed to DST, then those ideas involved in DST that steer biological research will also have implications for ethics. There has been much debate over whether certain human traits or attributes are the consequence of nature or nurture. This kind of question tends to be articulated in dichotomous terms where the focal point of the discussion is over which opposing causal mechanism asserts the most power over the development of these attributes. The debate places particular importance on such distinctions as that between gene and environment, and biology and culture. DST seeks to dismiss such dichotomous accounts. In this sense, DST is an attempt to do biology without these dichotomies. In the process, DST articulates a reconceptualized notion of “the natural.” I am interested in how DST’s reconceptualization of the natural can inform a naturalistic approach to ethics. Thus, the aim of this project is to examine the ramifications of taking DST as a guiding principle in the naturalization of ethics. iii Introduction In a general sense, naturalism is “a view of the world, and of man’s relation to it, in which only the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces is admitted or assumed.”1 One of the main goals of naturalism for philosophers is to show that the subject matter of philosophy, or phenomena about which philosophers theorize, is compatible with science. Ethical naturalism, then, can be seen as an attempt to demonstrate that ethics is compatible with science—specifically to show that ethical facts are natural facts. However, such attempts come with serious difficulties. One of the main problems encountered when attempting to ally science and ethics is figuring out how the human capacity to reason can be explained in accordance with natural law. Our experience of using reason can sometimes suggest that it is somehow free from the constraints of natural law. In other words, when we use reason to motivate an action, our experience is that we are freely choosing to perform whatever action our mind recommends. The problem consists in the idea that if nature is exhaustively governed by natural law, and the space of reasons is seen as operating freely in its own sphere, then the space of reasons may be seen as residing outside nature.2 But, if we are to understand ethics as compatible with scientific explanation, then this intuition must be 1 Flanagan, Sarkissian, Wong (1984, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2006) “Naturalizing Ethics.” Found in Sinnott- Armstrong, Walter (2008). Moral Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. p.1 2 Gubeljic, Mischa., Link, Simone., Müller, Patrick, and Osburg, Gunther. (1999) “Nature and Second Nature in McDowell’s Mind and World.” Found in John McDowell: Reason and Nature a Lecture and Colloquium in Münster. p.44 1 wrong because ethics involves the use of reason or seems to be a part of the space of reasons. Further, if the laws of science tell us that there is no empirical evidence to support the intuition that we make free choices, and responsibility is tied to the capacity to make free choices, then science seems to leave no room for attributing responsibility. If science leaves no room for responsibility, then naturalizing ethics jeopardizes a major component of ethical inquiry. A further difficulty that arises in attempts to naturalize ethics is how we are to reconcile the apparent divide between culture and biology, genetic and non-genetic factors, and nature and nurture. There has been much debate over the question of whether or not certain traits or attributes are the consequence of nature or nurture. This kind of question tends to be articulated in dichotomous terms where the focal point of the discussion is over which opposing causal mechanisms assert the most power over the development of these attributes. The debate places particular importance on such distinctions as that between gene and environment, and biology and culture. It assumes that we have the capacity to isolate these concepts in a manner that will allow for claims to be made about the causal power of each. It is here that my project has something to add. In this project I examine and outline some of the changes in how we see ethics when viewed through the filter of developmental systems theory (DST). DST seeks to dismiss dichotomous accounts of development.3 In this sense, DST is an attempt to do biology without these dichotomies.4 I am interested in how DST’s reconceptualization of the natural can inform a naturalistic approach to ethics. The aim of this project is to 3 See Griffiths, P.E.