Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 “Albania is not Cuba.” Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split Edited, annotated and introduced by Ana Lalaj, Christian F. Ostermann, and Ryan Gage lbania is not Cuba.” To most observers during romanticism, the Albanian communists’ open defection from the Cold War this statement would connote the the “revisionists” in Moscow likely validated and reinforced “A sense that, in the scheme of Cold War geopoli- Mao’s ideological extremism and his eagerness to challenge tics, Cuba’s peculiar role that brought the world to the edge of the USSR for leadership in the communist world. a nuclear conflagration differed vastly in significance and con- Albanian-Soviet relations had been on a path of decline sequence from the historic understudy played by the secluded from the post-1948 heyday of anti-Tito collaboration between country on the edge of the Balkans. But in fact this statement Moscow and Tirana for some years. Khrushchev’s rapproche- by a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politburo member to the ment with Belgrade in 1953-1955 and the de-Stalinization Albanian ambassador in Beijing in 1961 meant precisely the campaign launched at the February 1956 Twentieth CPSU opposite—comforting reassurance: “If imperialism dares to Congress threatened a return to the postwar subjugation to the attack Albania, we will assist her with all our forces.”1 Unlike hated and feared Yugoslavs. At the April 1956 Tirana party Moscow’s allegedly weak response to the Bay of Pigs crisis, conference ALP members demanded greater democracy in the Beijing would not abandon its far-away ally, no matter how dire inner life of their party organizations and asked their leaders the circumstances. One may wonder whether Beijing would to give up excessive privileges given the severe poverty in the have lived up to such expectations if push came to shove. Yet country. Delegates also called for the rehabilitation of certain the statement, at the end of a briefing by the Chinese official political figures and a change in relations with Yugoslavia. on the developments that had unfolded in Cuba, captured suc- Though Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha was not named personal- cinctly the remarkable importance that tiny Albania had taken ly, the discussion constituted a severe criticism of his policies. on for the communist giant by the early 1960s. On the second day of the conference, Hoxha launched a coun- Viewed from Beijing, the small and traditionally xenopho- terattack, forcing an end to the mounting criticism. Though he bic Balkan country had actually much common with Cuba. later made marginal concessions on Yugoslav policy and even And not just in size and population: as the Sino-Soviet alliance exercised a certain degree of self-criticism at the Third ALP of the 1950s dissolved amidst mutual recriminations at com- Congress in May 1956, he saw to it that within a short time munist gatherings and the withdrawal of Soviet advisors and many of his critics within the party were purged.2 economic aid, Albania emerged as China’s only but increas- Having survived the threat posed by the pro-Yugoslav ingly fervent ally in Europe. Much as Fidel Castro’s revolution Soviet policies, Hoxha was among the very first and the most had given the Soviet leaders a highly valuable strategic out- violent in renewing the attack on Tito after the 1956 Hungarian post in the US-dominated Western hemisphere, Enver Hoxha’s Revolution. Here he soon found himself in company of the break with Moscow provided the People’s Republic a politi- Chinese, who were undergoing a radical shift to the left in cal beachhead at a neuralgic spot on the southern edge of the 1958. Not even a visit to Tirana by Khrushchev in May 1959 Warsaw Pact. Much as Moscow supported the infant regime could stop the downturn in Albanian-Soviet relations. in Havana with generous military and economic aid, Chinese During the June 1960 Romanian Workers Party Congress, leaders stepped up aid in grain, industrial material and know- the Albanian delegation, headed by the party’s no. 3 man, how to the Albanians after the fall-out with Khrushchev. That Hysni Kapo, refused to fall in line behind Khrushchev’s this happened at a time of acute shortages and nationwide orchestrated attack on the Chinese. In turn Moscow refused famine in the wake after the disastrous “Great Leap Forward,” the Albania’s request for emergency grain supplies, reinforcing reflected not just strategic calculations but deeper ideologi- doubts on Hoxha’s part that any further support from Moscow cal considerations: Much as the Cuban communists’ zeal would be forthcoming.3 After Bucharest Hoxha sent two letters and actions seemed to appeal to Khrushchev’s revolutionary to the Soviet leadership, complaining that Soviet Ambassador Dr. Ana Lalaj is the director of the Albanian Cold War Studies Center. Christian F. Ostermann is the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program and has