Henry Ashby Turner. General Motors and the Nazis: The Struggle for Control of Opel, Europe's Biggest Carmaker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 200 pp. $38.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-300-10634-3. Reviewed by Uwe Fraunholz Published on H-German (June, 2008) In a classic formulation, the Communist Inter‐ to produce ammunition against pending class ac‐ national defined fascism in power as "the open tion suits on behalf of victims of forced labor. terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, Turner was appointed the director of this initia‐ most chauvinist, and most imperialist elements of tive and enjoyed unrestricted access to internal finance capital."[1] As early as 1932, political pho‐ records in writing this work, which was complet‐ tomontage artist John Heartfield informed the ed after the documentation project was brought public of "the real meaning of the Hitler salute" by to an end and without fnancial support from GM. showing "the little man" asking for "big gifts" with It responds to accusations that GM executives "millions" standing behind him.[2] These Marxist covertly exercised control over Opel even after views influenced the academic interpretations of Germany declared war on the United States.[4] Its fascism and Nazism for a long time, not only in declared goal is to assess the validity of these ac‐ the communist bloc. Throughout his career, Hen‐ cusations. ry Turner has fought the notion of Nazism as a In the frst chapter, Turner briefly outlines servant of capitalist interests tooth and nail since, the expectations of America's largest automotive as he has convincingly shown, such claims lack producer for an enormous expansion of automo‐ empirical evidence.[3] In his book on Opel, Turn‐ bile driving in Germany in the late 1920s. But pro‐ er sustains his master narrative by emphasizing tective tariffs and high import duties made Ameri‐ the pressure put on the American owners of the can models more costly for German consumers firm and by stressing the restricted space that than European cars. At the time, Opel was the General Motors (GM), which owned Opel begin‐ largest auto manufacturer outside the United ning in 1929, had to act in the German war econo‐ States, with a German market share of 25 percent. my. In March 1929, GM purchased this family-owned In 1999 GM started a documentation project firm, one of the frst to use American machinery on its dealings with the Third Reich as an attempt and assembly lines in Germany. That decision en‐ H-Net Reviews tailed a significant commitment of fnancial re‐ feasibility of producing small, inexpensive cars. sources: the Rüsselheim plant was GM's largest Opel was excluded from the meetings of the Auto‐ foreign holding. Unfortunately for these plans, the motive Association in 1936. Increased orders from Great Depression caused falling sales and losses the German army compensated to some extent: in the years between 1930 and 1932. Antiforeign‐ Opel established a new truck factory in Branden‐ er rhetoric expanded at the same time that cur‐ burg that benefited from the rearmament pro‐ rency exchange controls locked investments in gram. In return for this support, the military Germany. Nevertheless, GM reacted with a strate‐ served as GM's most reliable ally in the new gy of reinvestment, expansion and moderniza‐ regime. The subsequent three chapters detail tion: new technology was installed at Rüs‐ these power struggles. As a consequence of these selsheim. This action coincided with enthusiastic developments Opel became entangled in Hitler's support for the automobile industry by the Nazi preparations for war, not least due to the impor‐ party after its assumption of power: it reduced tance of American know-how to German military taxes and promoted the Autobahn. As a result technology. A new gear plant was planned with‐ Opel soon surpassed pre-Depression sales levels, out informing GM and Opel decided to manufac‐ and gained a market share of 40 percent in 1934. ture parts in order to supply Junkers, the airplane By the end of 1939, the value of the frm had more manufacturer. Opel also produced torpedo deto‐ than doubled. nators for the German navy and munitions for the The second chapter is dedicated to the strate‐ army. gies Opel and GM used in order to survive the One highlight of the book is the chapter on at‐ Third Reich. Nazi officials, especially the Gauleiter tempts by James D. Mooney, the president of the of Hesse, Jakob Sprenger, tried to take control of General Motors Overseas Corporation, to stop the the Rüsselsheim factory early on. So Wilhelm von Second World War. It reveals a private crusade Opel, the chairman of the frm's board, joined the for peace that met with hostility in the State De‐ Nazi Party quickly in 1933 and served as a patron partment and led to FBI investigations. Many U.S. of the National Socialist Motor Vehicle Corps. In officials were blind to the criminal nature of the 1934 the