University of Kentucky UKnowledge Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2015 Perception and Judgment in Plato's Theaetetus Paul DiRado University of Kentucky, [email protected] Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation DiRado, Paul, "Perception and Judgment in Plato's Theaetetus" (2015). Theses and Dissertations-- Philosophy. 5. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/5 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STUDENT AGREEMENT: I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright permissions. 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Paul DiRado, Student Dr. Eric Sanday, Major Professor Dr. David Bradshaw, Director of Graduate Studies PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT IN PLATO’S THEAETETUS _______________________________ DISSERTATION _______________________________ A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky By Paul DiRado Lexington, Kentucky Director: Dr. Eric Sanday, Professor of Philosophy Lexington, Kentucky 2015 Copyright © Paul DiRado 2015 ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT IN PLATO’S THEAETETUS I will argue that Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus demonstrates that knowledge is never caused by sense perception. While various kinds of qualities appear to the soul or mind as a result of sense perception—as a result of external bodies impacting with the sense organs—the being (einai or ousia) of these qualities is something different from the mere appearance of the qualities that occurs through the senses. While white colors appear to the soul through vision, perception itself does not reveal that these many appearances are all instances of one white quality. However, I will demonstrate that it is impossible to know anything, even something as basic as “the chalk is white,” if the knower does not recognize that “white” is some one thing and not merely a plurality of instances. Since sense perception does not disclose the one being of what appears within it, knowledge always requires the soul or mind to go beyond what is receptively disclosed to it through sense perception. In order to demonstrate this conclusion, Plato uses a reductio ad absurdum argument. He develops a theory that argues for the opposite conclusion. According to this theory, perceiving and knowing are the same. In order to justify this result, the theory posits that qualities have no one being that is distinct from their many appearances. I will show that the theory entails a series of unacceptable consequences. The worst of these consequences is that it makes reality itself is unintelligible—according to the theory, the world cannot be linguistically described because the world does not possess any concrete determinacy to describe as a result of the theory denying the difference between being and appearances. Plato’s Socrates demonstrates that these conclusions are unacceptable on the theory’s own terms. As a result, the theory fails and the postulate that being and appearances are identical must be rejected. It is impossible for the mere appearance of a quality through sense perception to ever be knowledge. It will only be possible for knowledge to come about through an activity of the soul that discovers the being of what appears to it. KEYWORDS: Plato, Theaetetus, Perception, Knowledge, Being and Appearances Paul DiRado May 29th, 2015 PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT IN PLATO’S THEAETETUS By Paul DiRado Dr. Eric Sanday Director of Dissertation Dr. David Bradshaw Director of Graduate Studies May 29th, 2015 Acknowledgements: It is impossible to carry out a project of any significance without relying upon the help and support of countless individuals. This dissertation is no exception. Before beginning, then, it is appropriate to acknowledge and thank the many educators, friends, and family without whom the composition of this document would not have been possible. I have been fortunate enough in my life to have received the instruction of countless outstanding teachers. I would like to especially thank Shannon Decker, who first encouraged me to explore philosophy all of those years ago, Alice Temnick, Amy Metcalf, and all of the other educators at Cactus Shadows High School who supported me in pursuing my academic dreams. I am also indebted to the philosophy department at Whitman College, especially my advisor Dr. Tom Davis, who provided me with a demonstration of everything that it is possible for a philosophy instructor to be both inside and outside of the classroom. Finally, I would like to thank the philosophy department of the University of Kentucky for supporting me during the long process of composing this dissertation and for instructing me in how to be a scholar in addition to a thinker. The members of my dissertation committee deserve special recognition. Dr. David Bradshaw, Dr. Arnold Farr, and Dr. Robert Rabel all offered valuable commentary and feedback throughout the various stages of preparing and composing the dissertation, and the document would have been far weaker without their assistance. I would also like to thank my independent evaluator, Dr. Jackie Murray, for agreeing to participate in my defense at the last minute. And of course, my chair, Dr. Eric Sanday, deserves special iii thanks. His tireless efforts to improve my thinking, my writing, and my scholarship have caused this document to attain heights that it otherwise could not have achieved. Those efforts, and his friendship, are incredibly appreciated. I would also like to thank the many conferences and meetings in which the ideas found in this dissertation were first presented to public scrutiny, including the Society of Ancient Greek Philosophy, the Collegium Phaenomenologicum, Ancient Philosophy Society, and the Ancient Philosophy Workshop. I must offer special thanks to Dr. Mitchell Miller, whose generosity in private conversations at these events has inspired many of the ideas found in this work. Finally, I would like to thank my dear friend Dr. Michael Wiitala—the countless hours of discussion we have spent together have shaped and improved both my thinking and my beliefs about the world in ways that are impossible to quantify. Lastly, I owe to my family a debt of gratitude that can never truly be repaid. My mother and father offered every last bit of support that a child could ever hope to receive, and then even more. If, as Aristotle argues, the beginning of process is the most important part, then it would have been impossible for any child to have ever requested a better beginning. Finally, to my wife Kristy—you will never know how much your support and love during the process of composing this document was necessary for its completion. Thank you. Given my overwhelming fortune in acquiring benefactors, it should hopefully be obvious that the flaws of this work can be attributed only to my own contribution, and not to theirs. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements: ....................................................................................................... iii Section 1: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 i. Interpretive Methodology ......................................................................................... 4 Chapter 1: The Theaetetus and the Platonic Tradition of Dialectic .................................. 14 Section 2: Inquiry into Intelligibility and the Forms ..................................................... 15 i. Meno’s Paradox ...................................................................................................... 16 ii. The Compresence of Opposites ............................................................................. 21 iii. Intelligibility and Non-Contradiction ..................................................................