headed CWIHP since 1997/98. Ryan Gage is a CWIHP Assistant and a MA candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 183 Inside China’s Cold War 1961 the USSR withdrew its advisers. In mid-1961 Moscow revoked scholarships for Albanian students in the USSR, later deporting all those remaining. Moscow’s East European allies soon followed suit, curtailing much of the support they had provided to Albania since 1949 through COMECON. Soviet actions dealt the Albanian economy a severe blow: Tirana’s third five-year plan (1961-1965) was contingent on Soviet aid, and its potential for success fell under serious doubt.7 The breakdown of Soviet-Albanian economic relations after Moscow quickly spilled over to the military relation- ship. Conflict over control of the Albanian-manned but Soviet- owned submarines stationed at the Warsaw Pact base in Vlorë led to the withdrawal of the Soviet submarines in June 1961, leaving Tirana to accuse Moscow of undermining its defense CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann, Tirana University Professor capabilities.8 During the 3-5 August 1961 Warsaw Pact sum- Ana Lalaj, Vice-Prime Minister Namik Dokle, and GWU Professor James G. Hershberg during November 2004 meetings hosted by the mit, called at East German leader Walter Ulbricht’s request to Albanian Cold War Studies Center. discuss the closing of the Berlin border, the Albanian delegate was forced to leave on the first day: his Pact colleagues refused Ivanov had allegedly questioned Albanian generals and offi- to recognize the junior Ramiz Alia whom Hoxha had sent in cers on the allegiance of the Albanian Army and had appar- his stead in a show of contempt. On 19 August Khrushchev ently tried to gather information from party functionaries and recalled Josef Shikin, his ambassador to Tirana, then, at the cadres in Tirana, Durres, Elbasan and other localities on the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in October 1961, engaged in issues raised in the ALP’s plenums. In return, Moscow with- long diatribes against the Albanian leaders (in two speeches drew its ambassador. Perhaps feeling that he that had gone on 17 and 27 October). The Albanians followed suit with a too far, Khrushchev urged the Albanians in August to attend month-long media campaign against Khrushchev, headlined the November meeting of 81 communist parties in Moscow to with a speech by Hoxha on 7 November widely broadcast by overcome the Bucharest dispute and “to exterminate the sparks Radio Tirana. In the speech, Hoxha exhorted the Albanian 4 of the misunderstanding born between us.” people in now-famous words: “The Albanian people and its Meanwhile, an Albanian government delegation partici- Labor Party will even eat grass if it is necessary in order not to pated in the PRC’s national day celebrations in October 1960. be sold for 30 pieces of silver to imperialists.”9 Four days later, The head of Albanian delegation, Deputy Premier Abdyl the Albanians addressed a letter to the newly elected Soviet Kellezi, publicly praised the ideological rigor of the Chinese Central Committee appealing to intervene against the “brutal communists and Mao Zedong personally. Following the fall- and anti-Marxist actions of Khrushchev and his group.”10 The out with Khrushchev in Bucharest, Hoxha began to purge next month, the countries’ embassies were shut down, and at pro-Soviet personalities from the Albanian leadership, such the beginning of 1962, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON de as Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko. After those purges the facto expelled Hoxha’s Albania. Albanian leadership under Hoxha turned increasingly vitri- As he sought to propel China towards a more radical path olic in its attacks on Khrushchev. At the Hanoi congress of the internationally, Mao Zedong sensed an opportunity in the grow- Vietnamese Workers’ Party, the Albanian delegate, Defense ing Soviet-Albanian estrangement. Sino-Albanian solidarity Minister Beqir Ballaku, strongly supported the Chinese posi- was plainly emergent at the first open confrontation between tion. The recriminations climaxed at the meeting of 81 com- Moscow and Beijing, at the communist-front General Council munist parties. On 12 November, in a conversation with of the World Federation of Trade Unions in early June 1960. Khrushchev, Hoxha repeatedly revealed his ability to press After the Bucharest meeting Mao swiftly stepped in to provide the Soviet leader’s buttons: “Why do you talk this way?” increased economic aid to Tirana as the faucets in Moscow all 5 Khrushchev finally retorted with exasperation. But Hoxha but dried up.11 Despite dramatic shortages, widespread famine, only stepped up his violent charges: in what was widely seen and mass starvation at home, the PRC granted Albania what as a philippic, he decried Khrushchev’s alleged wrongdoings was considered to be the largest loan extended by the Chinese in front of the assembled delegates: “while the rats could eat in government up to that time.