PLATO’S USE OF IRONY Aidan Rene Nathan June 2020 Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences The University of Sydney A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy I certify that the content of this thesis is my own work and that this thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. Aidan Rene Nathan CONTENTS PREFACE 1 INTRODUCTION 2 PART ONE 1 IRONY 14 A Brief History of the Word ‘Irony’ 17 The Nature of Irony 35 Simplistic and Sophistic Accounts of Irony 52 PART TWO 2 SOCRATIC IRONY 60 The Modern Scholarship 61 Socratic Irony in the Strict Sense 77 3 PARAGOGIC IRONY 98 Minor Examples of Paragogic Irony 99 Paragogic Irony in the Phaedo 103 PART THREE 4 IRONIC SYMBOLISM 126 Minor Examples of Ironic Symbolism 128 Seeing as Knowing 131 Erōs in the Symposium 142 5 IRONY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 167 The Palinode in the Phaedrus 168 Overview of the Palinode 174 Good and Bad Lovers 191 Growing Wings and Recollecting 199 CONCLUSION 217 BIBLIOGRAPHY 220 1 PREFACE Conducting an inquiry can be very personal. Even more so when we put out thoughts on to paper. For better or worse these things can often feel like they take something of us with them. This seems especially true of Plato’s works. The character of his philosophy is strikingly distinctive both in thought and expression; and one of his most pronounced idiosyncrasies is his irony. In this study I attempt to illustrate how Plato employs irony to address his audience in an intelligent, fruitful and characteristically Platonic way. In general, Plato uses irony to turn a defect or limitation—whether it’s an unwillingness to admit ignorance or an attachment to the corporeal—into its opposite. He uses irony to breathe life into the ‘dead’ written word. Many scholars regard the literary form of the dialogues as essential to their philosophical message. Perhaps we may say that for Plato using a dry treatise for philosophy would be as useful as using sign language to sing a song. Irony, then, is one of the means he employs to overcome the limitations of the written word and turn them to his advantage; to make his mute texts, not just speak to us, but sing. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the invaluable guidance and support of Rick Benitez, who always humoured my ramblings and treated me like a peer rather than a student. I’ve no doubt the shortcomings of this study would be far worse were it not for your help. Thank you. I would also like the acknowledge the efforts of my sister, Sivan Nathan, in proof- reading my work. 2 INTRODUCTION ...some truths are too important to stand or fall by mere argument. —Myles Burnyeat The purpose of this study is to isolate, explain and account for Plato’s use of irony. There are a growing number of articles and chapters on irony in Plato that deal with certain ‘types’ of irony, most notably Socratic irony; there are a few essays on particular ironic passages in Plato; and there is an increasing amount of work being done under the banner of ‘Platonic irony.’ My efforts, however, although not always at odds with these trends, generally do not coincide with them. The phrase ‘Platonic irony’ for instance has appeared with increasing regularity in the scholarship and is often employed as if it referred to some specific thing. This suggests that scholars think they have found that one special type of irony in Plato that deserves the epithet ‘Platonic.’ For example Eckstein (1981) 9-12 uses the term to refer to Plato’s use of deliberately fallacious arguments; Vlastos (1991) 245 uses it to describe how Plato sets up a double audience by hiding his meaning so that only certain readers perceive his true teaching. Others take this latter idea further and argue that ‘Platonic irony’ involves the absence of an authorial voice which forces the readers to think things through themselves. Nehamas (1998) 44 and Gordon (1999) 129-30, for example, argue that the reader is in fact tricked into becoming complacent: we think we are superior to Socrates’ victims (like Euthyphro) because we perceive their mistakes, but this superiority is a self-delusion that vitiates the examined life and makes us resemble the ignorant Euthyphros. Landy (2007) 92-5, while incorporating some of these themes, limits ‘Platonic irony’ to implicit criticisms of Socrates. By and large ‘Platonic 3 irony’ is most often employed to refer to authorial anonymity.1 This ‘irony’ tends to be understood as a simple concomitant of Plato’s refusal to speak in his own voice. In this way the term ‘irony’ has simply been diluted to mean ‘literary’ or the like.2 Virtually all fiction would be ‘ironic’ in this sense. The attempt to account for ‘Platonic irony’ in this sense is actually an attempt to explain why Plato wrote in the dialogue format. That topic, however, is not my primary concern. The irony that interests me is much more specific. As such my inquiry has a narrower focus and is, I believe, more original. Plato contra Socrates and the Non-Doctrinal View Within the scholarship on Plato’s literary techniques there is a strong tendency to associate Plato’s irony with the rejection of the following two assumptions: (1) that Socrates is put in a privileged position and (2) that Plato puts forward philosophical ideas and theories. That is, for certain scholars Plato’s irony is synonymous with the idea that he does not use Socrates (or 1 Plato’s irony is also discussed by e.g. Merlan (1947), Rowe (1987), Griswold (1987) and (2002), Hyland (1988), Michelini (2000) and Long (2007). The following thematise anonymity: Edelstein (1962), Plass (1964) and (1967) and Benitez (2010); and see further Press (2000). One of the most measured assessments of ‘Platonic anonymity’ I have encountered is Edelstein. He argues that Plato attributed his philosophy to Socrates in the tradition of the Pythagoreans who humbly attribute their philosophy to the master (11-13). This anonymity is carried down to the level of Socrates in that ‘the dialogues always divert attention from the person of Socrates and direct it to the truth; they always appeal not to his authority but rather to the strength of his argument’ (17). 2 See e.g. Griswold (1996) 12-3. Benitez (2010) 18, by contrast, is refreshingly explicit: ‘One of the problems generic to the interpretation of literature is the gap between author and character.’ Plass (1964) makes the surprising move of interpreting ‘anonymity’ or ‘irony’ as virtually anything that reduces the role of the speaker, whether attributing one’s view to another or disparaging oneself. 4 anyone else) to put forward positive doctrine. This being so, I feel obliged to make plain from the outset that, although this is a study of Plato’s irony, I do not take this approach. Regarding Socrates, and leaving aside the other principal speakers, I do not think that every word he says can be attributed to Plato. Socrates, as I understand him, is frequently ironic, elusive and, as I will argue, even manipulative. Yet I maintain that he is something like an ideal philosopher in Plato. He always acts to improve the people he speaks to, even if he must administer a bitter pill. Where Socrates is found to be using bad arguments and we have reason to believe that Plato knows these are bad arguments, I tend to bring Socrates in on it and ask why he might behave this way. Thus I do not think that Plato endorses everything that Socrates says. Indeed, I do not even think that Socrates endorses everything that he says. And yet those scholars who wish to undermine Socrates’ authority frequently argue that, since he cannot be taken as a straightforward ‘mouthpiece,’ he cannot be put in a privileged position.3 But this is a false dichotomy. We are not faced with an exclusive choice between the radical mouthpiece view (whereby Socrates matter-of-factly stands in for Plato) and the anti-Socrates view. A middling view whereby Socrates is privileged yet elusive has traditionally been the dominant one among literary approaches to Plato and at times it can be a little disappointing to read some of the uncharitable interpretations of Socrates that are employed by scholars to pit Plato against his Socrates.4 Frequently these scholars behave as if there is a burden of proof to be borne by anyone who takes Socrates as privileged. I think this is incorrect. Plato writes in such a way as to make 3 For the view that Plato never speaks in his own voice because none of his characters speak for him see e.g. Griswold (1987) 76, Hyland (1988) 318 and 332, Frede (1992) 215-7, Nails (2000) 16, Press (2000b) 27-8, Waugh (2000) 39-40 and West (2000) 100-1. Gonzalez (2000) is one of the more measured attempts to account for the distance between Plato and his Socrates; cf. Clay (2000) 100-15. 4 See especially Landy (2007) and Nails (2000) 18-9. 5 Socrates an obvious hero. Consider a question that is put forward by Debra Nails (2000) 15: ‘Who is Jane Austen’s mouthpiece in her novels? Is it, as is widely believed, the lively Elizabeth Bennet of Pride and Prejudice?’ If we leave aside the distracting mention of a ‘mouthpiece,’ talk of Jane Austen is apt to recall how easy it often is to see which characters we are supposed to identify with or sympathise with and which characters we should not.