corporation's board consisted of four National Socialist regime. Alfred P. Sloan acted Americans and four Germans. Nazi functionaries consistently against appeasement policy as well. were installed as corporate directors, board mem‐ The last American representatives of Opel left bers, and chief of the security force. Additionally, Germany in 1941. As a result, GM lost control of cars were given as gifts to Nazi officials and ad‐ the German corporation, but nonetheless harvest‐ vertising in National Socialist periodicals was in‐ ed wartime profits from holdings that were char‐ tensified. Turner asesses these changes as a strate‐ acterized as enemy property but delivered com‐ gy of camouflage: GM tried to minimize Opel's ponents to Messerschmidt and Daimler-Benz and outward appearance of being American sub‐ produced landmines and the three-ton Blitz (an sidiary. aircraft tanker), all the while exploiting forced la‐ The book goes on to depict Opel's efforts to bor. participate in the Volkswagen project. Opel had In his summary of his results, Turner empha‐ invested in the development of small cars since sizes that GM contributed only unwillingly to the the 1920s and offered the cheapest models avail‐ German war effort. On his view, rather than sup‐ able in 1934. But the German Automotive Associa‐ porting the German military, GM was an interna‐ tion commissioned Ferdinand Porsche, who there‐ tional business with a corporate structure that by gained personal access to Hitler, to explore the was not affected by the prevailing political condi‐ 2 H-Net Reviews tions. Thus, according to Turner, the corporation complishing his desired revision, insofar as the never deviated from the typical practices of the German edition of the book has met with no abra‐ business community, and it was never the object sive criticism from this side of the Atlantic.[6] Af‐ of negative public opinion for failing to divest it‐ ter all, the Nazi regime did not gain full control of self of its German holdings. He emphasizes that the largest automotive plant in Europe, which re‐ GM's investment in Opel had been locked in by mained the property of GM. Even if Opel attempt‐ currency controls established before Hitler gained ed to capture the propagandistic Volkswagen power. Although the frm saw rising profits dur‐ project, made extensive use of forced labor, pro‐ ing the frst years of Nazi rule, Turner sees GM as duced key components for the Luftwaffe, and a hostage of the Third Reich. manufactured the Blitz for the German army, it Limitations on its wartime room to maneuver hardly makes sense to condemn American man‐ notwithstanding, the question remains of whether agement for these decisions, because it had practi‐ corporations that hold businesses in foreign coun‐ cally no influence on Opel over the course of Nazi tries should continue to conduct those businesses rule. without regard for the local political circum‐ Turner's study stands somewhat in contrast stances. In order to address this question, Turner to the mainstream of newer business histories reconstructs in detail the perspectives of corpo‐ dealing with the National Socialist period, which rate managers, whose thinking was dominated by stress the wide range of options available to exec‐ economic categories. In order to explain these, he utives and corporate management in dealing with stresses the necessity of focusing on economic the challenges of the new regime, rather than em‐ success and profits. This position is not entirely phasizing their powerlessness. This distinction convincing, insofar as the documentation project may have a basis in Opel's status as the special itself was motivated not by philanthropy, but by case of an international company whose wartime the company's desire to protect future profits. operations continued largely independent of its Even if GM could not divest itself of Opel during American management. This circumstance sug‐ the war, some ethical difficulties remain, since gests that conclusions drawn from Opel's story GM insisted on collecting its wartime dividends are unlikely to apply universally to other compa‐ from Opel after the war ended. Turner criticizes nies in operation during the Third Reich. A sys‐ this decision in very clear language. tematic comparison of the entanglements and rel‐ The purpose of the book is to revise the older ative freedom to act enjoyed by multinational historiography on Opel, which drew a much more companies, including Ford, Coca-Cola, and IBM, negative picture of the GM management's implica‐ remains a challenge for business historians of the tion in the war effort, although or perhaps be‐ Nazi era. cause it did not enjoy unlimited access to the Notes firm's documents. This scholarship argued that [1]. Georgi Dimitroff, "The Fascist Offensive even after the United States entered the war, the and the Tasks of the Communist International in priority of the modern company remained the the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism.