ABSTRACT Where is Socrates Going? The Philosophy of Conversion in Plato’s Euthydemus Richard T. Whittington, Ph.D. Committee Chairperson: Anne Marie Bowery, Ph.D. This work examines the aim of Socratic philosophy in Plato’s Euthydemus. To understand the conflict that occurs in the dialogue between Socrates and his sophistic rivals, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, one must evaluate Socrates’ overarching goal and its divergence from sophistry. The author argues, however, that a sound analysis of this dialogue must go further and understand Socrates’ quarrel with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as part of a larger quarrel between philosophy and the competitive values of Greek society. The two sophists in this dialogue hardly merit serious, sustained attention. They make no serious arguments and do not seem clever enough to conceal the speciousness of their method. They practice eristic controversy for only one purpose: to refute their interlocutor and move quickly to the next refutation before anyone has time to scrutinize the soundness of their frequently absurd argument. Indeed, one might wonder why Plato spends his energy trying to discredit this absurdly clownish pair. The author argues that the brothers do not seem terribly threatening or important, but Plato’s critique does not stop with them. Rather, he uses them as a caricature of Greek culture and its cult of victory and violence. In opposition to the culture’s celebration of competitive values, he articulates a model of philosophical cooperation or (put differently) protreptic dialogue. Instead of aiming to win a dispute, he uses dialogue to convert his interlocutor to philosophy, a goal that diverges radically from sophistry. In this way, Socrates engages his interlocutor an intimate way, leading him patiently toward philosophy. At the same time, Socrates does not speak only to his interlocutor; he offers protreptic dialogue as a public model of discourse and an implicit critique of the city’s obsession with competition and victory. Finally, the author contends that one cannot understand Socrates’ philosophical goal (namely, exhorting his interlocutor to love wisdom) without understanding his sense of divine mission. In the Euthydemus Socrates begins with the divine sign, which sustains his sense of mission and purpose even when his protreptic dialogues terminate in aporia. Where is Socrates Going? The Philosophy of Conversion in Plato’s Euthydemus by Richard T. Whittington, M.A. A Dissertation Approved by the Department of Philosophy ___________________________________ Michael D. Beaty, Ph.D., Chairperson Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Approved by the Dissertation Committee ___________________________________ Anne-Marie Bowery, Ph.D., Chairperson ___________________________________ Robert C. Miner, Ph.D. ___________________________________ J. Lenore Wright, Ph.D. ___________________________________ David E. Corey, Ph.D. ___________________________________ Stuart E. Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Accepted by the Graduate School August 2008 ___________________________________ J. Larry Lyon, Ph.D., Dean Page bearing signatures is kept on file in the Graduate School. Copyright ©2008 by Richard T. Whittington All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface I. Summary of Dialogue v II. The Argument xii Acknowledgments xxii Dedication xxiii Chapter One Eristic Competition and the City 1 I. Aretê and Sophistry 1 II. Meeting the Brothers 6 III. Back to Crito 58 Chapter Two Philosophy and the Public 62 I. What is Enlightenment? 62 II. What is Philosophy? 64 III. Philosophy and the Public 69 IV. The Divine Sign 102 Chapter Three Protreptic and the Divine Sign 105 I. Enlightenment and the Daimonion 105 II. Where is Socrates Going? 110 III. Reason and Divine Sanction 116 IV. The Socratic Beginning 132 iii Chapter Four Conclusion 139 I. The Larger Context 139 II. Tradition and Sophistry 145 Bibliography 157 iv PREFACE I. Summary of dialogue The Euthydemus remains unfamiliar to many readers, even those familiar with many of Plato’s other dialogues. For that reason a brief introduction to the dialogue should seems necessary to clarify the themes I explore in this dissertation and provide a context for its central argument. The Euthydemus belongs to Plato’s narrated dialogues. Speaking to Crito, Socrates narrates his encounter with two foreign sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and occasionally interrupts the narrative to converse directly with Crito. Crito himself initiates the narrative; he had recently observed (without overhearing) an encounter between Socrates and Euthydemus at the Lyceum and would like to know more about him. He has a personal interest in the itinerant teachers because he seeks a qualified educator for his son, Critobulus. Initially he only mentions one sophist (whom Socrates recognizes as Euthydemus), apparently unaware of the other sophist present at the Lyceum. Socrates calls attention to Dionysodorus, Euthydemus’ brother and the other half of the sophistic team. After correcting Crito’s mistake, Socrates goes on to describe the brothers’ current occupation as well as the trajectory of their joint career. They come rather late to the practice of sophistry. Before embracing eristic argumentation (their sophistic specialty), they fought on the battlefield, argued in the courts and imparted their skill to others for a fee (272a). The brothers have not abandoned aggressive activities like warfare and legal debate, which divide the world v into enemies and competitors. Far from retiring to a life of private, leisured conversation, they have extended their skill in pancration—or “all-round fighting”—to a different type of combat. According to Socrates “not a single man can stand up to them, they have become so skilled in fighting in arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false” (272). Briefly stated, the brothers aim at refuting arguments regardless of their actual merits; as teachers they impart this skill to their students. Practitioners of eristic regard their interlocutors as foes, not people who can shed light on genuine perplexities. They have no interest in critiquing flawed arguments or seeking better alternatives; their method of controversy can make any argument seem false. Conversely, eristic also constructs elaborate arguments to defend patent falsehoods, a habit that becomes increasingly comical and strange as the dialogue progresses. Socrates conveys this information with mock admiration. He even tells Crito that he intends to “hand myself over to these men, since they say that they can make any other person clever at the same things in a short time” (272b). He invites Crito to participate in this odd endeavor, apparently forgetting that Crito does not seek an educator for himself; he seeks someone qualified to educate his son, still young enough to participate in higher education without violating convention.1 Still, Crito claims to have “no objections…if you really think well of their plan” (272d) but insists on hearing “what we are going to learn (272d) in greater detail. Socrates honors Crito’s request with a narrative. 1Athenian convention had entered a stage of transition at this time, extending education beyond the traditional span .See C.C.W. Taylor’s Introduction to the Protagoras: “The demand for success in forensic and political oratory, fostered by the increase in participatory democracy which was a feature of political life, led to the development of specialized techniques of persuasion and argument, associated in particular with the names of Gorgias and Protagoras.” C.C.W. Taylor, Introduction (in Plato’s Protagoras), Oxford University Press, 1996. P. x. ] vi Socrates’ narrative begins with the divine sign. Socrates tells Crito that he was preparing to leave the Lyceum when the sign “put in an appearance” (273a), telling him remain. Socrates obediently resumes his place. Shortly thereafter the brothers enter the building and walk around the cloister a few times before Clinias enters the room and catches their attention. Clinias notices Socrates and sits down at his right; at this point the brothers notice Clinias and also gravitate in Socrates’ direction. Given this conjunction of events, the purpose of the sign’s command seems obvious, although Socrates does not say so explicitly. The sign prevented Socrates’ departure because he needs to intervene between Clinias and the brothers, who have cast their predatory eyes on the young Athenian. “I was keeping a good eye on them” Socrates tells Crito, clearly wary of their interest in Clinias. The narrative thus begins on a serious note; the sign sets a solemn tone for a dialogue that oscillates wildly between gravity and farce. A hint of menace marks the opening of Socrates’ narrative. The brothers’ interest in Clinias does not seem benign; for that reason, Socrates assumes a protective role, a role the divine sign perhaps intended for him when it forbade him to leave the Lyceum. Since the sign does state its intentions, Socrates must interpret its messages. Here the mission he needs to fulfill seems rather obvious, especially as the encounter with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus unfurls. He must test the brothers to judge whether or not they threaten Clinias. After mentioning his encounter with the sign, Socrates describes the other people who attended the event. He notices Ctesippus, “a well-bred fellow except for a certain youthful brashness,” and a group of